Regulatory Distortion: Evidence from Uber's Entry Decisions in the US[1]

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Abstract

There is a large and long-standing literature on the distortionary effects of regulations on the functioning of markets. A newer strand of this literature focuses on licensing regulations, such as state-specific licensing of teachers and hairdressers. We seek to add to this literature with the specific case of ride-hailing services, such as Uber. We assemble a new and comprehensive data set of 250 US cities and their regulations regarding hackney services. We specify a stylized profit model for Uber, which is a function of these regulations, and estimate the parameters of the profit function using observed Uber entry decisions into these cities. Our data set and empirical strategy allow us to estimate the differential effects of particular types of regulations, separating out regulations governing safety, governing operations, and erecting entry barriers. We find that safety regulations do not have a distortionary effect on the functioning of the market for hackney services and evading them does not increase Uber's profits. We find evidence that Uber's profits are increased, however, by their ability to evade regulatory entry barriers and regulations governing operations. In other words, those regulations do have a significant distortionary effect on the market. To the extent that safety-related regulations are welfare-enhancing and those erecting entry barriers are welfare-decreasing, our results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of Uber's entry.

1 Introduction

The 2014-15 season of CBS's *Elementary*, a popular police procedural, featured a plot line where a driver for a ride-hailing service was murdered. The name of the ride-hailing service was invented for the show, but it was a thinly-veiled reference to Uber, perhaps others like Lyft as well. The first and most obvious suspect was a taxi driver furious over revenue lost to these services, popular culture testament to the disruptive effects of ride-hailing on legacy hackney[1] industries.

Consider also the effect on well-established markets in a few major US cities for buying and selling medallions, or the right to operate a taxicab.[2] Figure 1 shows time series of taxicab medallion prices in six cities.[3] We have noted on the figures the dates at which both Uber and Lyft entered each market. What is clear from these graphs is that the markets for medallions have collapsed over the past couple of years. Transactions prices leveled off soon after Uber entry and then fell precipitously. Volume also dropped dramatically, often before price fell, perhaps reflecting uncertainty in the market causing a hesitance to transact.

The transformation that ride-hailing services such as Uber are leading is certainly the stuff of lunch-time conversations as well as prime-time drama, but our focus here will be what actions by firms such as Uber can tell us about the regulatory environments in which their competitors operate. In particular, we seek to exploit the observed entry decisions of Uber to infer information on the distortionary effect of various regulations. We formulate a simple model of profit and are able to estimate parameters of this model, as well as characteristics of the cost distribution. We do this by combining assumptions implicit in our profit model with observations on entry decisions and their timing as well as city demographic, structural, and regulatory characteristics.

[1] Since we are Bostonians, we adopt the official terminology used here, "hackney services." We will also use the more familiar "taxicab" interchangeably with "hackney."

[2] Most US cities that have active taxicab fleets either do not have medallion systems or do not have active markets in the sale of these medallions. We were able to find fairly complete data on five medallion systems, New York, Chicago, Boston, Miami, and Philadelphia. New York, Chicago, and Boston seem to have the most active markets in medallions and, therefore, more complete data. Note that many other municipalities use other regulatory levers to control or prevent entry.

[3] The data used to create the medallion graphs were obtained from both regulatory websites and private websites.

We have compiled a detailed and comprehensive data set of the regulations imposed on hackney services by 250 cities and towns in the US, some of which experienced Uber entry by July 2015 and some of which did not. Furthermore, conditional on Uber entry, we know the date of entry. We can, therefore, examine the pattern of Uber entry over time as a function of the regulatory environment and demographics to assess the relative importance of particulars in the regulatory environment. We will flesh out our empirical strategy in later sections. First, though, it is important to note that regulations are not all created equal. They can have vastly different intents and effects on profits, market structure, and consumer welfare. A regulation requiring a potential entrant of hackney services to "prove pubic necessity" is clearly intended to deter entry and protect incumbents. A regulation requiring background checks of taxi drivers is likely intended to alleviate an asymmetric information problem and ensure the safety of passengers riding alone in cars with drivers. In our analysis, we will allow for these different types of regulations to have different effects on market distortion and Uber entry decisions.

