The Political Economy of Hegemonic Masculinity: Class, Race, and Work

Abstract: This paper considers how the macro cultural dynamics of hegemonic masculinity complicate microeconomic negotiations within households. I begin by drawing connections among established microeconomic phenomena that scholars have attributed to a defense of masculinity or 'gender deviance neutralization'. I then consider how hegemonic masculinities held by upper-income White men differ from or have influenced the masculine behavior and narratives of other groups of men. Specifically, I make use of PSID data to understand how men of different race and income groups respond to earning less than their female partners: an economic 'threats' to masculinity. Preliminary results indicate that upper-income White men have a stronger aversion to the situation in which a woman out-earns her male partner relative to lower-income White men and upper- and middle-income Black men. Using these findings, I discuss how this helps us understand the 'hegemonic' nature of hegemonic masculinity.

I. Introduction

Very few economists have directly considered the importance of masculinity in tying together many of these works. The opportunity to do so is ripe as several important connections exist. For instance, several economists have written on the "male backlash" theory in studies of intimate partner violence (Caridad Bueno & Henderson, 2017; Bhattacharya, 2015; Finnoff, 2012; Atkinson, Greenstein, & Lang, 2005). The male backlash theory postulates that when women begin to out-earn or otherwise out-perform their male partners, those male partners often respond with violence to reassert their dominant status in the home. In these scenarios, one could postulate that men are responding to threats to their masculine identity through violence. Other studies on intrahousehold dynamics have found that there is a general aversion to the situation in which a wife out-earns her husband, as illustrated in marriage markets, divorce and marital happiness, and allocations of housework (Bertand, Kamenica, & Pan, 2015). Again, in this case we see men's role as breadwinner being threatened, which impacts their self-identity. Others have similarly found that men who do "women's work" in the labor market spend more time on male-typed housework relative to men in gender-balanced occupations (Schneider, 2012). In this study, the importance of performing manhood becomes even more clear. Based on this literature, it seems that the role of gender identity, namely masculinity, is often influenced by dynamics involving work and income. Each seems to highlight the importance of working in 'manly' activities or breadwinning as pivotal in men's self-image, and then in turn, in their behavior and work allocation in the home.

Studies focusing on relationships outside the home follow similar trends. Perhaps most famously, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) use their model to demonstrate how a man responds to a threat to his masculine identity upon the inclusion of a woman in his workplace domain. This model only assumes a man will feel threated by the inclusion of women in his workplace, but many studies have backed this assumption. For instance, McLaughlin, Uggen, and Blackstone (2012) find women supervisors are more likely to experience sexual harassment and theorize that men see sexual harassment as an equalizer against women in power. Even men in women-dominated occupations often overcompensate for some kind of loss in masculine identity they incur by working in such fields. Cross and Baglihole (2002) and Simpson (2004) use in-depth interviews to document the experiences of men in women-dominated occupations. They find that

men often distance themselves from women colleagues or from the feminine aspects of their jobs: librarians who are men called themselves 'information scientists,' men working as flight attendants emphasized safety over service.

Considering these studies on the whole, it starts to become clear that masculine identities are deeply embedded in notions of work and that many of the previously listed economic phenomena might be attributed to men's efforts to preserve masculinity. As Folbre (1994) writes, "Bargaining takes place on the cultural as well as on the micro economic level…macro economic or macro cultural dynamics complicate microeconomic negotiations." This paper considers how the macro cultural dynamics of hegemonic masculinity influence microeconomic negotiations within households. I expand on the macro cultural dynamics of masculinity by providing a brief overview of how it has been economically and historically constructed in the United States. I specifically consider how White masculinities were formed differently than and influenced notions of Black masculinities, and how upper-class masculinities were formed differently than and influenced notions of working-class masculinities[1].

After examining this historical evolution, I examine whether the behaviors and tensions described in Bertrand, Kamenica & Pan (2015) exist or play out differently upper-income groups as opposed to lower income groups, and in Black masculinities as opposed to White. Specifically, I consider their finding that within a given couple, when the wife earns more than the husband, the gap in time spent on housework is higher relative to couples in which the wife makes the same or less than their husband. I reexamine this finding in light of different classed and racialized dynamics of hegemonic masculinity. Preliminary results indicate that upper-income White men might have a stronger aversion to the situation in which a woman out-earns her male partner relative to lower-income White men and upper- and middle-income Black men. Lower-income Black men also seem to have a relatively strong aversion to the situation in which a woman out-earns her male partner, especially when compared to middle- and upper-income couples with Black men. This paper's contribution is to establish that men of different race and class groups are differently impacted by hegemonic masculinity, and thus respond differently to economic 'threats' to their masculinity.

In future work, I hope to examine other economic 'threats' to masculinity along similar class and race dimensions, a question to which I return in the final section of this paper. Overall, this is an effort to understand how hegemonic masculinity operates along class and race dimensions, especially in response to shifting notions of work and income within families.

II. What is Hegemonic Masculinity?

Masculinity, in many ways, is a difficult concept to define: it means different things to different people based on class, race, geography, etc. Some scholars describe it relationally: masculinity as behavior that is simply "not feminine" (Cohen, 2010;). This definition, of course,

[1]While focusing on White and upper-class masculinities may seem to place too much emphasis on those already often centered in discussion, this is an act of 'studying up'. Studying up refers to studying the institutions and power structures that oppress people rather than 'studying down' and placing blame or passivity on the subaltern. Sprague (2016, p. 15) puts it best, writing that "without a parallel concentration of research focusing on the problematic character of elites and the social institutions bolstering their privilege, the focus on what is wrong with disadvantaged people creates a picture in which those on the downside of hierarchies have, and thus by implication are, problems." Studying up, in this context, means focusing on the hegemonic group when discussing the influence of hegemonic masculinity.

requires an understanding of what is feminine. In a similar vein, Schneider (2012) and others (Simister, 2013; Sullivan, 2011; Bittman, et al.,2003) use the notion of 'gender deviance neutralization' to refer to the phenomenon that when men and women diverge from normative expectations about gender in one realm, they seek to compensate for that deviance in other spheres of action. Many argue that performing housework affirms women's identity as feminine and avoiding housework affirms men's identity as masculine (Bittman, et al., 2003; Gupta & Ash, 2008; Sevilla-Sanz, et al., 2010; Thébaud, 2010; Greenstein, 2000). Thus, when a woman out-earns her male partner, he seeks to neutralize this gender deviance by reducing his contributions to housework. It is worth noting that Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) also find that when women out-earn their male partners, women also increase their level of housework as their male partners decrease their contributions to housework..

I argue that this type of gendered behavior has much more to do with wider notions of patriarchy, power, and privilege. Housework is indeed laborious work: prescribing gendered notions of who ought to do it is a reflection of power and patriarchy. Insisting that it is work for women and not for men places additional burdens on women that men get to avoid. Additionally, a man withdrawing from housework just as his female partner begins to earn more than him is an attempt to regain dominance in the home. While she may out-earn him, he responds by ensuring he still does relatively less housework, and that she must still do work to serve him. Furthermore, when women take on additional housework in the case where she outearns her male partner, this may be an example by which women's behavior responds to patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity just as men's does. While gender deviance neutralization is a useful concept in understanding the gendered aspects of housework and relative income, it does not address the power dynamics at the core of the problem. For this reason, I instead use the notion of 'hegemonic masculinity' as introduced by Raewyn Connell as "the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees, or is taken to guarantee, the dominant position of men and the subordination of women" (Connell, 2005: 77). Stated another way, hegemonic masculinity is "the currently most honored way of being a man.… It requires all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimates the global subordination of women to men" (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). As discussed further below, the specific behaviors associated with hegemonic masculinity change over time and across cultures, making Connell's definition fitting for nearly any patriarchal society.

III. Historical & Economic Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity in the U.S.

Some scholars associate specific behaviors with masculinity. For instance, David Cohen (2010) has identified three central characteristics to contemporary U.S. masculinity: heterosexual, not feminine, and physically aggressive (Cohen, 2010: 525). While this conceptualization is certainly useful in many contexts, it is worth considering how U.S. notions of manhood have changed throughout history, often in response to changes in the macroeconomy, and how notions of manhood look different for different groups of men. Putting masculinity in a historical context reminds us that it is socially constructed: it is constantly changing and is neither static nor timeless. In this section of the paper, I sketch a brief history of American masculinities as they have been shaped by institutional and economic changes, with

specific attention to how White masculinities and upper-class masculinities have evolved in the context of hegemonic masculinity.

I begin with notions of masculinity during British colonialism in the U.S., as this period serves as a useful example of how masculinity changes in response to changes in power and economic relations. In the eighteenth century, politeness became embedded in the masculinity of British aristocratic men (Carter 2001). This image of civility went hand-in-hand with the culture of British colonialism (Harvey, 2005). White colonists in the Americas felt infantilized, enslaved, and thus emasculated by this gentlemanly "English father". In an attempt to fight their emasculation, American colonists denounced upper-class British concepts of manhood: they called the aristocracy's life of luxury and etiquette effeminate. They argued that their experience of "Indian hostility and the perils of the Western wilderness" brought about true manliness and independence (Kimmel, 2006: 15). This is what Kimmel (2006) identifies the emergence of the 'Self-Made Man'. These notions of manhood offer a clear example of using opposing behaviors coded as 'masculine' to work against upper-class prescriptions of manhood.

Perhaps contrary to our more recent understandings of masculine identity, these behaviors did not necessarily involve distance from work in the home or from women. In the preindustrial economy, women and men were often in the same world of daily experience: they both worked primarily in the home sphere (Laslett and Brenner 1989). White men often managed household labor and educated children. They were the patriarchal authority in their homes, responsible for educating their families according to religious doctrine. Their productivity took place in the home, giving them the ability to be in charge of their own destiny and their family's destiny; to truly be the Self-Made Man.

