

# Trade Credit and Markups

Alvaro Garcia-Marin\* Santiago Justel\*\* Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr\*\*\*

\* Universidad de los Andes, \*\* The World Bank, \*\*\* Federal Reserve Board

## Overview

Document with U.S. Compustat and Chilean micro data that:

- Trade credit use increases in markups
- Markup effect stronger when borrowing costs higher

Rationalize findings in model with

- Positive markups
- Costly financial intermediation (borrowing rate exceeds deposits rate)

⇒ Financing cost advantage of trade credit.

## Introduction

Trade credit is the most important form of short-term finance for firms. In 2019, U.S. non-financial firms had \$4.5 trillion in trade credit outstanding, equaling 21 percent of U.S. GDP.

## Intuition for main mechanism

**Trade Credit:** Seller borrows production cost  $C$ :

$$FC^{TC} = r_b \frac{C}{\text{Production Cost}} \quad (1)$$

**Cash in Advance:** Buyer borrows revenue  $R = \mu C$ ; seller deposits surplus liquidity  $R - C = (\mu - 1)C$ :

$$FC^{CIA} = r_b \frac{\mu C}{\text{Revenues}} - r_d \frac{(\mu - 1)C}{\text{Bank Deposit}} \quad (2)$$

**Difference in financing costs:**

$$\Delta FC = FC^{CIA} - FC^{TC} = (\mu - 1)(r_b - r_d)C \quad (3)$$

⇒ If there is a positive markup and the borrowing rate is above the deposit rate, cash in advance has higher financing costs than trade credit.

## Proposition 1: Payment Choice: Domestic Case

Suppose the borrowing rate is above the deposit rate,  $r_b > r_d$ , and firms charge a positive markup over effective costs ( $\mu > 1 + r_b$ ). Then, firms should always use trade credit.

## Proposition 3: Trade Credit and Markups

Suppose  $(1 + r_b^*) \tilde{\lambda}^* > (1 + r_d) \tilde{\lambda}$ , where  $(\tilde{\lambda}, \tilde{\lambda}^*)$  are functions of domestic and foreign contract enforcement. Then:


- The use of trade credit increases with the markup  $\mu$ .
- This effect increases with  $r_b^*$  and  $\lambda^*$  and decreases with  $r_d$  and  $\lambda$ .

## Data

- **United States:** Compustat, 1965-2016.
- **Chile:** (i) Customs-level data, containing payment mode information; (ii) Production-level data at the firm-product level from ENIA, 2003-2007.
- **Chilean data key for identification:** It allows instrumenting markups with physical productivity (TFPQ), and controlling for exhaustive set of fixed effects, including firm-year fixed effects.
- **Markups estimation:** Follow production-based approach by De Loecker et al (2016), and De Loecker, Eeckout and Unger (2020).

## Graphical Evidence

Figure 1: Trade Credit Share Increases with Markups: U.S. Evidence



## Empirical Specification

### First Stage

$$\ln(\mu_{ipt}) = \gamma_1 \ln(TFPQ_{ipt}) + \gamma_2 \ln(L_{it}) + \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \alpha_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ipt} \quad (4)$$

### Second Stage

$$\rho_{ijpt} = \beta_1 \widehat{\ln \mu_{ipt}} + \beta_2 \ln(L_{it}) + \delta_i + \delta_p + \delta_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijpt}, \quad (5)$$

## Results

Table 1: Baseline Results

| Specification:          | OLS (1)             | Reduced Form (2)    | First Stage (3)     | Second Stage (4)    |
|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Dependent Variable:     | TC Share            | TC Share            | ln(markup)          | TC Share            |
| ln(Markup)              | .0204***<br>(.0047) | —                   | —                   | .1050***<br>(.0291) |
| ln(TFPQ)                | —                   | .0054***<br>(.0015) | .0519***<br>(.0038) | —                   |
| First Stage F-Statistic | —                   | —                   | 232.2               | —                   |
| Firm FE                 | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| HSS FE                  | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| Country-Year FE         | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| Observations            | 93,556              | 90,727              | 90,727              | 90,727              |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | .368                | .371                | .692                | .368                |

Table 2: Interaction Terms

| Specification            | OLS (1)           | OLS (2)           | OLS (3)          | OLS (4)          | 2SLS (5)          | 2SLS (6)          | 2SLS (7)          | 2SLS (8)          |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| ln(markup)               | -.0215<br>(.0311) | -.0298<br>(.0318) | —                | —                | .539**<br>(.222)  | .459**<br>(.226)  | —                 | —                 |
| ln(markup) × $r_d$       | -.533<br>(2.510)  | -.485<br>(2.512)  | —                | —                | -2.130<br>(17.34) | -1.551<br>(17.64) | —                 | —                 |
| ln(markup) × $r_b^*$     | .293**<br>(.121)  | .328***<br>(.126) | .308**<br>(.135) | .315*<br>(.141)  | .953*<br>(.545)   | 1.232**<br>(.562) | 1.136**<br>(.569) | 1.363**<br>(.587) |
| ln(markup) × Rule of Law | —                 | .0212<br>(.0151)  | —                | .0212<br>(.0164) | —                 | .239*<br>(.137)   | —                 | .209<br>(.147)    |
| First Stage F-Statistic  | —                 | —                 | —                | —                | 21.1              | 16.5              | 51.7              | 26.9              |
| Firm-Year FE             | ✓                 | ✓                 | —                | —                | ✓                 | ✓                 | —                 | —                 |
| HSS FE                   | ✓                 | ✓                 | —                | —                | ✓                 | ✓                 | —                 | —                 |
| Country-Year FE          | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                | ✓                | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                 | ✓                 |
| Firm-HSS-Year FE         | —                 | —                 | ✓                | ✓                | —                 | —                 | ✓                 | ✓                 |
| Observations             | 93,556            | 93,556            | 93,556           | 93,556           | 90,727            | 90,727            | 90,727            | 90,727            |
| R <sup>2</sup>           | .420              | .420              | .437             | .437             | .409              | .402              | .435              | .430              |

## Conclusions

- Strong link between trade credit provision and markups
- Trade credit allows firms to save on financial intermediation
- International trade data useful to shed light on trade credit trade-offs (because enforcement is harder across borders)

## Contact Information

Alvaro Garcia-Marin. E-mail: [agarciam@uandes.cl](mailto:agarciam@uandes.cl)