
## **Adverse Selection in Deposit Insurance** Following the 2023 Banking Crises



PRESENTER: **David Huberdeau-Reid** 

## **BACKGROUND**:

This paper analyzes whether U.S. banks that were riskier and more vulnerable to uninsured deposit runs at the end of 2022 responded by employing various institutional schemes to expand their insured deposits.

Such behavior would indicate adverse selection in the expansion of FDIC insurance that would reduce depositor discipline and exacerbate bank moral hazard incentives.

### **METHODS:**


- 1. Sample of 4,500 U.S. Banks (FFIEC Call Reports)
- 2. Riskiness measured based on estimate of uninsured depositor risk
  - (Likelihood of Insolvency \* UD Loss Given Default)


### **RESULTS:**

Compared to safer banks that were less subject to runs, riskier small and midsized banks were likely to gain insured deposits via reciprocal deposits, sweep deposits and to a lesser extent brokered deposits.

Risky midsized/regional banks, which were at the epicenter of the banking crisis were especially likely to expand their deposit insurance coverage via reciprocal and sweep deposits.

That riskier banks chose to exploit primarily reciprocal and sweep deposits is consistent with recent regulatory policy that reclassifies them as core deposits rather than brokered deposits. By removing restrictions and reducing the possibility of higher FDIC assessment rates, reciprocal and sweep deposits appear to now be subject to greater adverse selection.






 $D_{b,2022Q4}$ 

BS BS

BSF BS



# **RISKY BANKS** were more likely to gain insured deposit coverage via institutional mechanisms




## $\frac{R_{b,t} - R_{b,2022Q4}}{M} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 I R_{b,2022Q4} + \alpha_3 I L_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_1 B S R_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_2 B S R_{b,2022Q4} \times I R_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_2 B S R_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_2 B S R_{b,2022Q4} \times I R_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_2 B S R_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_2 B S R_{b,2022Q4} \times I R_{b,2022Q4} \times I R_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_2 B S R_{b,2022Q4} \times I R_{b,202Q4} \times I$

 $\beta_3 BSR_{b,2022Q4} \times IL_{b,2022Q4} + \beta_4 X_{b,2022Q4} + \varepsilon_{b,t}$ 

	Uninsured Deposits (UD)						
	Q1 2023	Q2 2023	Q3 2023	Q4 2023			
BSR	-0.105***	-0.157***	.157*** -0.144***				
SR*IR	-0.177***	-0.177***	-0.202***	-0.142***			
SR*IL	-0.009	-0.035	-0.006	-0.003			
		Reciprocal Dep	osits				
	O1 2023	O2 2023	O3 2023	04 2023			


	Reciprocal Deposits									
	Q1 2	Q1 2023		Q2 2023		Q3 2023		Q4 2023		
	IM	EM	IM	EM	IM	EM	IM	EM		
BSR	0.061***	0.152***	0.113***	0.153***	0.120***	0.163***	0.116***	0.170***		
SR*IR	0.039*	0.115***	0.072**	0.085**	0.078***	0.116***	0.095***	0.120***		
SR*IL	0.035		0.001		-0.000		-0.015			



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## David A. Huberdeau-Reid