The main economic argument in favor of the regulatory structure is the ability to license and monitor owners and drivers to ensure higher quality (availability, better driving skills, knowledge of local area, honesty, cleanliness, safety, environmentalism, lack of discrimination, etc.). Anyone who has ever ridden in a taxi can attest to the fact that hackney commissions have had uneven records regarding ensuring quality along those dimensions. This observation suggests an alternative view of the regulatory structure: hackney commissions might have originally come into existence to ensure quality but they have since been captured by the industry and now work largely to protect monopoly power and capture rents for the taxicab owners and drivers. It is difficult to justify regulations on geographic licensing, for instance, which require a Boston taxi taking a customer to Cambridge to return empty, on quality or efficiency grounds. We will remain somewhat agnostic on the question of whether the regulations in the hackney industry are overall welfare-improving, but, throughout the paper, there is a presumption that some of them have little scope for improving quality or enhancing welfare.

In addition to shedding light on the distortionary effects of hackney regulations, an auxiliary but important motivation of our paper is simply to offer a case study of the transformation of a long-standing industry. Economists have studied the markets for hackney services before, and the advent of ride-hailing services has caused an uptick in research interest. An important paper by Camerer et al (1997) estimated the labor supply elasticity of New York City taxicab drivers and found a large, negative, and significant elasticity. Their explanation, grounded in behavioral theory, is that taxicab drivers shoot for a certain target income each day and, when reached, supply their labor less willingly. A follow-on literature, for instance Farber (2005) and Crawford and Meng (2011), sought alternative explanations or nuance to the original result of Camerer et al. Recent papers by Bucholtz (2017) and Frechette, Lizzeri, and Salz (2016) exploit a rich data set made available by New York City of all taxicab rides from 2009-2013. They both estimate structural models of ride supply and demand to answer various questions about market functioning and perform policy counterfactuals. There is a growing literature looking at ride-hailing services specifically. We mention a few notable papers below. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) use a difference-in-difference approach to exploit the natural experiment of the entry of two different Uber services in California towns. They find a significant drop in the rate of alcohol-related vehicle homocides after the introduction of Uber. Hall and Krueger (2015) provide a descriptive study using proprietary Uber data on drivers, which establishes many interesting facts about the driver population and behavior. Chen et al (2017) study the value of flexibility to Uber drivers, again using proprietary Uber data, and find that drivers earn more than twice the surplus they would relative to less flexible work arrangements.

Our paper clearly fits in the broad landscape of empirical studies of the effects of regulation. We will not attempt a comprehensive discussion of that vast literature, but only mention that our paper is in the tradition of cross-sectional studies of regulation, observing the differential operation of different, say, geographic markets under regulatory regimes that differ geographically, such as those for electrical utilities across states or pharmaceuticals across countries. A quite closely-related study is Kyle (2007). She documents that price cap regulation in certain European countries has a statistically significant effect on entry patterns of pharmaceuticals. In particular, she finds that firms avoid countries with price caps, that firms headquartered in countries with price caps enter fewer countries, and that products introduced into countries with price caps will subsequently enter fewer countries. Her study differs from ours in two important ways. First, we study an empirical setting with complicated, multidimensional, and varied regulatory structures, and have data on them, allowing us to comment on the differential effects of certain provisions within a broader regulatory regime. Second, we exploit actions of a firm providing a substitute but *not* subject to the regulations and offer a structural interpretation, based on a stylized model of firm profits, of firm entry decisions. She is, instead, looking at the decisions of firms who are subject to the regulatory framework she studies.

Finally, as suggested above, our study is relevant to the literature and current debate on occupational licensing. Many of the regulations applying to hackney services are akin to licensing requirements. Drivers sometimes need special municipality-specific hackney licenses, and firms offering services often need to register and apply for licenses to operate in a specific municipality. Furthermore, these licenses can be limited in number. The labor literature on licensing has pointed out the inefficiencies that licensing requirements might cause by erecting unnecessary barriers to entry and hampering worker mobility. See, for instance, Kleiner and Krueger (2008) and Gittleman and Kleiner (2013). Onerous licensing requirements in some industries, such as hair styling, appear to be clear-cut cases of regulatory capture. In other industries, such as healthcare, there is broad concensus around the need for licensing, but these requirements can still be captured by market participants and used as a device to ensure entry at levels suboptimal for consumers.

