

Collateral Eligibility of Corporate Debt in the Eurosystem

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Motivation

- ▶ Central banks have three main monetary instruments:
 - ▶ open market operations,
 - ▶ the minimum reserve system,
 - ▶ standing facilities.
- ▶ The ECB and national central banks use these tools to affect money market rates and to provide funding liquidity to the banking sector.
- ▶ The cornerstone of this liquidity provision and an important part of the marginal lending facility is the **collateral framework** of the open market operations (REPO) and standing facilities.
- ▶ The ECB is one of the few central banks that has always accepted **corporate bonds** as collateral (even for OMO-REPO), since its inception.

Motivation

- ▶ **Collateral pledgeability** helps the ECB to fulfill multiple policy objectives:
 - ▶ Control short-term interest rates, and provide overnight funding to banks,
 - ▶ Enlarge the pool of eligible assets to reduce the scarcity effect of government bonds, which instead can be used for more profitable transactions (e.g., repo),
 - ▶ Influence the secondary and primary markets for corporate bonds, affecting Security Lending, secondary bond market yields/liquidity and the financial decisions of bond-issuing firms,
 - ▶ Improve market functioning and completeness (there is not a liquid REPO market for corporate bonds in the Eurozone).

What we do

- ▶ We focus on the **Eurosystem's Collateral Framework**
 - ▶ Using the pledgeable asset list (eligibility list) to identify the inclusion date of
 - ▶ individual assets,
 - ▶ first ever inclusion date of bond-issuing non-financial firms.
 - ▶ we measure the **direct** and **capital structure effects** of the Eurosystem's collateral policy.
- ▶ We consider the collateral channel of monetary policy at the level of **eligible bonds** and **bond issuing firms**.

Results preview

- ▶ Following an **asset**'s inclusion in the eligibility list, we find that:
 - ▶ activity in the securities lending (SL) market increases, relaxing the constraint of limited collateral supply for the ECB OMO-REPO activity.
 - ▶ Eligible bonds trade at lower yields due to the fungibility feature of pledgeability (quasi-money)
 - ▶ Liquidity of Newly issued bonds declines, whereas the liquidity of older bonds does not change, or even improves.
- ▶ Following the first-time eligibility list inclusion, **bond-issuing firms**
 - ▶ Reduce bank debt and expand corporate bond issuance activity,
 - ▶ Increase the overall size of debt (not only bank to bond substitution), and issue bonds with longer maturity.

Literature contribution

- ▶ Studies on collateral frameworks:
 - ▶ Eberl and Weber (2014), Nyborg (2016,2017), Bindseil et al. (2017), Van Bakkum et al. (2018), Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2016).
- ▶ **Studies on eligibility premium**
 - ▶ Bindseil et al.(2009) find a small eligibility premium in the Eurozone preceding the financial crisis,
 - ▶ Chen et al. (2019) quantify the value of pledgeability in the Chinese corporate bond repo market.
- ▶ Methodologically similar papers on the CSPP of the ECB:
 - ▶ Announcement: Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018), Grosse-Rueschkamp et al. (2019), Todorov (2019)
 - ▶ Purchases: Arce and Mayordomo (2017), Galema and Lugo (2017).
- ▶ Capital and debt structure literature:
 - ▶ Debt structure: Rauh and Sufi (2010), Becker and Ivashina (2014),
 - ▶ Access to credit market: Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Saretto and Tookes (2013), Subrahmanyam et al.(2014, 2016).

The data

- ▶ The ECB's list of eligible assets
 - ▶ Monthly list: 2007-2009 from Eberl and Weber (2014)
 - ▶ Daily lists: Apr 2010-June 2016 from the ECB's website
 - ▶ the list of eligible assets per day is about 25,000 securities.
 - ▶ About **6% of the list consists of corporate bonds**, an average of 1450 individual securities on a given day.
- ▶ Bond level data
 - ▶ Bond characteristics, daily price, yield, and liquidity information from Bloomberg
 - ▶ Securities lending data from IHS Markit
- ▶ Firm level data
 - ▶ Balance sheet information from Compustat
 - ▶ Debt structure information from Capital IQ
 - ▶ Bond/Public debt: commercial paper, senior and subordinated notes and bonds
 - ▶ Bank debt: drawn credit lines and term loans

Identification strategy and methodology


- ▶ The identification comes from the **eligibility assessment framework**:
 - ▶ the ECB never confirms eligibility prior to an asset's issuance,
 - ▶ The ECB might not include otherwise suitable assets in the list due to risk management and operational reasons, or any other discretionary measure.
 - ▶ Therefore the eligibility list inclusion is **not mechanical** and **predictable** even for compliant bonds/issuers.

- ▶ Methodology: two-way fixed effects diff-in-diff model

$$\text{Firm/bond_proxy}_{f,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 EA_{bt} \times Post_t + \beta_2 EA_{bt} + \beta_3 Post_t + B_{bt} + \Phi_f + \Gamma_t + \epsilon_{bt}$$

- ▶ Bond proxies are SL activity, yield and liquidity, while we study debt structure, size of total debt, and debt maturity at the firm level.
- ▶ EA_f is a time-invariant indicator for treated firms, $Post_t$ is an indicator for post-treatment periods $X_{,t}$ are controls, and Φ_f and Γ_t are firm and time fixed effects.