However, with the nineteenth century came the Industrial Revolution and new threats to the Self-Made Man and to his masculinity. In the early nineteenth century, manhood was "no longer fixed in land or small-scale property ownership or dutiful service (Kimmel, 2006, pg 17)." White men were no longer the managers of household labor but instead were responsible for providing an income on which their families survived (Laslett & Brenner, 1989). Some argue that the development of industrial capitalism took working-class White men's abilities to coordinate their own productive labor, and in turn their own destinies. Samuel Eliot in 1871 wrote that "to put a man upon wages is to put him in the position of a dependent" and "the less of a man he becomes" (cited in Rodgers, 1974, p. 33). This forced them to turn to other, more harmful ways to express masculinity. Working-class White men were no longer seen as moral beacons, responsible for their children's religious and emotional upbringing, but were seen as aggressive, sexual, and competitive (Laslett & Brenner, 1989). In this era, White masculinities were defined by success in the market, individual achievement, mobility, and wealth.

As working-class White men were thrust into the wage-earning workforce during this period, they became more aware of other men and of the importance of work in their masculine status. "The workplace was a man's world… If manhood could be proved, it had to be proved in the eyes of other men (Kimmel, 2006, pg 19)." White masculinity was no longer measured by one's success within his family but was now dependent on his success in the workforce and the public sphere. Kimmel explains that this was why many White men were opposed to women entering the labor force: "it was as if workplace manhood could only be retained if the workplace

only had men in it (2006, pg 23)." In this sense, an effort to maintain higher wages of White men in the industrial workforce via exclusion of other laborers became intertwined with notions of gender relations. Maynard (1989) argues that men workers mixed their evolving class consciousness with a strong sense of their gender identity because "as industrial capitalism unfolded in this period it not only altered class relations, but also shifted gender relations precipitating a crisis in masculinity." As women moved into industry, they no longer depended on men as a link to the public sphere, which further threatened men's dominance, both in the workplace and in the home (Hacker, 1957;). In order to maintain their dominance in the workplace and the home, men worked to exclude women from many occupations (for a comprehensive history of this, see Cockburn, 1991).

Efforts to exclude women from certain workplaces were also met by efforts to exclude Black men. The privileges conferred by race were (and often continue to be) used to make up for alienating and exploitative class relationships. (Roediger, 1999). Whiteness served as a secondary wage for white workers who were resisting the view of wage labor as a form of wage slavery. "Slaves were seen as dependent, helpless men, incapable of defending their women and children, and therefore less than manly" (Hoch, 2004). For working class White men, already feeling their identities threated by wage work, turned to racism, antifeminism, and nativism: excluding the 'other' would help White men to preserve their gender identity, especially in regard to work (Kimmel 2006, pg 62). For example, in the early 1900s, lynching of Black men became widespread. White workers feared the influx of low paid Black workers into the labor force and lynched them as a way to reduce competition or terrorize others to stay out. Alleging sex crimes (especially against White women) legitimated the practice (Davis, 1983). This is a particularly poignant example about White men's constructions of 'hyper-masculine' narratives about Black men, which I discuss in the subsequent section.

As White women began to enter the paid labor force in the 20th century, and specifically began working on occupations previously designated for men, White men again shifted their notions of masculine behavior and roles of manhood. In practice, the male-breadwinner model began to decline, but among some groups of men, the ideology of the male-breadwinner model continued (and continues) to persist. In the late 20th century, notions of 'the family wage' for men became less important and issues to relating "to working conditions, hours of work, parental leave, and so on came more and more to the fore," which Morgan (2005) argues made men feel as though work was less masculine.

Ultimately, given this brief history White men's changing notions of masculinity in the U.S., one can begin to see the importance of shifting macroeconomic contexts in notions of manhood. Additionally, one begins to see that masculinity, as it is associated with upper- and middle-class White men in the U.S., often has to do with power. Often most clearly, this means power over women, but it may also mean power over Black men or power over working-class men. This is why Raewyn Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity is more relevant and accurate than other conceptions of masculine identity which ignore power relations.

IV. What Makes Hegemonic Masculinity Hegemonic?

Turning back to Connell's definition, not only is hegemonic masculinity about perpetuating patriarchy, but it is, relatedly, about ensuring men outside of the hegemonic group, in some way, conform to notions of masculinity prescribed by the hegemonic group.

Connell writes that hegemonic masculinity "requires all other men to position themselves in relation to it. (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, pg 832)" In line with Connell's conceptualization, Kimmel (2006, pg 4) writes that "all American men must contend with a singular vision of masculinity, a particular definition that is held up as the model against which we measure ourselves." This is where the concept of *hegemonic* masculinity becomes especially important. By defining masculinity in this way, it becomes clear that the concept is rooted in notions of power and social relations. Connell & Messerschmidt acknowledge that notions of masculinity differ locally, regionally, and globally, but that there is generally a "singular form of masculinity that stand atop a gender hierarchy" (Garlick, 2017, pp. 35) In her work, Connell is clear in her claim that only a small minority of relatively powerful men need to enact hegemonic masculinity in order for it to steer the behavior of other groups of men. Notably, this is somewhat in contradiction to Himmelweit's (2003) macro-model of norms, in which the strength of the norm relies on the proportion of the population conforming to it.

One clear expression of the hegemonic groups' efforts to prescribe specific notions of manhood on other, oppressed groups is when one considers masculinity and race in the United States. Reeser (2011) writes extensively on this topic. For example, he explains that White men often spread narratives about Asian men as effeminate, or Black men as hyper virile, which places White masculinity as the perfect expression of manhood. These narratives should not be taken as two separate constructs, but "as part of a larger system of race-gender codings, the white man is privileged as the man in the middle: neither too masculine nor too unmasculine…Ending up in the middle is a way for white masculinity to be accorded the privileges of the happy medium and to keep those privileges away from the men coded otherwise." (Reeser, 2011, pp. 150) In this sense, hegemonic masculinity works to subordinate both women and 'non-hegemonically masculine' men. In explaining the subjection of Black men, Reeser writes the following on the narratives of Black masculinity:

> The image of the man in gender overdrive might be a way to suggest that he is out of control. The African American man is so gendered or so sexualized, or so the racist logic goes, that he is unable to control himself since he wants to have sex, to break into houses, or to rape women. The man of excess, then, can be just as subject to the rule of hegemonic masculinity as the effeminate man, and consequently, the construct of non-excessive or moderate applies to the white man or to another racialized group seen as ideal by contrast. ...This kind of thinking about excess can be a way to code a group as lacking and thus not fully legitimate in terms of masculinity. The white man may be disturbed or anxious by the black man's virility or by a perception of gender similarity with himself, and respond to this anxiety by coding his racial other as lacking in some way (without intelligence, culture, self-control, financial success, etc.). In this sense, and excess of masculinity can be transformed into a lack. (Reeser, 2011, pp. 149)

When a powerful group in society codes Black men as 'excessive' and 'out of control', this provides justifications for heavy surveillance, incarceration, and other punishments of Black men, even when Black men enact gender norms in similar ways to White men. Scholars have found that in educational, labor market, and criminal justice settings, "black men pay a disproportionate price for enacting masculinity norms in comparison to white males" with similar incomes (Royster, 2007). Additionally, placing White (in this case, the hegemonic) masculinity in the middle group serves to maintain the dominance of the hegemonic group, both by heavy surveillance and punishment of black man, and by coding them as lacking intelligence, culture, or self-control.

Similar dynamics exist when one considers the role of class and hegemonic masculinity in forming working-class conceptualizations of manhood. Morgan (2005) also discusses the shift of more and more men into service work in the late 20th century. He writes that upper- and middle-income working men aimed make this work seem masculine and to separate themselves from work done by the masses. Because of this, working-class men "were presented as sheep who were easily led by politically motivated leaders or group pressure. Management, on the other hand, was presented as dealing with some of the key issues in the national economy" (pp. 170). In response, working class men constructed their masculinity as collective, physical, and oppositional: similar in many ways to the White colonists in America opposing British aristocracy. Additionally, designations of 'skilled' and 'unskilled' work were changing, largely driven by the capitalist class and an economic shift to service sector work. Men in the 'unskilled' category responded by prescribing physical strength to their masculine identities if they were to be excluded from notions of technical mastery (Maynard, 1986). On the other hand, middle and upper-class men working in services associated their masculinity with individuality, rationality, and intelligence. Again, efforts put forth by the hegemonic group to redefine masculine work or behavior places them in the optimal position: upper- and middle-income men seen as rational leaders and individuals rather than brutish sheep. In this way, the hegemonic group is again considered to have the perfect 'amount' of manhood relative to the oppressed working class.

V. Empirical Research Questions

Given this background, my research question is largely about how hegemonic masculinity influences the behavior of men inside and outside the hegemonic group. How does the notion of 'all men must contend' in Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity play out? In a U.S. context, I ask who is the dominant group maintaining hegemonic masculinity and what are their masculine behaviors. What are the masculine behaviors that upper class White men set as standards for masculinity in which 'all men must contend'? I also ask how other groups of men adopt or do not adopt similar behaviors. Who reinforces behaviors associated with hegemonic masculinity and who works against them?

Carrigan, Connell, and Lee (1985) and Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) have discussed the possibility that there are hegemonic masculinities, plural: a hierarchy of sorts, subject to local, national and global dynamics, and to class and race dynamics. In other words, there are certainly overlapping modes of oppression which suggests that men in different class and race groups would behave differently when contending with hegemonic masculinity, as

presented by upper-income White men, or by others with power relative to those within their own class and race groups.

I examine whether the behaviors and tensions described in Bertrand, Kamenica & Pan (2015) exist or play out differently upper-income groups as opposed to lower income groups, and in Black masculinities as opposed to White. Specifically, I consider their finding that within a given couple, when the wife earns more than the husband, the gap in time spent on housework is higher (driven both by men doing less housework and by women doing more housework) relative to couples in which the wife makes the same or less than their husband. I reexamine this finding in light of different classed and racialized dynamics of hegemonic masculinity. These results are preliminary. As I continue with this paper, I hope to consider how some of the other economic phenomena associated with hegemonic masculinity play out for different race and class groups. I discuss this future research in the final section of this paper.

