

Centralized Admission Systems and School Segregation: Evidence from a National Reform

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Motivation

- Centralized admission systems are being adopted to coordinate student assignment
- In practice, also used as policy tools to promote diversity, giving priority to low-SES students
 - E.g. New York and Boston
- However, more efficient and welfare-enhancing theoretical allocation might not necessarily lead to less segregated schools
 - Residential segregation and heterogeneity in outside option: Calsamiglia et al 2020, Baum-Snow et al 2011
- This paper:** Studies Chile's large-scale adoption of a centralized allocation system and its effects on school segregation
 - DA mechanism
 - Replaced country's decentralized system
- Exploits sequential introduction of the reform across regions using a Difference-in-Difference strategy
- Preview of results:** No impact on average school segregation, but important heterogeneity across school districts.
 - Increased segregation in areas with high levels of residential segregation
 - Higher provision and differential access to private education associated with increased segregation

Background

- Since 1980s, three types of school in Chile: public, voucher schools and private schools,
- Decentralized school admission system; highly selective
- High socioeconomic stratification in the educational system
 - Overwhelming majority of low SES students in public schools
- In 2015 the government passed the law (*Ley de Inclusión Escolar*)
 - Major component: centralized school admission system (SAS)

Centralized Schooling Admission System

- Centralized Schooling Admission System (SAS) for public and voucher schools through a web application platform.
 - Admissions to private schools continues to be decentralized.
- Deferred Acceptance algorithm with multiple tie breaking
 - Priorities:
 - sibling enrolled in the school
 - priority students, (up to the min of 15%)
 - children of school officials
 - former students (except expelled)
- Reform was gradually introduced at the regional level, between 2016-2019

Figure 1. Spatial distribution of school types in the Metropolitana (Santiago) and Coquimbo regions



A. Metropolitana

B. Coquimbo

Empirical Strategy

- Incremental implementation and geographic variation: Diff-in-Diff design

$$y_{crt} = \delta_0 \times D_{rt} + Z_{1crt}\beta + \gamma_r + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{crt} \quad (1)$$

y_{crt} is Duncan index, D_{rt} is treatment variable and Z_{1crt} are pre-SAS measures of local schooling. γ_r captures time invariant region specific differences, and λ_t captures aggregate differences in segregation over time

- The policy parameter of interest is δ_0 .
- Assumptions:
 - Adoption date of the policy random to existing levels of school segregation
 - No responses in anticipation of the treatment
- Also heterogeneous effects

Data

- Enrollment, SIMCE and school data
- School segregation (Duncan Index) at school district level
 - Low SES: mothers without a HS degree
 - As of 2019, Duncan [0.3, 0.5] in Chile.
- Residential segregation: commuting time to amenities using complete road network of Chile
 - Captures variation in access to amenities within a municipality.
- Outside option: local provision differential access to private education
 - Private schools are a substitute for voucher and public schools and impacts participation in DA.

Final sample: Panel of 327 school districts (municipalities) over five years

Main Results


- Overall no statistically significant impact
- Heterogeneous effects?

VARIABLES	Duncan index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × Residential Segregation	0.008*		
	[0.004]		
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × % of public pre-SAS		-0.601***	
		[0.253]	
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × % of voucher pre-SAS		-0.656***	
		[0.274]	
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × Travel time to private (sd)			0.034*
			[0.018]
Observations	1,623	1,623	1,623
R-squared	0.598	0.501	0.534
Region FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Residential Segregation

Figure 2. Spatial density plots of low and high SES students in the Biobío region



A. Low income families

B. High income families

Potential Mechanism

Potential mechanism: high SES migrating from public and voucher to private schools

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: % of switchers
SAS dummy (D_{rt})	0.004** [0.002]
Educ mother >= 12	0.010*** [0.003]
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × [Educ mother >= 12]	-0.004 [0.004]
Private dummy (pre-SAS)	-0.009** [0.004]
Private dummy (pre-SAS) × [Mother educ. >= 12]	0.015** [0.006]
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × Private dummy (pre-SAS)	-0.041* [0.025]
SAS dummy (D_{rt}) × Private dummy (pre-SAS) × [Educ mother >= 12]	0.068* [0.038]
Constant	-0.004** [0.002]
Observations	1,712
R-squared	0.179
Region FE	✓
Year FE	✓

Threats to Identification & Robustness Tests

Threats to identification

- Parallel trends: leads and lags test, visual pre-trends, region-specific trend variables, random assignment into treatment
- Rule out strategic responses/migration by parents in anticipation of the policy.
- No correlation between the policy adoption date and the existing levels of school segregation in a region

Robustness tests

- Duncan Index: alternative proxies for student SES
- Only urban municipalities
- Provinces as school districts
- Alternative segregation measure