

Properties of New Keynesian Model: Analytic Applications

AEA Continuing Education, 2022, DSGE Modeling

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Outline

- Fisherian vs anti-Fisherian Debate:
 - How do you get inflation down (or, up)?
 - Fisherian answer: cut the nominal rate of interest.
 - Anti-Fisherian answer: raise the interest rate.
- How do we think about these seemingly contradictory answers?
 - NK model gives us a way to think about this.
- Draw on Erceg and Levin, 2003 JME paper, “Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence”
- Forward Guidance Puzzle
- How does the Taylor Principle work to stabilize inflation in the equilibrium local to steady state?

Fisherian versus Anti Fisherian Policy

- *Fisherian effect*
 - Interest rate and inflation move in the same direction.
- *Anti-Fisherian effect*
 - Interest rate and inflation move in opposite direction.

Intuition

- Monetary policy rule (inflation target, $\bar{\pi}_t$):

$$r_t = \pi_t + \phi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t)$$

- Temporary cut in $\bar{\pi}_t$ (anti-Fisherian effect)
 - actual inflation, π_t , responds very little because price setters focus on long-run conditions
 - remember that inflation depends on current and future values of marginal cost
 - r_t rises and $r_t - \pi_{t+1}$ rises too.
 - output, inflation fall

$$\text{cov}(\pi_t, r_t) < 0$$

- Permanent cut in $\bar{\pi}_t$ (Fisherian effect)
 - π_t drops strongly
 - r_t falls
 - not much change in $r_t - \pi_{t+1}$ so little change in output.

Linearized Equilibrium Conditions

- Monetary policy rule:

$$r_t = \pi_t + \phi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t).$$

- Law of motion of inflation target, $\bar{\pi}_t$:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \delta \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t.$$

- Phillips curve and output gap:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t$$

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - [r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}].$$

Solving Linearized Equilibrium Conditions

- (Linearized) Equilibrium Conditions of Model:

$$r_t = \pi_t + \phi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t), \quad \bar{\pi}_t = \delta \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

- Undetermined coefficients method, a_1, a_2, a_3 :

$$\pi_t = a_1 \bar{\pi}_t, \quad x_t = a_2 \bar{\pi}_t, \quad r_t = a_3 \bar{\pi}_t$$

- Substitute the solution into the equations and require that they hold for all possible $\bar{\pi}_t$:

$$a_3 \bar{\pi}_t = a_1 \bar{\pi}_t + \phi (a_1 - 1) \bar{\pi}_t$$

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$$a_1 \bar{\pi}_t = \beta \delta a_1 \bar{\pi}_t + \kappa a_2 \bar{\pi}_t$$

$$a_2 \bar{\pi}_t = a_2 \delta \bar{\pi}_t - [a_3 - a_1 \delta] \bar{\pi}_t.$$

- Want to know: a_1, a_3 when $\delta = 0$ and $\delta = 1$.

Solving the Model: Getting the a 's

- Substitute the solution into the equations:

$$\begin{aligned}a_3 &= a_1 + \phi (a_1 - 1) \\a_1 &= \beta\delta a_1 + \kappa a_2 \\a_2 &= a_2\delta - [a_3 - a_1\delta].\end{aligned}$$

- Now start rearranging stuff

$$\begin{aligned}a_3 &= (1 + \phi) a_1 - \phi \\a_1 &= \frac{\kappa}{1 - \beta\delta} a_2 \\a_2 &= a_2\delta - (1 + \phi - \delta) a_1 + \phi\end{aligned}$$

- $\delta = 1$ result now obvious ($a_1 = a_3 = 1$); $\delta = 0$ easy.

Solving the Model: Getting the a 's

- Model:

$$r_t = \pi_t + \phi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t), \quad \bar{\pi}_t = \delta \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

$$\pi_t = \beta \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t$$

$$x_t = x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}].$$

- Undetermined coefficients, a_1, a_2, a_3 :

$$\pi_t = a_1 \bar{\pi}_t, \quad x_t = a_2 \bar{\pi}_t, \quad r_t = a_3 \bar{\pi}_t$$

- Solution ▶ derivation

$$a_1 = \frac{\phi}{\left[\frac{1-\beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 \right] (1-\delta) + \phi}, \quad a_3 = (1 + \phi) a_1 - \phi.$$

