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  5. Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics

American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy

ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)

Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics

  • Ethan Kaplan
  • Jörg L. Spenkuch
  • Haishan Yuan
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (Forthcoming)

Abstract

We exploit the timing of natural disasters to study the connection between attention to politics and legislators' support for special interests. When a disaster strikes, the media reduce their coverage of politics. At the same time, members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Taken together, the evidence implies that politicians are more inclined to take actions that benefit special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggests that attention to politics improves electoral accountability, even in an environment with stringent transparency requirements.

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