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  5. From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England

American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics

ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)

From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England

  • Camille Terrier
  • Parag A. Pathak
  • Kevin Ren
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (Forthcoming)

Abstract

Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems for student placement. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. We investigate the effects of the national ban of IA in England. Before the ban, 49 local authorities used DA and 16 used IA; all switched to DA afterwards. We find that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students. This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition.

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