- Permanent case, $\delta = 1$: $a_1 = a_3 = 1$

- Temporary case, $\delta = 0$:

$$- a_1 = \frac{\phi}{\frac{1}{\kappa} + 1 + \phi} > 0, \quad a_3 = -\frac{\phi/\kappa}{\frac{1}{\kappa} + 1 + \phi} < 0.$$

It all depends on persistence

$$\pi_t = a_1 \bar{\pi}_t, \quad x_t = a_2 \bar{\pi}_t, \quad r_t = a_3 \bar{\pi}_t$$

- Fisherian result:
 - A permanent increase in $\bar{\pi}_t$, ($\delta = 1$) leads to a rise in π_t and a rise in r_t .
- Anti-Fisherian result:
 - A purely temporary increase in $\bar{\pi}_t$ leads to a rise in π_t and a fall in r_t .
- Impact of a rise in $\bar{\pi}_t$ on π_t and r_t (sign of a_3) depends on persistence of the rise and the other parameters of the model

Erceg and Levin Combine the two Effects to Explain Volcker Recession

- Volcker reduced the inflation target, $\bar{\pi}_t$, permanently.
- But, what matters is people's *beliefs*, and they were convinced the reduced target was only temporary.
 - The 1970s had witnessed numerous episodes in which the Fed reduced the target 'permanently', only to raise it again soon after.
- So, the public thought Volcker was 'business as usual' and interpreted the decline in the target as temporary.

The Volcker Recession

- Interest rates went way up and output, down.
- Forecasts of inflation remained stubbornly high.
- Eventually, everyone realized that $\bar{\pi}_t$ was down permanently.
 - Fisherian effects kicked in and both interest rates and inflation fell.
 - Output returned to potential.
- Bond markets **now** indicate that people believe that there hasn't been a persistent increase in $\bar{\pi}_t$, i.e. the Fed will bring inflation down.

Forward Guidance Puzzle

- When interest rates became very low after 2008, monetary policy authorities resorted to 'forward guidance':
 - Announcements that interest rates in the future will be low.
- Studying forward guidance in models, researchers stumbled on what came to be called the 'forward guidance puzzle':
 - Announcements about a cut in the interest rate in the distant future have a bigger impact than a current reduction in the interest rate.
- People felt this was implausible (though we have no empirical evidence on the issue) and so called it a puzzle.

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- People feel this property is implausible (though we have no empirical evidence on the issue) and so called it a *puzzle*.

Characterizing the Puzzle

- Phillips curve and output gap:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t &= \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t \\ x_t &= E_t x_{t+1} - [r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}].\end{aligned}$$

- Two scenarios, each followed by Taylor rule in $t + j + s$, $s \geq 0$.
 - j Period Forward guidance:
 - $r_{t+s} = 0$ for $s = 0, \dots, j - 1$, $r_{t+j} = \theta$.
 - Immediate policy:
 - $r_t = \theta$, $r_{t+s} = 0$, for $s = 1, 2, \dots, j$.

- Taylor rule:

$$r_t = \overbrace{\phi}^{\text{Taylor principle, } \phi > 1} \pi_t.$$

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- Taylor rule:

$$r_t = \overbrace{\phi}^{\text{Taylor principle, } \phi > 1} \pi_t.$$

- Result: impact on date t variables **greater** from forward guidance than from immediate policy.

One-period Forward Guidance ($j = 2$)

- Announcement at time t : $r_t = 0$, $r_{t+1} = \theta$, Taylor rule thereafter.
- Because (i) there are no shocks, (ii) the model is purely forward looking and (iii) Taylor rule with $\phi > 1$ in place after $t + 1$:

$$r_{t+s} = x_{t+s} = \pi_{t+s} = 0, s > 1.$$

- In period $t + 1$

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - [r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}].$$

$$r_{t+1} = \theta$$

$$x_{t+1} = x_{t+2} - [r_{t+1} - \pi_{t+2}] = 0 - [r_{t+1} - 0] = -r_{t+1}$$

$$\pi_{t+1} = \beta \pi_{t+2} + \kappa x_{t+1} = \kappa x_{t+1} = -\kappa r_{t+1}$$

- So, in $t + 1$:

$$r_{t+1} = \theta, x_{t+1} = -\theta, \pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta.$$

- What happens in period t ?