VI. Data

Like Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015), I use Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. The main disadvantage of the PSID is its question about housework is rather vague: "About how much time do you spend on housework in an average week—I mean time spent cooking, cleaning, and other work around the house?" However, the main advantage is that both the household head and the spouse/partner answer the question, which allows us to directly measure the gender gap in home production within a household. The panel nature of the data also allows examination of how changes in relative income affect this gap

In this early version of the paper, I make use of PSID data from 1986-2017, inclusive. I restrict my sample to those who are aged 18 and older, and to opposite-sex couples who are either married or 'permanently cohabitating'. My data is also restricted to those who have reported the number of housework hours done per week by both the man and woman partners. Like Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015), I make use of this data to understand the relationship between gaps in housework hours and relative income (where the gap in housework is calculated by subtracting the number of housework hours done by the male partner from the number of housework hours done by the female partner). In order to do this, I make use of the PSID data on total labor income (which includes regular pay, overtime pay, tips, and bonuses) as well as hourly wage rates earnings data. Using this information, I construct binary variables to indicate whether the woman outearns her partner or not. In my model (described in the subsequent section), I also make use of data on labor hours per week, age, and education for both partners, as well as the number of children under 18 in the family unit, the age of the youngest child, the total income of the family unit (including non-labor income), and whether or not the partners are married or permanently cohabitating. The descriptive statistics for these measures are listed below in Table 1. In Table 2, I list the same data but it is disaggregated by the race of the male partner: if the man in the couple is White or Black. The female partner may be of any race. However, it is worth noting that among couples with Black men, 93% of the female partners are Black and among couples with White men, 97% of the female partners are White. In Table 3, I also list some summary statistics for the upper, middle, and lower income terciles[2]. Income

[2] Additional summary statistics can be found in Appendix A.

terciles are calculated simply by sorting the available population into thirds for each year. In the future, I intend to test different measures of class, including by occupation, asset ownership, etc.

VII. Model

Similar to Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015), I estimate a linear probability model with couple and year fixed effects regressing the housework gap in year *t* on whether the wife earned more than the husband in year *t* – 1. My baseline specification is as follows:

$$HouseworkGap_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 WomanEarnsMore_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \boldsymbol{I}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \boldsymbol{X}_{i,t} + \lambda_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

The dependent variable, the housework gap, is calculated as the woman's housework in time *t* minus the man's housework in time *t.* The independent variable of interest, $WomanEarnsMore_{i,t-1}$, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the woman earned more than her male partner in time *t-1,* and equal to 0 if not. As indicated in the results tables below, I have used two different measures of earning when constructing this variable. In some regressions, I use a measure which indicates whether or not the woman has a higher hourly wage rate than her male partner. In others, I use a measure which indicates whether or not the woman had a higher total annual labor income than her male partner. In my baseline regression, I also include various measures of income, represented by vector $\boldsymbol{I}_{i,t-1}$. These include the log of each partner's labor income, the log of each partner's labor income squared, the log of the household's total income (including non-labor income), all in year *t*-1. Vector $\boldsymbol{X}_{i,t}$ represents couple-specific controls, including the age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. The terms λ_i and α_t represent couple and year fixed effects respectively.

In additional regressions, I add controls for each individual's labor hours per week, level of education, a binary indicator variable for whether the woman is not working, and a binary indicator variable for whether the man is not working. These additions to the baseline model are noted in the subsequent tables.

After estimating this model for the entire population, and getting coefficient estimates similar to that of Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015), I then estimate separate models for couples with a White man and for couples with a Black man. These results, using relative wage rates and relative total labor incomes, respectively, as the dependent variables, are listed in Table 4 and Table 5. I then estimate separate models for those in the lowest income group, the middle income group, and the highest income group. These results are listed in Tables 6 and 7. Finally, I estimate separate models for couples with Black men in the lowest, middle and highest income groups. The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. I do the same income-tercile breakdown for couples with White men, with the results reported in Tables 10 and 11.

This separate models approach allows for an investigation of how the mix of causal factors change across different intersections of race and class, and also facilitates a direct comparison of the model's overall explanatory power across these intersections (Sprague, 2016; Scott & Siltanen, 2017). Another strategy might be to incorporate interaction terms. While I intend to estimate a model using interaction terms as a robustness check in the future, it is

somewhat useful to not have a reference group which is implicitly often defined as normal. Estimating separate models also allows us to better account for race- and class-based heterogeneity.

VIII. Results & Interpretation

Referring to Table 4 and Table 5, one can see that when considering the total population, it would appear when a woman earns more than her male partner in period *t*-1, the gap in housework increases by a substantial amount: over one hour for models comparing the couples' wage rates, and more than half an hour for some models using the couples' total labor income. In Table 4, when hourly wage rates are compared, it seems that the increase in the housework gap when a female partner out earns her male partner is larger in couples with a White man than in couples with a Black man. However, when total labor incomes are compared in Table 5, this statement no longer holds: none of the coefficients for women having higher labor incomes in *t*-1 are statistically significant for couples with White men. Additionally, for the model considering couples with Black men, it seems that some of the coefficients' magnitudes are much higher than the statistically insignificant coefficients in the model considering couples with White men. This difference in the models may have to do with a difference what the measures capture. The total labor income measure includes tips, overtime, and bonuses, while the hourly wage rate measure does not. In the context of hours spent on housework, it may also make more sense for the hourly wage rate measure to be more sensitive, in that it represents the opportunity cost of one hour's worth of housework. The total income measure may also be picking up some information on hours spent in paid labor. For this reason, I add controls for labor hours in all models, as indicated at the bottom of each results table[3].

Next, in Table 6 and Table 7 the results for the models separated by income tercile are presented. In Table 6, the independent variable of interest is whether or not the woman has a higher hourly wage rate than the man. Using this measure, it appears that for the lowest income tercile, there is a relatively smaller or statistically insignificant relationship between the woman out-earning the man and the increase in the gap in housework. The increase in the housework gap when a female partner out earns her male partner is largest in middle-income and upper-income couples. Similar results hold in Table 7, where the independent variable of interest measures whether or not the woman's total labor income is higher than her male partner's.

Table 8 and Table 9 indicate the results for couples with Black men for all three income terciles. Tables 10 and 11 report the results for couples with White men for all three income terciles. In the case of couples with Black men, it seems that lower-income couples see a bigger increase in the housework gap when the woman out-earns the man relative to middle- and upper-income couples. Using the wage-rate measure as the dependent variable, as reported in Table 10, it seems that the opposite trend occurs in couples with a White man. In this case, upper- and middle-income couples with White men experience large and statistically significant increases the housework gap, but lower-income couples with White men see no statistically significant effects. When using the total labor income measure as the independent variable of interest, as

[3] Additional robustness checks in Appendix B use a different measure of relative income as the independent variable of interest but offer little difference in results. In Appendix C, I also present results from several models which use different measures for the dependent variable: some use men's hours spent on housework as the dependent variable, others use a measure of relative housework as the dependent variable.

reported in Table 11, there are no statistically significant results for any income tercile with White men in the partnership.

Overall, based on the results presented in Table 8 and Table 10, it seems that upper- and middle-income White men might have a stronger aversion to the situation in which a woman out-earns her male partner relative to lower-income White men and upper- and middle-income Black men. Lower-income Black men in this model also seem to have a relatively strong aversion to the situation in which a woman out-earns her male partner, especially when compared to middle- and upper-income couples with Black men (as indicated in the results presented in Table 8 and Table 9). However, these preliminary results should be interpreted cautiously, as there are some overlapping confidence intervals among these groups, and the results are somewhat sensitive to which type of income measure is used.

What do these results mean in light of research done on hegemonic masculinity? Recall that the broader research questions are as follows: What are the masculine behaviors that upper class White men set as standards for masculinity in which 'all men must contend'? Who reinforces behaviors associated with hegemonic masculinity and who works against them?

Given the previous discussion about the dynamics of hegemonic masculinity, it seems that middle-income White men and lower-income Black men contend with the masculinity norms set by upper-income White men by conforming to and simulating them in some way. Upper- and middle-income Black men may be opposing these norms as a way to retaliate against notions of White manhood or to establish their own notions of Black manhood. More specifically, this may be an example of Black men combatting the White narratives of Black 'man in overdrive', as Reeser (2011) puts it. Lower-income Black men, oppressed by both racism and class dynamics, may be emulating behaviors found in the hegemonic group as a way of reasserting manhood and dominance. Lower-income White men, who may be oppressed by class dynamics, but still receive the 'wages of Whiteness' may be attempting to position themselves in the middle ground, as Reeser (2011) argues, relative to Black men in their same income group. However, more empirical work studying responses other 'threats' to masculinity is necessary in order to understand whether these trends generally hold.

IX. Conclusions & Future Work

Ultimately, this analysis only offers a peek into the dynamics of hegemonic masculinity. In order to get a more robust understand of how various groups of men contend with prescriptions of masculinity passed down the by hegemonic groups in society, one must consider other expressions of manhood and how different groups respond to 'threats' to masculinity. I intend to do this in future work. For instance, I will consider other dynamics which might influence relative housework: I could consider how occupational segregation impacts notions of 'manhood' and thus performances of housework (similar to Schneider, 2012), or perhaps the impact of unemployment or public assistance as 'threats' to masculinity. In these analyses, similar to the one I have taken on here, I will break down analyses based on race and class groups. I will also consider other dependent variables in my models aside from housework. For instance, Syrda (2019) finds that men have increasing levels of stress when their wives begin to out-earn them. Does this vary by race and class groups? One might also consider a class and race

analysis of how marriage and divorce rates (Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan, 2015) or rates of intimate partner violence (Atkinson, Greenstein, & Lang, 2005), are impacted by women out-earning their partners. I hope to examine several of these phenomena in the future so as to offer a more robust understanding of how the macro-norms associated with hegemonic masculinity influence different groups of men and their behavior within homes.

In future iterations of this work, I will include all available PSID data (from 1968 to 2017). I also intend to run robustness checks using American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data, as it asks more specific questions about types of housework and childcare, even if it only asks one spouse to respond for both.

To my knowledge, this work is the first of its kind to consider hegemonic masculinity in conjunction with the intrahousehold economic phenomena studied in this paper, and those listed in the previous paragraph. Merging these insights, and conducting an empirical analysis focused on race and class dynamics, is helpful in understanding notions of power and oppression that are present in behaviors previously attributed to 'gender deviance neutralization.' Analyses such as these are important if we are interested in a nuanced understanding of gender dynamics within homes: hegemonic masculinity may be harmful for women, but also for men in the non-hegemonic group. Beginning to understand the nuance and power relations associated with the behavior of men is helpful in improving the economic and social situation of women and subordinated men.

TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for All Couples: PSID 1986-2017

	N	mean	S.D
Woman Housework in t	99,429	21.65	15.31
Man Housework in t	99,429	7.81	9.31
Housework gap in t	99,429	13.84	16.68
Woman total labor income	97,537	15069.64	21494.51
Man total labor income	97,537	34856.31	66317.02
Woman hourly wage	91,070	9.54	15.38
Man hourly wage	85,987	16.42	23.69
Woman work hours per week	99,118	19.57	20.49
Man work hours per week	99,013	31.49	23.08
Total income	97,537	63981.26	84281.89
Woman earns more income	97,537	0.198	0.398
Woman earns more hourly wages	85,713	0.247	0.431
Only woman working	98,733	0.054	0.225
Only man working	98,733	0.214	0.410
Woman's age	99,429	42.59	13.55
Man's age	99,429	45.25	14.09
Married	99,429	0.775	0.418
Number of children	99,429	1.27	1.31
Age of youngest child	60,698	6.99	5.07

TABLE 2: Summary Statistics for White and Black Couples: PSID 1986-2017

Couple:	w/ White man			w/ Black man		
	N	mean	S.D	N	mean	S.D.
Woman Housework in t	71,841	22.00	15.02	21,113	19.54	15.19
Man Housework in t	71,841	7.79	8.88	21,113	7.60	9.99
Housework gap in t	71,841	14.21	16.36	21,113	11.94	16.57
Woman total labor income	70,560	15296.41	22676.03	21,078	14721.69	17402.95
Man total labor income	70,560	38605.28	76017.94	21,078	23752.67	22323.39
Woman hourly wage	65,838	9.82	16.63	19,829	8.74	10.71
Man hourly wage	62,172	17.93	25.99	18,940	11.74	12.63
Woman work hours per week	71,659	19.37	20.38	21,009	21.04	20.74
Man work hours per week	71,638	32.38	23.06	20,954	28.85	22.77
Total income	70,560	69798.55	94628.94	21,078	46564.82	35943.95
Woman earns more income	70,560	0.183	0.387	21,078	0.251	0.433
Woman earns more hourly wages	61,973	0.229	0.420	18,890	0.309	0.462
Only woman working	71,470	0.047	0.211	20,863	0.078	0.267
Only man working	71,470	0.216	0.411	20,863	0.194	0.395
Woman's age	71,841	43.20	13.86	21,113	40.96	12.42
Man's age	71,841	45.75	14.33	21,113	43.97	13.22
Married	71,841	0.773	0.419	21,113	0.761	0.427
Number of children	71,841	1.18	1.25	21,113	1.52	1.42
Age of youngest child	41,629	7.20	5.12	14,568	6.62	4.92

TABLE 3: Summary Statistics by Income Tercile: PSID 1986-2017

	N	mean	S.D
Lower Income			
Woman Housework in t	32,312	24.3	17.19
Man Housework in t	32,312	8.07	11.09
Housework gap in t	32,312	16.25	16.68
Woman work hours per week	32,198	12.90	18.88
Man work hours per week	32,132	23.90	23.75
Woman earns more income	32,312	0.211	0.408
Woman earns more hourly wages	28,173	0.241	0.428
Only woman working	32,031	0.086	0.280
Only man working	32,031	0.271	0.444
Woman's age	32,312	43.24	16.61
Man's age	32,312	46.22	17.28
Married	32,312	0.776	0.416
Number of children	32,312	1.32	1.42
Age of youngest child	19,175	5.92	4.78
Middle Income			
Woman Housework in t	32,581	21.22	14.60
Man Housework in t	32,581	7.76	8.77
Housework gap in t	32,581	13.46	15.69
Woman work hours per week	34,481	21.50	20.23
Man work hours per week	32,461	33.35	21.81
Woman earns more income	32,581	0.203	0.402
Woman earns more hourly wages	28,783	0.256	0.437
Only woman working	32,370	0.459	0.209
Only man working	32,370	0.203	0.402
Woman's age	32,581	40.94	12.63
Man's age	32,581	43.46	13.09
Married	32,581	0.769	0.421
Number of children	32,581	1.33	1.29
Age of youngest child	20,961	6.91	5.01
Upper Income			
Woman Housework in t	32,644	19.10	13.11
Man Housework in t	32,644	7.499	7.63
Housework gap in t	32,644	11.60	14.09
Woman work hours per week	32,567	24.37	20.58
Man work hours per week	32,567	37.11	21.71
Woman earns more income	32,644	0.181	0.385
Woman earns more hourly wages	28,757	0.244	0.430
Only woman working	32,496	0.028	0.165
Only man working	32,496	0.164	0.370
Woman's age	32,644	43.55	10.56
Man's age	32,644	46.00	10.94
Married	32,644	0.766	0.423
Number of children	32,644	1.163	1.210
Age of youngest child	19,301	8.18	5.16

TABLE 4: Relative hourly wage rates and housework gap by couples with Black and White men[a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total population				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	1.736***	1.010***	1.558***	1.230***
	[0.191]	[0.192]	[0.228]	[0.231]
Obs.	37,297	37,093	22,204	22,204
R-squared	0.128	0.151	0.141	0.151
Couples w/Black man				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	1.386***	0.779**	1.115**	0.793**
	[0.368]	[0.369]	[0.434]	[0.441]
Obs.	9,176	9,077	5,353	5,353
R-squared	0.070	0.085	0.072	0.081
Couples w/White man				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	1.734***	0.926***	1.672***	1.302***
	[0.231]	[0.230]	[0.278]	[0.280]
Obs.	25,970	25,880	15,481	15,481
R-squared	0.143	0.169	0.157	0.167
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a]Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 5: Relative labor income and housework gap by couples with Black and White men[a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total population				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.381	0.226	0.714***	0.657***
	[0.237]	[0.235]	[0.274]	[0.274]
Obs.	41,798	41,555	26,379	26,379
R-squared	0.123	0.150	0.137	0.150
Couples w/Black man				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.271	0.218	1.750***	1.717***
	[0.445]	[0.444]	[0.527]	[0.526]
Obs.	10,172	10,059	6,274	6,274
R-squared	0.066	0.082	0.069	0.078
Couples w/White man				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.201	0.016	0.168	0.148
	[0.219]	[0.287]	[0.330]	[0.329]
Obs.	29,017	28,910	18,382	18,382
R-squared	0.140	0.168	0.155	0.168
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a]Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 6: Relative hourly wage rates and housework gap by income tercile[a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	0.915*	0.343	0.733	0.396
	[0.512]	[0.510]	[0.689]	[0.696]
Obs.	8,854	8,784	4,885	4,885
R-squared	0.085	0.103	0.110	0.118
Middle income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	1.671***	0.837**	1.542***	1.151***
	[0.332]	[0.331]	[0.396]	[0.401]
Obs.	14,437	14,356	8,704	8,704
R-squared	0.120	0.146	0.129	0.136
Upper income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	2.013***	1.364***	1.259***	1.003***
	[0.287]	[0.289]	[0.335]	[0.340]
Obs.	14,006	13,953	8,615	8,615
R-squared	0.149	0.177	0.169	0.182
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a]Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Information in income terciles by year is presented in Appendix A. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 7: Relative labor income and housework gap by income tercile [a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.078	-0.142	0.405	0.404
	[0.676]	[0.670]	[0.875]	[0.873]
Obs.	9,863	9,784	5,817	5,817
R-squared	0.083	0.103	0.105	0.112
Middle income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.484	0.355	1.046**	1.010**
	[0.426]	[0.421]	[0.499]	[0.497]
Obs.	16,214	16,114	10,341	10,341
R-squared	0.119	0.149	0.128	0.140
Upper income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.738**	0.657*	0.900**	0.883**
	[0.356]	[0.353]	[0.398]	[0.398]
Obs.	15,721	15,657	10,221	10,221
R-squared	0.140	0.173	0.155	0.172
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a]Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Information in income terciles by year is presented in Appendix A. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 8: Relative wage rates & housework gap by income tercile (for couples with Black men) [a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	1.880**	1.700**	1.002	0.841
	[0.846]	[0.851]	[1.060]	[1.085]
Obs.	2,787	2,750	1,468	1,468
R-squared	0.074	0.085	0.044	0.047
Middle income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	0.600	-0.295	0.698	0.594
	[0.611]	[0.611]	[0.672]	[0.683]
Obs.	3,804	3,760	2,337	2,337
R-squared	0.062	0.079	0.045	0.049
Upper income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	0.624	0.112	-0.146	-0.466
	[0.608]	[0.618]	[0.780]	[0.791]
Obs.	2,585	2,567	1,548	1,548
R-squared	0.033	0.050	0.014	0.023
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a] Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Information in income terciles by year is presented in Appendix A. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 9: Relative labor income & housework gap by income tercile (for couples w/ Black men)[a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.391	0.191	2.918**	2.716**
	[1.120]	[1.125]	[1.382]	[1.381]
Obs.	3,037	2,997	1,698	1,698
R-squared	0.064	0.081	0.039	0.044
Middle income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.951	1.133	1.927**	1.994**
	[0.760]	[0.755]	[0.877]	[0.877]
Obs.	4,260	4,209	2,755	2,755
R-squared	0.119	0.149	0.058	0.063
Upper income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.514	0.521	1.675*	1.742*
	[0.731]	[0.724]	[0.891]	[0.890]
Obs.	2,875	2,853	1,821	1,821
R-squared	0.033	0.052	0.020	0.029
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a] Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Information in income terciles by year is presented in Appendix A. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 10: Relative wage rates & housework gap by income tercile (for couples with White men)[a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	0.665	-0.261	0.716	0.390
	[0.699]	[0.691]	[0.976]	[0.980]
Obs.	5,183	5,156	2,864	2,864
R-squared	0.089	0.112	0.091	0.098
Middle income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	1.806***	0.957**	1.893***	1.346***
	[0.406]	[0.404]	[0.505]	[0.510]
Obs.	9,858	9,828	5,871	5,871
R-squared	0.098	0.134	0.162	0.141
Upper income group				
Woman has higher wage rate in $t-1$	2.164***	1.510***	1.452***	1.229***
	[0.333]	[0.334]	[0.381]	[0.385]
Obs.	10,929	10,896	6,746	6,746
R-squared	0.166	0.198	0.183	0.195
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a]Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Information in income terciles by year is presented in Appendix A. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