So far, the labor literature has documented the prevalence and growth of licensing requirements in detail, and has also looked at the effect on wages, but little work has attempted to quantify the other possible distortionary effects of these regulations. Our study can comment on this issue by seeing how the regulations impact the profits and entry decisions of a potential competitor who would not be subject to them. In other words, regulations which had a large distortionary effect on the market by, say, ensuring a suboptimal number of hackney licenses (from a welfare perspective) would create a large incentive for a potential entrant to exploit the distortion. Observing Uber's entry decisions as a function of licensing and other regulations will help us gauge the magnitude of the distortionary effects.

We find evidence that regulations creating barriers to entry and regulations governing operations did result in market distortions, leading to significantly earlier entry by Uber. In contrast, we find no evidence that safety-related regulations caused market distortions that were exploited by Uber.

In the following section, we recount a brief history of hackney operation and regulation. Section 3 discusses the data set for the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical model and results of the main analysis. We conclude in Section 5.

2 A Short History of Hackney Services and Regulation

It is difficult to know the exact historical origins of for-hire transportation.[4][5] We do know, though, that a direct antecedent of modern taxicab fleets, for-hire hackney carriage services, began operating in both London and Paris in the early 17th century. These services, obviously horse-drawn at the time, were often hired by innkeepers for their guests. The first regulation of these services was not far behind their introduction, appearing in 1635, when British Parliament passed the Hackney Carriage Act. It was followed by the Ordinance for Regulation of Hackney-Coachmen in London and the Places Adjacent in 1654. The first hackney-carriage licenses were issued in 1662. Other cities followed London's lead both in terms of services available and regulation of those services.

A mechanical "taximeter" to measure the fare was developed in the 19th century, giving rise to the term "taxicab," a portmanteau of "taximeter" and "cabriolet." Something akin to a modern taxicab became common around the turn of the 20th century: gasoline-powered, meter-equipped vehicles for hire were operating in major cities in Europe and North America. Demand for services grew, as did the fleets, and by the 1910's, New York City had half a dozen large fleets, mostly owned by automobile manufacturers, as well as thousands of independent owner/drivers.

In New York City in 1934, to protest wages and corruption in the industry, 2000 taxi drivers took over Times Square, crippling the city. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia responded

[4]Gondolas, for instance, were first mentioned in a letter from a Venetian Republic official in 1094 (See "The Rough Guide to Venice and the Veneto.")

[5]Information from this section was taken from various documents and websites we cite in the references. We do not provide the source of every fact separately.

by signing the Haas Act of 1937, introducing the medallion system that exists to this day in New York City. The system was intended to put a strict and binding limit on supply, in the case of New York City, capping the number of taxicabs at 16,900, therefore helping to ensure adequate (typically excess) demand for each taxicab. The number of medallions in New York has actually decreased since 1937 and now stands at 13,437.[6] It is interesting to note that in the case of the Haas Act, at least, the regulation was demanded by drivers and aimed at controlling entry into the market.

Not all cities have medallion systems, but several major US cities, such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and Atlanta do. In those cities, medallions can be bought and sold,[7] and, in some cases, active markets and extensive data on prices and quantities exist. Many cities do not have medallion systems, but use other regulatory levers to control or prevent entry of taxicabs. We discuss the nature and scope of regulation in more detail in the data section.

Other regulations governing operations have been enacted in various places. For instance, matching between taxicabs and customers seeking a ride is aided in some cities by extensive use of cab stands, also known as hack stands or cab ranks. These are designated areas where taxicabs can queue up to wait for customers. Some cities, such as Boston and Cambridge, use them extensively. In fact, since a large fraction of taxicabs are waiting in cab stands, hailing a taxicab on the street can often take much longer than walking to the nearest cab stand. New York City, in contrast, does not make such extensive use of cab stands. Some cities mandate that taxicab companies must operate around the clock. Others mandate that cars must be dispatched by radio, although such a regulation seems counterproductive given recent advances in dispatching algorithms and wireless communication.

Taxicab fares are routinely capped, and sometimes mandated, by regulation in U.S. cities. These regulations vary locally or at the state level and are the result of local costs and wages, lobbying by firms, customer input, and other factors. Note that even if the regulation on taxicabs comes in the form of a cap as opposed to a mandate, meters typically

[6]See NYC Taxi & Limosine Commission Factbook.