One-period Forward Guidance ($j = 2$)

- Effect: in the period $t + 1$, of $t + 1$ policy action announced in t :

$$r_{t+1} = \theta, x_{t+1} = -\theta, \pi_{t+1} = -\kappa\theta.$$

- In period t :

$$r_t = 0$$

$$x_t = x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}] = - \left(\underbrace{1}_{\text{direct effect}} + \underbrace{\kappa}_{\text{indirect effect}} \right) \cdot (r_{t+1})$$

$$\pi_t = \beta\pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t = -\beta\kappa \cdot (r_{t+1} = \theta) + \kappa x_t$$

so,

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= -\beta\kappa r_{t+1} + \kappa \cdot \overbrace{x_t}^{=-(1+\kappa)r_{t+1}} \\ \rightarrow \pi_t &= -[1 + \beta + \kappa]\kappa\theta, \quad x_t = -(1 + \kappa)\theta \end{aligned}$$

Immediate Policy

- Announcement at time t : $r_t = \theta \neq 0$, $r_{t+1} = 0$ and Taylor rule thereafter.
- Because the model is completely forward looking,

$$r_{t+s} = x_{t+s} = \pi_{t+s} = 0, s > 0.$$

- Then,

$$r_t = \theta$$

$$x_t = x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}] = 0 - [r_t - 0] = -r_t$$

$$\pi_t = \beta\pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t = \beta \times 0 + \kappa x_t$$

- So,

$$\rightarrow r_t = \theta, \quad x_t = -\theta, \quad \pi_t = -\kappa\theta.$$

which is smaller than with one-period forward guidance:

$$\pi_t = -[1 + \beta + \kappa]\kappa\theta, \quad x_t = -(1 + \kappa)\theta$$

Intuition

- Consider j Period Forward Guidance.
 - Announcement at time t : $r_{t+j} = \theta \neq 0$ and $r_{t+s} = 0$ for $s = 0, 1, \dots, j - 1$. Switch to Taylor rule after $t + j$.
- IS equation (recall, $r_t = \dots = r_{t+j-1} = 0$) :

$$\begin{aligned}x_{t+j} &= x_{t+j+1} - (r_{t+j} - \pi_{t+j+1}) = -r_{t+j} \\x_{t+j-1} &= x_{t+j} - (r_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j}) = - (r_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j}) - r_{t+j} \\&\vdots \\x_t &= - (r_t - \pi_{t+1}) - (r_{t+1} - \pi_{t+2}) \\&\quad - \dots - (r_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j}) - r_{t+j}\end{aligned}$$

Intuition, cnt'd

- IS equation (recall, $r_t = \dots = r_{t+j-1} = 0$) :

$$x_t = - (r_t - \pi_{t+1}) - (r_{t+1} - \pi_{t+2}) \\ - \dots - (r_{t+j-1} - \pi_{t+j}) - r_{t+j}$$

- Change in r_{t+j} has a *direct* effect on x_t and an *indirect* effect.
 - *Direct*: change in r_{t+j} moves x_{t+j} and (by consumption smoothing channel) that leads to an equal change in earlier output gaps, including x_t .
 - This channel holds fixed the real interest rates, $(r_{t+s} - \pi_{t+s+1})$, $s = 0, \dots, j-1$.
 - *Indirect*: change in r_{t+j} affects $(r_{t+s} - \pi_{t+s+1})$, $0 \leq s \leq j-1$ in each date between now and $t+j$ by reducing inflation in each date.
 - The impact on x_t of the indirect effect is the *cumulative sum* (increasing in j) of the changes in the real interest rate.

Forward Guidance: Conclusion

- Forward Guidance Puzzle is generally attributed to Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 'The Forward Guidance Puzzle', NYFed Staff Report No. 574, 2012, **revised manuscript** in 2017.
- Sparked a large literature to 'solve' the problem.
 - Gabaix, "A Behavioral New Keynesian Model", NBER WP 22954, June 2019.
 - Farhi and Werning, "Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality, and Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Paper No. 23281, 2017.
 - Angeletos, and Lian, "Forward guidance without common knowledge," American Economic Review, 2018.
 - Campbell, Ferroni, Fisher and Melosi, "The Limits of Forward Guidance, " JME, Vol 108, December 2019.
 - This offers what is perhaps the simplest resolution: in practice, announcements about policy actions far in the future have little impact on behavior because they are not credible.
 - In my presentation, I assumed 100% credibility.

How Does the Taylor Principle Work to Stabilize Inflation?

- Model

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - [r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^*]$$

$$r_t = \phi_\pi \pi_t, \quad \phi_\pi > 1$$

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t$$

$$\Delta a_t = \rho \Delta a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

$$r_t^* = E_t (a_{t+1} - a_t) = \rho \Delta a_t.$$

- Unique non-explosive solution:

$$\pi_t = \gamma_1 \Delta a_t, x_t = \gamma_2 \Delta a_t, r_t = \gamma_3 \Delta a_t$$

– γ_i 's ~ undetermined coefficients.