TABLE 11: Relative labor income & housework gap by income tercile (for couples w/ White men)[a]

Dependent variable: housework gap	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lower income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	-0.298	-0.453	-1.191	-1.065
	[0.924]	[0.908]	[1.226]	[1.220]
Obs.	3,037	2,997	1,698	1,698
R-squared	0.064	0.081	0.039	0.044
Middle income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	-0.0646	-0.255	0.250	0.254
	[0.538]	[0.528]	[0.634]	[0.629]
Obs.	11,033	10,993	6,979	6,979
R-squared	0.131	0.165	0.140	0.155
Upper income group				
Woman has higher labor income in $t-1$	0.529	0.475	0.454	0.448
	[0.420]	[0.416]	[0.453]	[0.448]
Obs.	12,264	12,227	8,022	8,022
R-squared	0.156	0.194	0.165	0.183
Additional controls:				
Labor hours	no	yes	no	yes
Education	no	no	yes	yes
Whether man/woman not working	no	no	yes	yes

[a]Data from the PSID 1986-2017. The dependent variable (housework gap) is calculated by subtracting the number of hours the man spends on housework in time t from the number of hours the woman spends on housework in time t. Income related controls include the log of each partner?s labor income, the log of each partner?s labor income squared, the log of the household?s total income (including non-labor income), all in year t-1. Other controls include couple and year fixed effects, age of both partners, ages squared, as well as the number of children under 18 in the household and the age of the youngest child in the household. Information in income terciles by year is presented in Appendix A. Standard errors are in brackets. ***significant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%.

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Appendix A.

Additional summary statistics for the lower, middle, and upper income terciles, respectively:

```
. summarize totalincome LaborIncomeMan LaborIncomeWoman ManHrlyEarnings WomanHrlyEarnings if incomegrp==1
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
totalincome	32,312	23774.83	12197.09	0	60000
LaborInc~Man	32,312	11112.35	11286.28	0	60000
LaborInc~man	32,312	4980.338	7499.067	0	90000
ManHrlyEar~s	28,287	6.401209	9.0331	0	442.31
WomanHrlyE~s	30,112	3.887813	6.291807	0	172.41

```
. summarize totalincome LaborIncomeMan LaborIncomeWoman ManHrlyEarnings WomanHrlyEarnings if incomegrp==2
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
totalincome	32,581	51277.98	18396.99	24280	108470
LaborInc~Man	32,581	27786.27	17397.39	0	107000
LaborInc~man	32,581	13713.38	13502.02	0	104000
ManHrlyEar~s	28,841	13.61837	11.57282	0	833.27
WomanHrlyE~s	30,463	8.712651	9.733483	0	279.56

```
. summarize totalincome LaborIncomeMan LaborIncomeWoman ManHrlyEarnings WomanHrlyEarnings if incomegrp==3
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
totalincome	32,644	116457.5	127376.1	41001	6317099
LaborInc~Man	32,644	65415.19	105692.5	0	6300000
LaborInc~man	32,644	26409.98	30193.67	0	923392
ManHrlyEar~s	28,859	29.0428	34.54318	0	960.65
WomanHrlyE~s	30,495	15.94636	22.35213	0	1405.88

Summary statistics related to education:

Years of education, entire sample:

```
. summarize YrsEduMan YrsEduWoman
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YrsEduMan	68,285	12.86791	2.947057	1	17
YrsEduWoman	68,065	12.89817	2.747122	1	17

Years of education, for couples with a White man and for couples with a Black man, respectively:

```
. summarize YrsEduMan YrsEduWoman if whiteman==1
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YrsEduMan	49,709	13.21632	2.844495	1	17
YrsEduWoman	49,328	13.13666	2.658077	1	17

```
. summarize YrsEduMan YrsEduWoman if blackman==1
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YrsEduMan	13,895	12.19978	2.519671	1	17
YrsEduWoman	13,877	12.63407	2.33217	1	17

Years of education, for lower, middle, and upper income groups, respectively:

```
. summarize YrsEduMan YrsEduWoman if incomegrp==1
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YrsEduMan	21,596	11.33122	3.00642	1	17
YrsEduWoman	21,638	11.54099	2.763189	1	17

```
. summarize YrsEduMan YrsEduWoman if incomegrp==2
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YrsEduMan	22,343	12.88905	2.431148	1	17
YrsEduWoman	22,129	12.96633	2.311454	1	17

```
. summarize YrsEduMan YrsEduWoman if incomegrp==3
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YrsEduMan	22,589	14.51375	2.272644	1	17
YrsEduWoman	22,544	14.3294	2.195436	2	17

Appendix B.

As a robustness check, I use a different measure of relative income for the independent variable of interest in my model. First, I constructed a 'weekly total labor income' measure, calculated by multiplying the hourly wage rates by the number of hours worked per week for both individuals in the couple. Then, using this this weekly total labor income measure, create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the woman has a higher weekly total labor income than her male partner, equal to 0 if not. I then use this as my new independent variable of interest. The results are presented below (which include all the controls listed in Tables 4-11.

For the total sample:

```
. xtreg hswkgap imputedwifeincomemore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD
>  ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren onlywifeworking onlyhusbandworking eduh eduw HDwrkhrs WFwrkhrs i.yrnum,
>  fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     22,204
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      5,580

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.1037                                         min =          1
     between = 0.1639                                         avg =        4.0
     overall = 0.1508                                         max =         14

                                                F(31,16593)       =      61.91
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0200                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswkgap	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
imputedwifeincomemore	1.355786	.3012013	4.50	0.000	.765399	1.946172
lnlbrincomeWF	1.042766	.5533827	1.88	0.060	-.0419233	2.127455
lnlbrincomeHD	-1.347931	.7646553	-1.76	0.078	-2.846737	.1508754
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.1699552	.0346865	-4.90	0.000	-.2379444	-.101966
lnlbrincomeHD2	.1555558	.0446078	3.49	0.000	.0681198	.2429918
lntotalincome	-.8873281	.373753	-2.37	0.018	-1.619924	-.1547323
ageHD	.2170975	.1641833	1.32	0.186	-.1047194	.5389143
ageWF	-.4068001	.1725696	-2.36	0.018	-.745055	-.0685452
ageHD2	-.0055836	.0020004	-2.79	0.005	-.0095045	-.0016626
ageWF2	.008924	.002204	4.05	0.000	.0046038	.0132441
childage	-.0121919	.0286092	-0.43	0.670	-.068269	.0438851
numchildren	1.025897	.1274974	8.05	0.000	.7759886	1.275806
onlywifeworking	-2.367646	.67229	-3.52	0.000	-3.685407	-1.049886
onlyhusbandworking	2.694927	.420784	6.40	0.000	1.870145	3.519709
eduh	-.3684242	.0959294	-3.84	0.000	-.556456	-.1803923
eduw	-.4975476	.1048795	-4.74	0.000	-.7031225	-.2919727
HDwrkhrs	.0283532	.0096752	2.93	0.003	.0093888	.0473176
WFwrkhrs	-.1053433	.0091438	-11.52	0.000	-.1232661	-.0874205

For couples with a Black man:

```
. xtreg hswkgap imputedwifeincomemore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD
>  ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren onlywifeworking onlyhusbandworking eduh eduw HDwrkhrs WFwrkhrs i.yrnum
> if blackman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,353
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,433

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0566                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0904                                         avg =        3.7
     overall = 0.0817                                         max =         14

                                                F(31,3889)        =       7.53
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0301                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswkgap	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
imputedwifeincomemore	1.56105	.5510974	2.83	0.005	.4805831	2.641518
lnlbrincomeWF	.254527	1.571608	0.16	0.871	-2.826728	3.335782
lnlbrincomeHD	1.171836	2.429797	0.48	0.630	-3.59196	5.935633
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0487664	.0944034	-0.52	0.605	-.2338513	.1363184
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0470399	.1365703	0.34	0.731	-.2207162	.3147961
lntotalincome	-1.682645	.8010419	-2.10	0.036	-3.253147	-.1121427
ageHD	.2681915	.3157408	0.85	0.396	-.3508416	.8872247
ageWF	-.3187422	.3535877	-0.90	0.367	-1.011977	.3744927
ageHD2	-.0056661	.0037104	-1.53	0.127	-.0129406	.0016084
ageWF2	.0079202	.0044089	1.80	0.073	-.0007238	.0165642
childage	-.026536	.051213	-0.52	0.604	-.126943	.0738709
numchildren	.8489258	.2464394	3.44	0.001	.365763	1.332089
onlywifeworking	-.6157254	1.27968	-0.48	0.630	-3.124634	1.893183
onlyhusbandworking	.4983898	1.043178	0.48	0.633	-1.546837	2.543617
eduh	-.1331219	.2151542	-0.62	0.536	-.5549476	.2887038
eduw	-.3025133	.2280312	-1.33	0.185	-.7495855	.1445588
HDwrkhrs	.0359059	.0203825	1.76	0.078	-.0040556	.0758673
WFwrkhrs	-.1186845	.02266	-5.24	0.000	-.163111	-.0742579

For couples with a White man:

```
. xtreg hswkgap imputedwifeincomemore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD
>  ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren onlywifeworking onlyhusbandworking eduh eduw HDwrkhrs WFwrkhrs i.yrnum
> if whiteman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     15,481
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      3,729

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.1204                                         min =          1
     between = 0.1725                                         avg =        4.2
     overall = 0.1660                                         max =         14

                                                F(31,11721)       =      51.74
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0094                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswkgap	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
imputedwifeincomemore	1.106447	.3670818	3.01	0.003	.3869059	1.825989
lnlbrincomeWF	1.39492	.6078452	2.29	0.022	.2034421	2.586397
lnlbrincomeHD	-1.839737	.8061553	-2.28	0.023	-3.419936	-.2595385
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.2031092	.0383964	-5.29	0.000	-.2783725	-.1278459
lnlbrincomeHD2	.1798901	.0478514	3.76	0.000	.0860933	.2736868
lntotalincome	-1.038595	.4377244	-2.37	0.018	-1.896608	-.1805828
ageHD	.2015934	.2020004	1.00	0.318	-.1943609	.5975478
ageWF	-.5444127	.2080614	-2.62	0.009	-.9522476	-.1365779
ageHD2	-.0057958	.0025023	-2.32	0.021	-.0107007	-.000891
ageWF2	.0109076	.002672	4.08	0.000	.0056701	.0161451
childage	.0162501	.0380886	0.43	0.670	-.0584098	.09091
numchildren	1.077077	.1549545	6.95	0.000	.7733399	1.380813
onlywifeworking	-2.589609	.8262138	-3.13	0.002	-4.209125	-.9700924
onlyhusbandworking	3.003463	.4694578	6.40	0.000	2.083247	3.923678
eduh	-.4314869	.1218787	-3.54	0.000	-.6703895	-.1925843
eduw	-.3645583	.1312356	-2.78	0.005	-.621802	-.1073146
HDwrkhrs	.025017	.011538	2.17	0.030	.0024007	.0476334
WFwrkhrs	-.1074671	.0102206	-10.51	0.000	-.1275012	-.087433

Appendix C.