[7]San Francisco has a medallion system but prohibited the private sale of medallions in 1978.

charge the cap without the possibility of lowering the fare during periods of low demand or high supply, which may result in the cap behaving more or less as a mandate. In other words, fare stickiness should be thought of as the result of both regulatory restrictions and technological limitations of the meters. The combination of these two factors makes adaptive, or equilibrium, pricing for taxicabs close to impossible. So periods of high demand cannot be addressed by temporarily raising fares, thus both inducing a supply response and causing low-valuation passengers to seek alternative transportation. It should also be noted that taxicabs in the US accept (and expect) tips, so reported fares understate actual fares.[8]

As we will discuss in the following section, we assembled a comprehensive data set of hackney regulations in 250 US cities. In doing so, we came across a wide variety of different regulations, not all of which made it into our final data set. In addtion to ones mentioned above, we found explicit caps on the number of taxicabs, geographic restrictions on pick-ups, limits on advertising in and on vehicles, dress codes for drivers, required proof of public need for entry, and many others.

A crucial point to emphasize (and a key to our empirical strategy) is that Uber was not subject to the regulatory structures that applied to taxicabs in US cities. This situation resuslted from the working definitions that most cities used to regulate hackney industries: a taxicab was a car that could pick passengers up on the street when hailed or park at cabstands and wait for passengers there. Cars with whom passengers would have to arrange ahead of time were typically subject to different and much less stringent regulatory structures, if any. Ubers, of course, did neither of the things that would categorize them as taxicabs. Furthermore, Uber argued that its drivers were independent contractors rather than employees, so regulatory compliance, if any occurred, was not Uber's responsibility.

The advent of ride-hailing services has a rethinking of taxi deregulation in many US cities as well as discussions of how cities can bring Uber under their current regulatory regime. Some attempts at deregulation of hackney services predate the entry of ride-hailing services, of course. A notable example is the Irish deregulation in 2000. Barrett (2003)

[8]In Boston, UberX has a base fare of \$2. Fares increase \$0.20 a minute and \$1.24 a mile. Compare this with taxis, which have a base fare of \$2.60, increasing at a rate of \$2.80 a mile. Unlike taxis, though, Uber fares can and do vary with supply and demand conditions, so those base fares are often in force but not always.

discusses the particulars of the reform and estimates its effects: a three-fold increase in the the number of taxis, much reduced passenger waiting times, and no discernable reduction in either driver or vehicle standards.

3 Data

The data for our analysis of Uber entry and regulatory environments are drawn from many sources. We gathered data on entry dates from Uber's website (including archived pages from Internet Archive). We gathered data on regulated taxicab fares from taxi-farefinder.com (including archived pages). We gathered city-level demographics and other covariates from various sources, including census reports. Finally, we put together a detailed and comprehensive data set on regulations governing taxi drivers and hackney industries. These data were compiled from city and state websites, the US Department of Labor's website, and emails and phone calls to local regulatory bodies. All of these data sets are at the city level, although the definition of a city varies across data sources. The regulations, for instance, are often at the level of municipality: Boston's regulations differ from Cambridge's, which is across the river. They also each have separate taxi fleets. Uber, however, entered the Boston metropolitan area at once, not Boston and Cambridge separately. In other words, the Uber entry data are at the metropolitan area level whereas regulations could vary within those metropolitan areas. We describe below how we handle these mismatches.

First, however, we describe how we create our measures of regulatory burden. Recall that we want to see how important explanations such as the technological—more efficient dispatch, real-time supply response—and the regulatory—avoiding potentially distortionary and burdensome regulation—are to explaining equilibrium demand for Uber services. In order to carry out such an analysis, we must have a measure or measures of regulatory burden. Our construction of measures was guided by a detailed study on the regulatory hurdles imposed on potential entrants to the taxicab market in large cities in Ohio (prepared by the Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions). The detail in that study allowed us to define potential areas of regulation, ranging from location of dispatch operations to appropriate clothing for the drivers. After identifying these potential areas, we then called or visited websites of local governing bodies and did one of two things: For variables that naturally were binary in nature, for instance, whether taxis were only allowed to pick up at cab stands, we coded a 1 for a municipality that imposed that regulation and 0 otherwise. For variables that were linear in nature, for instance, minimum age of driver, we transformed them to take on values between 0 and 1 where 1 was the most restrictive.