Solving the Model

- Model and solution

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - [r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^*]$$

$$r_t = \phi_\pi \pi_t, \quad \phi_\pi > 1$$

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t$$

$$\Delta a_t = \rho \Delta a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

$$r_t^* = E_t (a_{t+1} - a_t) = \rho \Delta a_t$$

- Solution is of form

$$\pi_t = \gamma_1 \Delta a_t, x_t = \gamma_2 \Delta a_t, r_t = \gamma_3 \Delta a_t$$

Solving the Model

- Substitute solution into model:

$$\gamma_2 = \rho\gamma_2 - \gamma_3 + \rho\gamma_1 + \rho$$

$$\gamma_3 = \phi\pi\gamma_1$$

$$\gamma_1 = \beta\gamma_1\rho + \kappa\gamma_2$$

- Real rate: $\tilde{r}_t = r_t - E_t\pi_{t+1} = \gamma_4\Delta a_t,$

$$\gamma_4 = \gamma_3 - \gamma_1\rho.$$

Solving the Model

- Each to verify:

$$r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} = \overbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_4} \Delta a_t, x_t = \frac{\overbrace{(1 - \beta\rho)}^{=\gamma_2}}{\kappa(\phi_\pi - \rho)} \psi \Delta a_t, \pi_t = \frac{\overbrace{\psi}^{=\gamma_1}}{\phi_\pi - \rho} \Delta a_t$$

where

$$\psi \equiv \frac{\rho}{\frac{(1 - \beta\rho)(1 - \rho)}{\kappa(\phi_\pi - \rho)} + 1}.$$

- For ϕ_π sufficiently large,

$$\psi \simeq \rho, r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} \simeq r_t^*, \pi_t \simeq 0, x_t \simeq 0.$$

Solving the Model

- Big value of ϕ_π stabilizes equilibrium around first best.
 - However, requires very large value of ϕ_π .
 - For practical values, Taylor rule too weak, $\psi < \rho$ and $\gamma_2 > 0$.
- Taylor principle:
 - real rate of interest increases when π_t high ($\psi > 0$ and $\phi > \rho$).
 - effects bigger with bigger ϕ_π .

Solving the Model

- The equations:

$$\begin{aligned}r_t &= \pi_t + \phi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t) \\ \pi_t &= \beta \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t \\ x_t &= x_{t+1} - [r_t - \pi_{t+1}].\end{aligned}$$

- Substitute the solution in here:

$$\begin{aligned}a_3 &= a_1 + \phi (a_1 - 1) \\ a_1 &= \beta \delta a_1 + \kappa a_2 \\ a_2 &= a_2 \delta - [a_3 - a_1 \delta].\end{aligned}$$

- Rearranging:

$$\begin{aligned}a_3 &= (1 + \phi) a_1 - \phi \\ a_1 &= \frac{\kappa}{1 - \beta \delta} a_2 \\ a_2 &= a_2 \delta - [a_3 - a_1 \delta] = a_2 \delta - (1 + \phi - \delta) a_1 + \phi \\ \rightarrow a_2 &= -\frac{1 + \phi - \delta}{1 - \delta} a_1 + \frac{\phi}{1 - \delta}\end{aligned}$$

Solving the Model

- Working on the second equation,

$$a_1 \frac{1 - \beta\delta}{\kappa} = -\frac{(1 + \phi - \delta)}{1 - \delta} a_1 + \frac{\phi}{1 - \delta}$$

then,

$$a_1 = \frac{\frac{\phi}{1 - \delta}}{\frac{1 - \beta\delta}{\kappa} + \frac{1 + \phi - \delta}{1 - \delta}} = \frac{\frac{\phi}{1 - \delta}}{\frac{1 - \beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 + \frac{\phi}{1 - \delta}} = \frac{\phi}{\left[\frac{1 - \beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 \right] (1 - \delta) + \phi}$$

- Then,

$$a_3 = \frac{(1 + \phi) \phi}{\left[\frac{1 - \beta\delta}{\kappa} + 1 \right] (1 - \delta) + \phi} - \phi$$

- So, when $\delta = 1$: $a_1 = a_3 = 1$. When $\delta = 0$, get formulas for a_1, a_3 in main presentation. [▶ Go Back](#)