Here I present results from the same models presented in the paper, but use different measures for the dependent variable.

First I use a measure of relative housework as the dependent variable instead of the housework gap. This is calculated as the number of hours the woman spends on housework divided by the number of total hours spend on housework. The results presented below simply use the baseline specifications (do not have controls for labor hours, education, or whether one partner is not working).

For the entire sample, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifewagesmore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     37,254
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      6,911

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0406                                         min =          1
     between = 0.1037                                         avg =        5.4
     overall = 0.0690                                         max =         19

                                                F(30,30313)       =      42.71
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0698                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	.0252925	.0025146	10.06	0.000	.0203637	.0302213
lnlbrincomeWF	.0377202	.0063872	5.91	0.000	.025201	.0502394
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0485863	.0093505	-5.20	0.000	-.0669136	-.030259
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0038544	.0004015	-9.60	0.000	-.0046414	-.0030674
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0044315	.0005349	8.28	0.000	.003383	.0054799
lntotalincome	-.0120072	.0033535	-3.58	0.000	-.0185803	-.0054341
ageHD	-.0001023	.00164	-0.06	0.950	-.0033168	.0031121
ageWF	.0009503	.0016512	0.58	0.565	-.0022862	.0041867
ageHD2	-.000012	.0000195	-0.61	0.540	-.0000503	.0000263
ageWF2	.0000184	.0000205	0.90	0.370	-.0000218	.0000586
childage	.0005212	.0003201	1.63	0.103	-.0001062	.0011486
numchildren	.0021622	.001414	1.53	0.126	-.0006093	.0049338

For the couples with Black men, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifewagesmore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if black
> man==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,161
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,840

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0328                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0540                                         avg =        5.0
     overall = 0.0423                                         max =         19

                                                F(30,7291)        =       8.25
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0165                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	.0215016	.0052962	4.06	0.000	.0111196	.0318836
lnlbrincomeWF	.0686617	.019833	3.46	0.001	.0297832	.1075403
lnlbrincomeHD	.0051597	.0290097	0.18	0.859	-.0517076	.062027
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0049624	.0012067	-4.11	0.000	-.0073278	-.0025969
lnlbrincomeHD2	.001644	.0016212	1.01	0.311	-.0015341	.0048221
lntotalincome	-.0163707	.0068756	-2.38	0.017	-.0298489	-.0028926
ageHD	.0000394	.0035784	0.01	0.991	-.0069753	.007054
ageWF	.0035704	.0040228	0.89	0.375	-.0043155	.0114564
ageHD2	-.0000254	.000041	-0.62	0.535	-.0001057	.0000549
ageWF2	.0000154	.0000499	0.31	0.758	-.0000825	.0001133
childage	.0004935	.0006489	0.76	0.447	-.0007786	.0017656
numchildren	.0059636	.002997	1.99	0.047	.0000887	.0118385

For the couples with White men, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifewagesmore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if white
> man==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     25,943
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      4,554

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0500                                         min =          1
     between = 0.1162                                         avg =        5.7
     overall = 0.0843                                         max =         19

                                                F(30,21359)       =      37.44
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0797                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	.0261761	.0029414	8.90	0.000	.0204108	.0319413
lnlbrincomeWF	.0355142	.006743	5.27	0.000	.0222974	.048731
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0590636	.0097194	-6.08	0.000	-.0781143	-.0400129
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0038589	.0004275	-9.03	0.000	-.0046969	-.003021
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0049256	.0005634	8.74	0.000	.0038213	.0060299
lntotalincome	-.0100383	.0039313	-2.55	0.011	-.0177438	-.0023328
ageHD	-.0006024	.0019386	-0.31	0.756	-.0044023	.0031974
ageWF	-.0001497	.0018716	-0.08	0.936	-.0038181	.0035187
ageHD2	-7.91e-06	.0000234	-0.34	0.735	-.0000538	.000038
ageWF2	.0000248	.000023	1.07	0.282	-.0000204	.00007
childage	.0013354	.0003978	3.36	0.001	.0005558	.0021151
numchildren	.0018399	.0016643	1.11	0.269	-.0014223	.005102

For the entire sample, using total labor income comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
.
. xtreg relativehswk wifeincomemore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     41,749
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      7,050

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0365                                         min =          1
     between = 0.1033                                         avg =        5.9
     overall = 0.0651                                         max =         21

                                                F(32,34667)       =      40.98
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0700                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifeincomemore	.0045267	.0031448	1.44	0.150	-.0016373	.0106907
lnlbrincomeWF	.0235781	.0061037	3.86	0.000	.0116145	.0355416
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0397761	.0083187	-4.78	0.000	-.056081	-.0234711
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.002876	.0003827	-7.51	0.000	-.0036262	-.0021259
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0036206	.0004795	7.55	0.000	.0026808	.0045605
lntotalincome	-.011293	.0030801	-3.67	0.000	-.0173301	-.0052559
ageHD	-.0004424	.0015354	-0.29	0.773	-.0034519	.0025671
ageWF	.0019711	.0015511	1.27	0.204	-.0010691	.0050112
ageHD2	-7.98e-06	.0000183	-0.44	0.663	-.0000438	.0000279
ageWF2	8.00e-06	.0000194	0.41	0.679	-.0000299	.0000459
childage	.0001455	.0002985	0.49	0.626	-.0004397	.0007306
numchildren	.0011146	.001326	0.84	0.401	-.0014844	.0037136

For the couples with Black men, using total labor income comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifeincomemore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if blac
> kman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     10,156
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,885

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0302                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0583                                         avg =        5.4
     overall = 0.0413                                         max =         21

                                                F(32,8239)        =       8.02
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0203                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifeincomemore	.0046608	.0065038	0.72	0.474	-.0080883	.0174098
lnlbrincomeWF	.040785	.0190277	2.14	0.032	.003486	.0780841
lnlbrincomeHD	-.003487	.0223666	-0.16	0.876	-.0473312	.0403572
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0032874	.0011632	-2.83	0.005	-.0055675	-.0010073
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0019989	.0012876	1.55	0.121	-.0005251	.0045228
lntotalincome	-.018572	.0067435	-2.75	0.006	-.0317909	-.0053531
ageHD	-.0015363	.0033756	-0.46	0.649	-.0081533	.0050806
ageWF	.0058287	.0037848	1.54	0.124	-.0015906	.0132479
ageHD2	.0000112	.0000387	0.29	0.771	-.0000646	.000087
ageWF2	-.0000309	.0000472	-0.66	0.512	-.0001234	.0000615
childage	.0004359	.0006071	0.72	0.473	-.0007542	.0016259
numchildren	.0045038	.0028098	1.60	0.109	-.001004	.0100117

For the couples with White men, using total labor income comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifeincomemore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if whit
> eman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     28,985
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      4,623

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0445                                         min =          1
     between = 0.1157                                         avg =        6.3
     overall = 0.0791                                         max =         20

                                                F(32,24330)       =      35.41
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0810                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifeincomemore	.0039512	.0037492	1.05	0.292	-.0033975	.0112999
lnlbrincomeWF	.0229888	.0064447	3.57	0.000	.0103568	.0356207
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0513669	.0088561	-5.80	0.000	-.0687255	-.0340084
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.00296	.0004065	-7.28	0.000	-.0037568	-.0021632
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0041059	.0005145	7.98	0.000	.0030974	.0051144
lntotalincome	-.0085991	.0035891	-2.40	0.017	-.0156341	-.0015642
ageHD	.0002485	.0018201	0.14	0.891	-.003319	.003816
ageWF	.0000848	.0017646	0.05	0.962	-.0033738	.0035435
ageHD2	-.0000235	.000022	-1.07	0.285	-.0000665	.0000196
ageWF2	.0000277	.0000218	1.27	0.203	-.000015	.0000704
childage	.0010535	.0003719	2.83	0.005	.0003246	.0017824
numchildren	.0011614	.0015647	0.74	0.458	-.0019056	.0042284

For the lowest income couples, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifewagesmore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if incom
> egrp==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      8,849
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      3,327

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0430                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0653                                         avg =        2.7
     overall = 0.0620                                         max =         16

                                                F(30,5492)        =       8.23
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0485                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	.0151936	.0058842	2.58	0.010	.0036582	.026729
lnlbrincomeWF	.0284652	.0160961	1.77	0.077	-.0030896	.06002
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0598763	.0297882	-2.01	0.044	-.1182731	-.0014796
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0029238	.0010922	-2.68	0.007	-.0050649	-.0007827
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0057558	.0018144	3.17	0.002	.0021988	.0093127
lntotalincome	-.0127635	.0081791	-1.56	0.119	-.0287977	.0032708
ageHD	.0051036	.0039855	1.28	0.200	-.0027095	.0129167
ageWF	-.006077	.0046583	-1.30	0.192	-.0152091	.0030552
ageHD2	-.0000563	.000049	-1.15	0.251	-.0001523	.0000398
ageWF2	.0000739	.0000624	1.18	0.236	-.0000484	.0001962
childage	.0012459	.0009236	1.35	0.177	-.0005646	.0030565
numchildren	.0016418	.0038179	0.43	0.667	-.0058428	.0091265

For the middle income couples, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifewagesmore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if incom
> egrp==2, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     14,422
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      4,402