Unfortunately, a number of areas of potential regulation had to be dropped entirely from the data set. For instance, we were only able to obtain information on a couple of cities which regulated attire for taxi drivers. We might have assumed that no other cities had such regulations and assigned them 0, but, absent definitive information, we decided to omit the areas on which our information was particularly sparse from the set we used. We are not overly concerned about these data issues, however. Since our goal is to determine whether a city's regulatory enviroment had an effect on the timing of Uber's entry into that city, we might expect that Uber's decisions would be based on the *observable* regulatory environment, which should be fairly accurately characterized by our data collection effort.

We then used these variables to create composite indexes for intensity of regulation in three broad categories. The indexes were created to ease interpretation but also out of necessity. Even after only retaining potential areas of regulation where our information was not too sparse, and despite hundreds of hours of effort combing through webpages and phoning agencies, we still had missing values for many cities for at least some of the areas of regulation. Creating the indexes allowed us to retain observations by creating non-missing values of the index when some of the constituent variables were missing.

Our three indexes are $Safety$, $Operations$, and $Barriers$. $Safety$ measures the intensity of safety-related regulations, such as requirements on drivers and vehicles. $Operations$ is the index which includes regulations involving hours of operation, size of fleet, method of dispatch, and so forth. $Barriers$ includes regulations that we interpreted as having the primary purpose of erecting entry barriers for new operators without other discernible effects. These base indexes were computed using only affirmative information, positive or negative, that we were able to find about each regulation. We were concerned, however, that the indexes were not based on the same regulations for each city due to missing values, so we computed an alternative version for each of these three indexes, denoted with a 0. In this alternative version, we assumed that a specific regulation did not exist in a city if we could find no mention or evidence of it. Not only do we think this assumption is quite reasonable—it should be much easier to find positive evidence of the existence of a regulation than negative evidence of its absence—but it also allows us to retain additional observations. Because it is an assumption, however, we maintain both versions of the regulatory variables and present our results with both.

Table 1 lists the variables which went into each index.

Summary statistics for those three indexes are included in Table 2. Also included in the table are summary statistics on the Uber entry data as well as the main city-level demographic variables we gathered. *UberEntry* was converted to an integer where 1 is March 1, 2009, the date that Uber was founded. They entered San Francisco and San Jose on March 4, 2011, which marked the beginning of their operations. The last Uber entry in our data set is Moline/Rock Island IL, which was entered 1,614 days after San Francisco and San Jose. We have 89 cities which had not experienced entry at the time of our data collection. *Subway*, *Bus*, *LtRail*, *Trolley*, and *Ferry* are indicator variables for whether the city had that particular type of transit system. Some cities have multiple types. We also gathered data on population, population density, average wage, and the percent of households without a vehicle.

As mentioned earlier, an Uber entry event might cover multiple municipalities. One example is when Uber entered Moline and Rock Island, Illinois simultaneously. The two cities are adjacent (and across the Mississippi River from Davenport and Bettandorf, Iowa, incidentally), so treating them as a single market for entry made sense. When considering whether and when to enter, Uber would have taken into account the demographics and regulatory environments in both cities, so we aggregated them using a population weighted average of the demographic and regulatory variables of the two cities along with the sum of their populations.

4 Empirical Strategy and Results

We start first with a simple model of Uber's profits and how they relate to its entry decisions. Let

$$\Pi_{it} = \Pi(X_i\beta, t, C_i) = X_i\beta + \log t - C_i,$$

where t is calendar time and i indexes cities. We can think of Π_{it} as being the expected per period profits Uber receives from entry into city i at time t, so Uber will enter if and only if $\Pi_{it} > 0$. The fact that our specification requires that Π_{it} be monotonic in t prevents a situation where Uber would enter and then subsequently exit a city.[9] In other words, Uber should enter around the time when $\Pi_{it} = 0$ (exactly so, if t were continuous). Here, C_i is a city-specific per period operating cost that Uber must incur once it enters city i, and we assume that is drawn from some distribution. The Xs are, again, city-specific and could include both demographics and structural characteristics of the cities as well as measures of the regulatory environment. Note that we do not include a coefficient on $\log t$ as a parameter in the model since it will not be identified.