The collateral channel of monetary policy



Securities lending market activity

New bonds	Supply	Demand	Utilisation	LendingFee
EA*Post	0.393*** [0.035]	0.841*** [0.232]	3.489*** [0.841]	-0.254*** [0.049]
Post	-0.029 [0.021]	-0.312 [0.197]	-1.192* [0.624]	0.095** [0.040]
EA	-	-	-	
Observations	21,210	15,990	21,210	15,873
R-squared	0.921	0.676	0.767	0.471
Bond Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bond FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Bond Clusters	735	673	735	671

- ▶ The SL market allows market participants to borrow collateral eligible assets, thereby relaxing the constraint of limited collateral supply.
- ▶ Eligibility increases supply, demand, and utilisation, while borrowing costs drop. SL activity is concentrated in the new bond segment.

Secondary market yield effects of eligibility

Yield spread	Overall sample	On-the-run bonds	Old bonds
EA*Post	-0.110*** [0.017]	-0.070** [0.032]	-0.165*** [0.038]
Post	0.066*** [0.006]	0.041 [0.030]	0.062*** [0.006]
EA TTM/tenor	- 3.111*** [1.025]	-	-
Observations	113,813	21,210	92,601
R-squared	0.750	0.984	0.716
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bond Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bond FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
#Bond Clusters	819	735	146


- ▶ In the 30 days following the eligibility list inclusion of a bond, its yield drops by 7-16 basis points, but this effect is larger in seasoned bonds.
- ▶ The yield drop is an eligibility premium, compensating for the fungibility/liquidity service of eligible bonds.

Secondary market liquidity effects of eligibility

	Bid-ask spread		% of zero returns	
	On-the-run	Old bonds	On-the-run	Old bonds
EA*Post	0.149** [0.061]	0.038 [0.043]	4.571*** [0.551]	-0.188 [0.161]
Post	-0.088 [0.060]	0.011*** [0.004]	-1.574*** [0.468]	-0.002 [0.011]
EA	-	-	-	-
Observations	20,934	92,002	21,210	92,601
R-squared	0.860	0.752	0.843	0.517
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bond Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bond FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# Bond Clusters	729	145	735	146


- ▶ Two liquidity measures: bid-ask spread and % zero returns.
- ▶ Eligibility and the subsequent demand pressure can trigger either an increase in liquidity (spotlight effect) or a decrease (hoarding effect).
- ▶ We find an asymmetric liquidity reaction for both liq. measures: on-the-run bonds are subject to hoarding, whereas the liquidity of older bonds does not change, or even improves.

The collateral channel of monetary policy




Capital structure effects of collateral policy

- ▶ A unique feature of the eligibility list is that we see the first ever inclusion date of an issuer.
- ▶ So we can study the **effect** of eligibility on the firm's capital and debt structure.



- ▶ We study the debt structure, size of total debt, and bond maturity of treated firms pre- and post eligibility list inclusion.
- ▶ We control for the eligibility list inclusion predictability by including the probability of inclusion estimated from issuer-level logistic regressions.

Capital structure effects of collateral policy: Public debt share of bond issuing firms



Capital structure effects of collateral policy

▶ **Debt structure**

- ▶ Firms restructure their debt following their inclusion in the eligibility list: they decrease bank debt and increase public debt.

▶ **Total debt**

- ▶ In the 4 quarters following the eligibility event, firm increase their total debt by about 5%.
- ▶ Eligibility improves the capital market access of firms, which tilt their debt structure toward the cheaper funding option, corporate bond issuance.

▶ **Debt maturity**

- ▶ The maturity of public (bond) debt increases by up to 1.5 years, following the eligibility list inclusion.

Policy implications

- ▶ Corporate bond pledgeability and its externalities have **policy implications**:
 - ▶ The collateral framework is an efficient crisis management tool: expand/contract the size of the eligible asset list or the specific set of asset classes depending on the business cycle.
 - ▶ Expanding the pledgeable asset classes is more flexible than the standard practice of OMOs, as it can even address liquidity issues in the repo market during QE.
- ▶ The **unintended consequences** of eligibility criteria are:
 - ▶ Positive externality of improved market functioning and completeness, mostly due to the SL market for corporate bonds.
 - ▶ Capital market development, whereby the European corporate bond market doubled in size by 2018, reaching about 10% of EU GDP.

Summary

- ▶ Our paper is the *first* to examine the plethora of implications the **collateral channel of monetary policy** has on the primary and secondary markets for Eurozone corporate debt
- ▶ We find that increased demand for pledgeable collateral,
 - ▶ Increases trading activity in the SL market, that relaxes the constraint of limited collateral supply.
 - ▶ Gives rise to an eligibility premium (yields)
 - ▶ Generates an asymmetric liquidity response along the maturity spectrum of corporate bonds
- ▶ We observe that eligible firms
 - ▶ Reduce bank debt and expand corporate bond issuance activity,
 - ▶ Increasing the overall size and maturity of their total debt.

Thank you for your attention!