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0354                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0730                                         avg =        3.3
     overall = 0.0611                                         max =         16

                                                F(30,9990)        =      12.21
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0502                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	.023467	.0045291	5.18	0.000	.014589	.032345
lnlbrincomeWF	.0087856	.0136456	0.64	0.520	-.0179625	.0355337
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0473284	.02316	-2.04	0.041	-.0927266	-.0019302
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0020455	.0008854	-2.31	0.021	-.003781	-.0003099
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0045422	.0013754	3.30	0.001	.0018461	.0072383
lntotalincome	-.0324055	.0149417	-2.17	0.030	-.0616943	-.0031166
ageHD	.0006699	.0028596	0.23	0.815	-.0049356	.0062753
ageWF	.0044289	.0026964	1.64	0.101	-.0008566	.0097144
ageHD2	-.0000171	.0000334	-0.51	0.609	-.0000826	.0000484
ageWF2	-.0000201	.0000313	-0.64	0.519	-.0000814	.0000411
childage	.0000339	.0005722	0.06	0.953	-.0010877	.0011555
numchildren	-.0026409	.0026704	-0.99	0.323	-.0078753	.0025936

For the upper income couples, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg relativehswk wifewagesmore lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if incom
> egrp==3, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     13,983
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      3,521

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0518                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0808                                         avg =        4.0
     overall = 0.0795                                         max =         17

                                                F(30,10432)       =      18.99
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0351                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

relativehswk	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	.0327506	.0041158	7.96	0.000	.0246828	.0408184
lnlbrincomeWF	.0552391	.0108635	5.08	0.000	.0339446	.0765336
lnlbrincomeHD	-.0348888	.0183813	-1.90	0.058	-.0709197	.0011421
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0048041	.0006561	-7.32	0.000	-.0060902	-.0035179
lnlbrincomeHD2	.0036689	.0009708	3.78	0.000	.001766	.0055719
lntotalincome	-.0005089	.0081111	-0.06	0.950	-.0164082	.0153904
ageHD	-.0015397	.0034692	-0.44	0.657	-.00834	.0052606
ageWF	.0007759	.0034313	0.23	0.821	-.0059501	.0075018
ageHD2	3.31e-06	.0000398	0.08	0.934	-.0000748	.0000814
ageWF2	.0000304	.0000413	0.74	0.462	-.0000506	.0001114
childage	.0005209	.0005359	0.97	0.331	-.0005295	.0015713
numchildren	.0076625	.0023095	3.32	0.001	.0031354	.0121896

I also use men's hours spent on housework as the dependent variable. The results from this specification are presented below.

For the entire sample, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     37,297
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      6,916

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0539                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0566                                         avg =        5.4
     overall = 0.0609                                         max =         19

                                                F(31,30350)       =      55.73
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0141                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswrkHD	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	-.7446456	.1190736	-6.25	0.000	-.9780349	-.5112563
hswrkWF	.1436529	.0039257	36.59	0.000	.1359584	.1513474
lnlbrincomeWF	-.5438576	.3026244	-1.80	0.072	-1.137014	.049299
lnlbrincomeHD	.7713987	.4430409	1.74	0.082	-.0969801	1.639778
lnlbrincomeWF2	.0742535	.0190381	3.90	0.000	.0369379	.1115691
lnlbrincomeHD2	-.1167238	.0253423	-4.61	0.000	-.1663957	-.0670519
lntotalincome	.6762223	.1589473	4.25	0.000	.3646789	.9877658
ageHD	.061997	.0776682	0.80	0.425	-.090236	.21423
ageWF	-.1246215	.0781716	-1.59	0.111	-.2778412	.0285981
ageHD2	-.0001086	.0009254	-0.12	0.907	-.0019224	.0017052
ageWF2	.0007558	.0009715	0.78	0.437	-.0011484	.00266
childage	-.0365462	.0151291	-2.42	0.016	-.0661998	-.0068926
numchildren	.1717001	.0671475	2.56	0.011	.0400881	.303312

For couples with Black men, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if bl
> ackman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,176
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,842

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0721                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0607                                         avg =        5.0
     overall = 0.0809                                         max =         19

                                                F(31,7303)        =      18.30
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0231                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswrkHD	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	-.7809054	.2373021	-3.29	0.001	-1.246086	-.3157248
hswrkWF	.1762031	.0082387	21.39	0.000	.1600528	.1923534
lnlbrincomeWF	-1.563852	.890277	-1.76	0.079	-3.309052	.181348
lnlbrincomeHD	-.2909461	1.302397	-0.22	0.823	-2.84402	2.262128
lnlbrincomeWF2	.1087347	.0541677	2.01	0.045	.0025504	.2149191
lnlbrincomeHD2	-.0544045	.0727812	-0.75	0.455	-.1970766	.0882676
lntotalincome	1.066246	.3087617	3.45	0.001	.4609842	1.671508
ageHD	-.0512189	.1604606	-0.32	0.750	-.365768	.2633303
ageWF	-.3205426	.1803977	-1.78	0.076	-.6741742	.0330889
ageHD2	.001719	.0018384	0.94	0.350	-.0018849	.0053229
ageWF2	.0020045	.0022403	0.89	0.371	-.0023872	.0063963
childage	.0094122	.0290747	0.32	0.746	-.0475826	.066407
numchildren	.0973788	.1345973	0.72	0.469	-.1664708	.3612284

For couples with White men, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if wh
> iteman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     25,970
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      4,557

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0516                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0542                                         avg =        5.7
     overall = 0.0576                                         max =         19

                                                F(31,21382)       =      37.55
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0088                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswrkHD	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	-.6700145	.1397906	-4.79	0.000	-.9440145	-.3960144
hswrkWF	.1292065	.0045302	28.52	0.000	.1203271	.138086
lnlbrincomeWF	-.5259988	.3205429	-1.64	0.101	-1.154287	.1022894
lnlbrincomeHD	1.049183	.4619999	2.27	0.023	.1436285	1.954737
lnlbrincomeWF2	.0765398	.020347	3.76	0.000	.0366582	.1164214
lnlbrincomeHD2	-.1261291	.026778	-4.71	0.000	-.1786161	-.0736422
lntotalincome	.406215	.1869259	2.17	0.030	.0398262	.7726038
ageHD	.1425477	.0921219	1.55	0.122	-.038018	.3231135
ageWF	-.0312106	.0889105	-0.35	0.726	-.2054819	.1430607
ageHD2	-.0012464	.0011118	-1.12	0.262	-.0034256	.0009328
ageWF2	.0003222	.0010948	0.29	0.769	-.0018238	.0024682
childage	-.0905916	.0188423	-4.81	0.000	-.1275239	-.0536593
numchildren	.169949	.0793299	2.14	0.032	.0144564	.3254416

For couples in the lowest income group, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      8,854
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      3,328

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0451                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0545                                         avg =        2.7
     overall = 0.0527                                         max =         16

                                                F(31,5495)        =       8.38
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0103                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswrkHD	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	-.3537891	.3047898	-1.16	0.246	-.9512977	.2437195
hswrkWF	.1012632	.0089654	11.29	0.000	.0836875	.118839
lnlbrincomeWF	-.9548916	.8345697	-1.14	0.253	-2.590978	.6811953
lnlbrincomeHD	1.153237	1.543933	0.75	0.455	-1.873483	4.179957
lnlbrincomeWF2	.0873824	.0566622	1.54	0.123	-.023698	.1984628
lnlbrincomeHD2	-.1863921	.0940332	-1.98	0.048	-.3707345	-.0020497
lntotalincome	1.333595	.4240295	3.15	0.002	.5023293	2.164861
ageHD	-.0050753	.2066894	-0.02	0.980	-.4102683	.4001177
ageWF	.1334386	.2415062	0.55	0.581	-.3400091	.6068864
ageHD2	.0001179	.0025401	0.05	0.963	-.0048616	.0050974
ageWF2	-.0009156	.003235	-0.28	0.777	-.0072575	.0054264
childage	-.1442005	.0479086	-3.01	0.003	-.2381204	-.0502806
numchildren	-.0231237	.1981928	-0.12	0.907	-.41166	.3654126

For couples in the middle income group, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==2, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     14,437
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      4,405

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0630                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0619                                         avg =        3.3
     overall = 0.0735                                         max =         16

                                                F(31,10001)       =      21.68
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0218                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswrkHD	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	-.4948717	.2091876	-2.37	0.018	-.9049215	-.0848219
hswrkWF	.1617054	.0067897	23.82	0.000	.1483962	.1750147
lnlbrincomeWF	1.424687	.630047	2.26	0.024	.189668	2.659706
lnlbrincomeHD	1.171412	1.069672	1.10	0.273	-.9253602	3.268184
lnlbrincomeWF2	-.0468257	.0408699	-1.15	0.252	-.1269389	.0332875
lnlbrincomeHD2	-.1294832	.0635232	-2.04	0.042	-.2540015	-.0049649
lntotalincome	.9590847	.6898675	1.39	0.164	-.3931944	2.311364
ageHD	-.113693	.1320183	-0.86	0.389	-.3724754	.1450894
ageWF	-.143403	.1244787	-1.15	0.249	-.3874063	.1006004
ageHD2	.0017803	.001543	1.15	0.249	-.0012444	.0048049
ageWF2	.0007916	.0014432	0.55	0.583	-.0020373	.0036205
childage	.0016205	.0262863	0.06	0.951	-.049906	.0531471
numchildren	.4257055	.1233832	3.45	0.001	.1838497	.6675614

For couples in the upper income group, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==3, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     14,006
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      3,524

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0659                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0339                                         avg =        4.0
     overall = 0.0601                                         max =         17