It is useful, perhaps, to pause at this point to explain why regulations to which Uber is not subject would enter into its profit function. If regulations are sufficiently distortionary, they create market opportunities for firms that are not subject to them. For instance, if the imposition of advertising bans on taxis was a binding constraint on taxi behavior, Uber's profit potential would be greater in the cities that imposed advertising bans if Uber allowed its drivers to advertise on their cars. It is also worth noting that there could be a number of reasons why a regulation might not be distortionary. For instance, it might have been binding at some point but became obviated by technology. It might not be binding or enforced. Or perhaps an entrant not subject to the regulation might decide to self-impose it. Finally, let us emphasize that we are not poised to make welfare statements about the regulatory distortions, although we can make some speculative comments about welfare based on the specific types of regulations we find to be distortionary.

[9] This situation has occured, but it is rare in the United States. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Uber has exited cities where regulatory conditions towards ride-hailing companies changed dramatically after its entry. Although rare, these instances could provide interesting case studies on regulatory effects but are beyond the scope of this paper.

Returning to our profit function, we want to determine the entry condition for Uber. In a discrete time setting, we can think of Uber entering at time t_i under two conditions, that its profis at time $t_i - 1$ would have been negative and its profits at time t_i would be non-negative, *i.e.*, if

$$X_i\beta + \log(t_i - 1) - C_i < 0$$

and

$$X_i\beta + \log(t_i) - C_i \geq 0.$$

This is equivalent to

$$e^{C_i} \leq t_i e^{X_i\beta} \qquad \text{and} \qquad e^{C_i} > (t_i - 1)e^{X_i\beta}.$$

If we make a distributional assumption on the cost term, $e^{C_i} \sim \mathcal{E}(\lambda)$, then the probability of Uber entering city i at time t_i is approximately $\lambda e^{X_i\beta}$ because it is the probability of an exponential random variable "failing" in an interval of width $e^{X_i\beta}$ conditional on having survived through the start of the interval.

One may notice this formulation as familiar from the literature on survival analysis. It is a standard and general model for the waiting time of a process (or survival time) with time-invariant explanatory variables. In fact, if we know the t_is, we can recover estimates of β and characteristics of the distribution of C_i from standard survival analysis.[10] Note that the econometrician does not observe the C_is—these behave as the error term in the model we will estimate. We use the particular distributional assumption mentioned above, although one may choose a different assumption or even proceed semi-parametrically. Our distributional assumption, that $e^{C_i} \sim \mathcal{E}(\lambda)$, corresponds to a Cox proportional hazards model with a time-invariant baseline hazard.

The interpretation of a coefficient in a survival model can be explained with an example. Let there be one explanatory variable, Z, a dummy variable for groups 0 and 1. If $e^{Z\gamma} = 2$ when $Z = 1$, the expected waiting time for group 1 is twice as long as for group 0. So a γ of $\log 2 = 0.6931$ would suggest that members of group 1 survive twice as long in expectation as members of group 0. Our interpretation of the coefficients is more straightforward—it

[10] See, for example, Cox and Oakes (1984) or Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980).

comes directly from our specification of the profit function—but we can also relate them to marginal effects on entry decisions in a similar way as above. Do note, however, that these coefficients will only be identified on a relative basis.

Recall that we want to use data on regulatory environment and patterns of Uber entry to comment on how distortionary the regulations we observed were, or, put another way, on the relative gain to Uber from entry into more regulated markets. The idea is simple: in cities with strict and binding regulations governing the behavior of taxicab operators, a firm offering similar services but not subject to the regulations could exploit a significant advantage over the existing taxicab operators and would, therefore, have an incentive to enter that market earlier than expected. If we found that markets with stricter regulatory environments did not experience earlier than expected entry, we could conclude that evading the regulations did not confer a market or cost advantage or that the regulations were not binding or that the entering firm chose not to exploit the potential advantage. To do this, we estimate profit as a function of city-specific regulations, controlling for other factors.

We estimated a Cox proportional Hazards model on 250 cities, 161 of which had experienced Uber entry by the end of 2015. The analysis we performed accommodated this truncation so we could use data from all 250 cities, even the ones Uber had not entered, to estimate the parameters of the model. The results are presented in Table 3. We also estimated the models with the regulatory variables computed each of two ways, as desribed in the data section. In the "missing excluded" specifications, we excluded a specific regulation from the calculation of the regulatory index if we were not able to obtain any information on that specific regulation for that city. In the "missing imputed to zero" specifications, we made the assumption that the regulation did not exist if we were unable to obtain information about whether a city imposed a specific regulation.

