

Cyclicity and Asymmetry of the User Cost of Labor: Evidence and Theory

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[Link to the paper](#)

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Motivation

- ✓ Observed earnings \neq price of labor, in the presence of a long-term contract.
- ✓ User cost of labor (UCL) measures the "allocative" wage, but faces empirical challenges.

Summary of the paper

- ✓ Address the empirical challenges of the UCL by exploiting Japanese wage data.
 - Challenge 1: Limited sample size---use large-scale Japanese wage survey.
 - Challenge 2: Upgrading of job-match quality through job changes---focus on new school graduates.
- ✓ The estimated UCL is highly cyclical after correcting the cyclical upgrading, while it is downwardly rigid.
- ✓ Propose a directed search model with adverse selection to account for the empirical findings.

Concept

- ✓ UCL: labor as a long-term asset


$$UCL_t = PDV_t - E_t[\beta(1-s)PDV_{t+1}]$$

where $PDV_t = E_t[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j (1-s)^j w_{t,t+j}]$

$w_{t,t+j}$: wage at $t+j$ of those hired at t ; s : separation rate.

- ✓ UCL = new-hire wage + cohort wage differences.

$$UCL_t = w_t^{new} + E_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j (1-s)^j (w_{t,t+j} - w_{t+1,t+j}) \right]$$




Data

- ✓ Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) of Japan
 - Nationwide representative survey.
 - Earnings and hours worked available for each year of service; and
 - firm-worker characteristics.
 - Construct the UCL for 18 categories (gender \times education \times firm size)
 - Worker's age is also available.
 - Identify new graduates from school (e.g., 18 years old with high school degree)

Empirical result

- ✓ Cyclicity of the UCL

- The UCL is highly procyclical after correcting the cyclical changes in job-match quality ("new school graduates").
- The new-hire wage is no longer more cyclical than the average wage after the correction.




Notes: Semi-elasticity with respect to 1 s.d. of the unemployment rate (sign flipped). Both wage measures and the unemployment rate are HP-filtered. Sample: 1981-2010.

Empirical result (cont.)


- ✓ History dependence of incumbent-worker wage

- The UCL is more procyclical than the new-hire wage due to sizable and persistent cohort wage differences.



- ✓ Asymmetry of the UCL

- The UCL is not responsive in recessions.



Model

- ✓ Setting

- Directed search + wage contract (Rudanko 2009)
- Skilled/unskilled workers, high/low prod. firms.
- H firms can operate only if matched with S workers, but screening is imperfect (adverse selection).

- ✓ Wage as a screening tool

- H firms maintain high wages to keep their submarket "too competitive" for unskilled workers.
- H firms can still attract S workers, who face a higher job-finding probability than N workers.
- Single wage policy attains a separation equilibrium.

- ✓ Model simulation

- The UCL tracks underlying productivity in booms, but does not in recessions.