                                                F(31,10451)       =      23.78
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0254                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
```

hswrkHD	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
wifewagesmore	-.8808279	.1857664	-4.74	0.000	-1.244965	-.5166902
hswrkWF	.1660616	.0069029	24.06	0.000	.1525306	.1795925
lnlbrincomeWF	-1.528519	.4909489	-3.11	0.002	-2.490872	-.5661653
lnlbrincomeHD	1.05104	.8310185	1.26	0.206	-.577915	2.679995
lnlbrincomeWF2	.134686	.0296786	4.54	0.000	.0765103	.1928617
lnlbrincomeHD2	-.1066522	.0438669	-2.43	0.015	-.1926397	-.0206647
lntotalincome	-.1402643	.3663454	-0.38	0.702	-.8583713	.5778427
ageHD	.1648204	.1568047	1.05	0.293	-.1425467	.4721876
ageWF	-.1519365	.1546906	-0.98	0.326	-.4551596	.1512865
ageHD2	-.0007832	.0018008	-0.43	0.664	-.0043131	.0027466
ageWF2	.0002908	.0018626	0.16	0.876	-.0033603	.0039418
childage	-.0251898	.0241556	-1.04	0.297	-.0725394	.0221599
numchildren	-.0491074	.104967	-0.47	0.640	-.2548629	.156648

For couples in the lower, middle and upper income group (respectively) with Black men, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==1 & blackman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,787
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,040

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0791                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0832                                         avg =        2.7
     overall = 0.0892                                         max =         13

                                                F(31,1716)        =       4.75
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0076                        Prob > F          =     0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     hswrkHD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
wifewagesmore |   -.7044177   .4979226    -1.41   0.157    -1.681017    .2721814
     hswrkWF |    .1413825   .0150631     9.39   0.000     .1118386    .1709264
lnlbrincomeWF |   -1.088138   2.118082    -0.51   0.608    -5.242434    3.066157
lnlbrincomeHD |    2.954674   3.002855     0.98   0.325    -2.934969    8.844317
lnlbrincomeWF2 |    .0721678    .136785     0.53   0.598     -.196115    .3404506
lnlbrincomeHD2 |   -.2714318   .1823075    -1.49   0.137    -.6290001    .0861364
lntotalincome |    1.062419   .6442274     1.65   0.099    -.2011348    2.325973
        ageHD |   -.4145638   .3137756    -1.32   0.187    -1.029987    .2008591
        ageWF |   -.7004453   .3925504    -1.78   0.075    -1.470373    .0694825
      ageHD2 |    .0040791   .0035377     1.15   0.249    -.0028597    .0110178
      ageWF2 |    .0088304   .0049557     1.78   0.075    -.0008895    .0185502
    childage |    .0333259   .0762047     0.44   0.662     -.116138    .1827898
  numchildren |    .1217516   .3093813     0.39   0.694    -.4850527    .7285558

. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if
> comegrp==2 & blackman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,804
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,208

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0986                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0644                                         avg =        3.1
     overall = 0.0965                                         max =         14

                                                F(31,2565)        =       9.05
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0203                        Prob > F          =     0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     hswrkHD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
wifewagesmore |   -.616952   .4281196    -1.44   0.150    -1.456447    .2225432
     hswrkWF |    .2126849   .0152627    13.93   0.000     .1827564    .2426135
lnlbrincomeWF |   -1.00128   2.858001    -0.35   0.726    -6.605503    4.602943
lnlbrincomeHD |  -14.13564   5.679065    -2.49   0.013    -25.27166   -2.999625
lnlbrincomeWF2 |    .0973634   .1706313     0.57   0.568    -.2372257    .4319525
lnlbrincomeHD2 |    .6724701   .3126466     2.15   0.032     .0594047    1.285535
lntotalincome |    2.201268   1.681664     1.31   0.191    -1.096288    5.498825
        ageHD |   -.1404511   .2941545    -0.48   0.633    -.7172555    .4363533
        ageWF |    .0911361   .3311925     0.28   0.783    -.5582958    .7405679
      ageHD2 |    .0031858   .0034122     0.93   0.351    -.0035051    .0098766
      ageWF2 |   -.004082   .0041501    -0.98   0.325    -.0122199     .004056
    childage |    .0679547   .0541456     1.26   0.210    -.0382188    .1741283
  numchildren |    .5912991   .2696783     2.19   0.028     .0624897    1.120108

. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==3 & blackman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,585
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =        719

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.1009                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0103                                         avg =        3.6
     overall = 0.0583                                         max =         17

                                                F(31,1835)        =       6.64
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1160                        Prob > F          =     0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     hswrkHD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
wifewagesmore |   -.4407121   .4090723    -1.08   0.281    -1.243008    .3615842
     hswrkWF |    .2005872   .0169564    11.83   0.000     .1673313     .233843
lnlbrincomeWF |   -4.221138   3.299055    -1.28   0.201    -10.69144    2.249159
lnlbrincomeHD |    11.47839   7.207433     1.59   0.111    -2.657243    25.61402
lnlbrincomeWF2 |    .2473212   .1803324     1.37   0.170    -.1063571    .6009995
lnlbrincomeHD2 |   -.4906004   .3512203    -1.40   0.163    -1.179434    .1982331
lntotalincome |   -1.181914   1.153637    -1.02   0.306    -3.444493    1.080666
        ageHD |    .231782   .3740923     0.62   0.536    -.5019093    .9654733
        ageWF |    .1666945   .3980302     0.42   0.675    -.6139453    .9473343
      ageHD2 |   -.001882   .0042355    -0.44   0.657     -.010189     .006425
      ageWF2 |   -.0010867   .0047295    -0.23   0.818    -.0103624    .0081889
    childage |   -.0955237   .0434516    -2.20   0.028    -.1807435   -.010304
  numchildren |   -.2945751   .2345855    -1.26   0.209    -.7546578    .1655076
```

For couples in the lower, middle and upper income group (respectively) with White men, using hourly-wage rate comparison as the independent variable of interest:

```
. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==1 & whiteman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,183
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      1,930

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0557                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0353                                         avg =        2.7
     overall = 0.0514                                         max =         16

                                                F(31,3222)        =       6.13
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0552                        Prob > F          =     0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     hswrkHD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
wifewagesmore |  -.3599142   .4168678    -0.86   0.388    -1.177267    .4574387
      hswrkWF |   .0775576    .012057     6.43   0.000     .0539175    .1011977
 lnlbrincomeWF |  -.8459653   .9683152    -0.87   0.382    -2.744541    1.052611
 lnlbrincomeHD |   2.118561   1.864995     1.14   0.256    -1.538136    5.775258
lnlbrincomeWF2 |   .0837483   .0675623     1.24   0.215    -.0487211    .2162177
lnlbrincomeHD2 |  -.2633922   .1143476    -2.30   0.021    -.4875936   -.0391908
 lntotalincome |   1.423051   .5797644     2.45   0.014     .2863065    2.559795
         ageHD |   .1608556   .3252597     0.49   0.621    -.4768813    .7985925
         ageWF |    .433923   .3570706     1.22   0.224    -.2661856    1.134032
        ageHD2 |  -.0012595   .0044116    -0.29   0.775    -.0099094    .0073904
        ageWF2 |  -.0044696   .0051103    -0.87   0.382    -.0144894    .0055503
      childage |  -.3031903    .068579    -4.42   0.000    -.4376532   -.1687274
   numchildren |   .2229707   .2836552     0.79   0.432    -.3331923    .7791336
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==2 & whiteman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,858
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      2,899

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0656                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0473                                         avg =        3.4
     overall = 0.0683                                         max =         16

                                                F(31,6928)        =      15.68
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0118                         Prob > F          =     0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     hswrkHD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
wifewagesmore |  -.3403269   .2375399    -1.43   0.152    -.8059779     .125324
      hswrkWF |   .1482589   .0073523    20.16   0.000     .1338461    .1626717
 lnlbrincomeWF |    1.50182   .6197217     2.42   0.015     .2869755    2.716664
 lnlbrincomeHD |   1.182991   1.022984     1.16   0.248    -.8223702    3.188353
lnlbrincomeWF2 |   -.049702   .0408909    -1.22   0.224    -.1298607    .0304568
lnlbrincomeHD2 |  -.1140025   .0625276    -1.82   0.068    -.2365758    .0085708
 lntotalincome |   .1719385   .7576244     0.23   0.820    -1.313237    1.657115
         ageHD |  -.1016752   .1494791    -0.68   0.496       -.3947    .1913496
         ageWF |   .0296824   .1334933     0.22   0.824    -.2320054    .2913701
        ageHD2 |   .0008613   .0017526     0.49   0.623    -.0025742    .0042969
        ageWF2 |   .0000301   .0014754     0.02   0.984    -.0028621    .0029223
      childage |  -.0551158   .0305512    -1.80   0.071    -.1150055    .0047739
   numchildren |    .229987   .1381034     1.67   0.096    -.0407379    .5007119
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. xtreg hswrkHD wifewagesmore hswrkWF lnlbrincomeWF lnlbrincomeHD lnlbrincomeWF2 lnlbrincomeHD2 lntotalincome ageHD ageWF ageHD2 ageWF2 childage numchildren i.yrnum if in
> comegrp==3 & whiteman==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     10,929
Group variable: personID                        Number of groups  =      2,642

R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
     within  = 0.0653                                         min =          1
     between = 0.0297                                         avg =        4.1
     overall = 0.0583                                         max =         17

                                                F(31,8256)        =      18.61
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0310                        Prob > F          =     0.0000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     hswrkHD |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
wifewagesmore |   -.873962   .2118079    -4.13   0.000    -1.289159   -.4587653
      hswrkWF |   .1569632   .0076399    20.55   0.000     .1419872    .1719393
 lnlbrincomeWF |  -1.606166   .4979592    -3.23   0.001    -2.582291   -.6300405
 lnlbrincomeHD |   1.120412   .8311177     1.35   0.178     -.508788    2.749611
lnlbrincomeWF2 |   .1394246   .0304678     4.58   0.000       .0797    .1991492
lnlbrincomeHD2 |  -.1195971   .0445761    -2.68   0.007    -.2069774   -.0322168
 lntotalincome |    .082375   .3926783     0.21   0.834    -.6873731    .8521232
         ageHD |   .0649229   .1845722     0.35   0.725    -.2968849    .4267308
         ageWF |  -.1568798   .1795906    -0.87   0.382    -.5089225     .195163
        ageHD2 |   .0000706   .0020984     0.03   0.973    -.0040429     .004184
        ageWF2 |   .0002095   .0021271     0.10   0.922    -.0039603    .0043792
      childage |   .0217837   .0311017     0.70   0.484    -.0391834    .0827508
   numchildren |    .058221   .1200008     0.49   0.628    -.1770107    .2934528
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```