Of course, in such an analysis, one would want to contol for other important determinants of entry into a market, such as population density, average wage, public transportation infrastructure, and number of vehicles per household. Not surprisingly, these and other demographic and structural variables prove to be quite important and explain most of the variation in entry dates that we observe. Interestingly, we see that Uber entered cities with public transportation earlier, even though Uber would be competing with those alternative modes of transporation. The existence of public transportation is likely highly correlated with unmeasured city characteristics, like traffic congestion and high parking rates, which could account for that result. Alternatively, these results could be consistent with a story in which Uber is a complement to public transportation, not a substitute. Hall, Pallson, and Price (2017) consider this possibility.

Of the three types of regulatory variables, one type, $Safety$, was not significant in any of the specifications we tried. In other words, Uber's entry decisions seem unrelated to the regulations involving either safety of passengers or drivers. We find no evidence that Uber being able to evade these types of regulations had an impact on Uber's entry decisions.

$Operations$ had mixed results. In some specifications, we find that Uber entered markets with high levels of operations regulations somewhat early. Recall that operations regulations included capping the number of vehicles per operator, mandating 24/7 operation, and restricting advertising on the car. One could imagine that not being subject to some operations regulations, like a cap on the number of taxis per operator, could afford Uber some advantage over the legacy services. The index was significant despite the fact that many of the regulations in the index would not be particularly relevant for Uber.

The third category of regulations, $Barriers$, also was a significant determinant in Uber entry decisions in some specifications, with Uber entering cities with high barriers to entry sooner than expected. The hazard ratio indicates that, at any point in time, Uber was three times more likely to enter a city with the highest observed barriers to entry versus the lowest observed barriers, conditional on other city characteristics. Another way to think about the magnitude of these effects is to note that high barriers to entry and high levels of operations regulations both matter about as much in Uber's profits as multiplying population by 2.6. Recall that we classified regulations as "barriers to entry" when they existed primarily to deter or prevent entry. We are not surprised to find that cities that took unusual actions to deter or prevent entry of competitors to their existing taxicab operators would be attractive cities for a ride-hailing service such as Uber to enter.

These results are robust to the inclusion of demographics on vehicles, which cuts down our sample size significantly due to missing data.

Our construction of the regulatory indexes was sensible, we think, but still arbitrary. One might prefer a less constrained specification, where each regulation can enter separately. With the limited sample size and the large number of possible explanatory variables, however, we are quite constrained and would need some type of model selection procedure. Since LASSO and other similar procedures have not been extended to the maximum likelihood techniques we need to estimate our profit function, we simply perform a LASSO regression with the dependent variable being the number of days after Uber's launch that it entered a particular city. For the cities that Uber had not yet entered at the time of our data collection, we substitute the latest entry date we observe. Explanatory variables are the demographic, structural, and (individual) regulatory variables, along with some non-linear functions and interactions. The LASSO procedure ranks the explanatory variables by their contribution to the predictive power of the model and reports which variables exceeded the default inclusion threshold. Accordingly, we see these results as more of a descriptive complement to our core results rather than a reliable model selection criterion for our analysis.

See Table 4 for the results. Note first that the regulatory variables are almost entirely behind both the demographic variables and those describing transportation infrastructure in terms of predictive power. It is also interesting to note that the most important among the regulatory variables is $DictatedFare$, suggestive of the possible profit opportunities inherent in adaptive pricing, like Uber's surge pricing. Interestingly, $MaxFare$ is much lower on the list, below Stata's default threshold for inclusion, which again is consistent with a firm like Uber wanting to sometimes price below the mandated fare and sometimes price above it.

It is well-known that regulations that pull markets very far away from their counterfactual freely-operating state present opportunities for entry by similar firms that are not subject to the regulations. These results offer some evidence on the distortionary effect of the reglatory environment, and which specific regulations Uber benefited from evading.

We are far from making definitive statements about social welfare and consumer surplus on the basis of results from this analysis.[11] We do think it is interesting to note, though, that the largest distortions seem to be generated by the regulations that we think are least likely to protect consumers and result in social welfare gains. This observation suggests that municipalities might want to rethink the regulatory apparatus surrounding hackney services. Of course it may be that Uber and other ride-hailing services are obviating legacy hackney services quickly enough that the question of the optimal form of their regulation is moot, but this analysis could offer some broader lessons on regulatory capture.

It is reassuring that the safety-related regulations seem to either be non-distortionary—requirements that consumers would demand in a free market in any case—or voluntarily adopted by Uber for other reasons.

5 Conclusion

In the introduction, we noted how ride-hailing services had gained such popularity in such a short time. We presented a small piece of evidence of the effect that they are having on legacy hackney services in the form of changes over time of medallion prices. The core of our paper looked at the regulatory environment in 250 cities and towns in the US and the pattern of Uber entry (and non-entry) into them. Keeping in mind that Uber and other ride-hailing services were not subject to the regulations that existed for the legacy hackney services, we argued that unexpected timing decisions for Uber entry as a function of the regulatory environment could give us information on how distortionary the regulations were. We found evidence that regulations that we categorized as "barriers to entry"—regulations that we felt had little justification other then to make the entry of other providers of hackney services into the market costly or impossible—were associated with unexpectedly early entry of Uber into that market. We also found the regulations governing "operations" were associated with early Uber entry. We found little or no evidence that regulations relating to safety were associated with early or late Uber entry.

It is clear that avoidance of many of these regulations could provide a substantial ad-

[11] An interesting study by Farronato and Fradkin (2016) looks at entry of Airbnb into various geographic markets and, using detailed data on hotel prices and occupancy rates, can produce estimates of the welfare effects of Airbnb entry. Their focus is not on regulatory avoidance, but their paper provides a blueprint for thinking about welfare issues in similar markets.

vantage to ride-hailing services. What is less clear is the overall welfare consequences of this avoidance. The main argument in favor of the regulatory structure is the ability to license and monitor owners and drivers to ensure higher quality (availability, better driving skills, knowledge of local area, honesty, cleanliness, safety, environmentalism, lack of discrimination, etc.). As noted before, the bodies charged with regulation of hackney industries have had uneven records regarding ensuring quality. This observation suggests a regulatory capture story, where commisions now work largely to protect monopoly power and capture rents for the taxicab owners and drivers. While we remain largely agnostic on the question of whether the regulations in the hackney industry are overall welfare-improving, we do presume that that some of them have little scope for improving quality. And it is precisely those least likely to ensure quality and safety for which we have found evidence of their market distortion and their importance for entry decisions. Combining the results from the survival analysis on Uber entry with the response of the values of taxicab medallions to the entry of Uber and Lyft, the evidence suggests that ride-hailing services are exploiting the barriers to entry erected to protect legacy hackney services and are eroding their value as a result.

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Table 1: Regulatory Indexes

Safety
maximum age of cars
minimum age for drivers
maximum workday
physician's certificate required
fingerprint required
background check required
Operations
maximum fare
dictated fare
24/7 service
cab stand-only pick-up
mandated radio dispatch
restricted advertising on car
max number of taxis per operator
Barriers
fee for driver
fee to start company
fee to license each car
minimum fleet size
insignia approval
proof of public need

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Profit Function Estimation

Variable	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max	Obs.
$UberEntry$	1876.78	341.46	733	2347	161
$Barriers$	0.32	0.24	0	1	200
$Safety$	0.54	0.22	0	1	235
$Operations$	0.62	0.27	0	1	181
$Barriers0$	0.26	0.25	0	1	250
$Safety0$	0.51	0.25	0	1	250
$Operations0$	0.45	0.36	0	1	250
$Subway$	0.04	0.21	0	1	250
Bus	0.70	0.46	0	1	250
$LtRail$	0.11	0.31	0	1	250
$Trolley$	0.07	0.25	0	1	250
$Ferry$	0.06	0.23	0	1	250
$VehPerHouse$	1.52	0.23	0.60	2.00	195
$PercentNoVeh$	12.63	7.24	3.50	55.70	195
$EmploymentNum$	649.94	1398.68	30	11160	173
$AnnualMeanWage$	23071.64	2865.71	17530.00	33920.00	250
$Population$	256944.90	596906.40	6585	8175133	250
$PopDensity$	3176.18	2848.06	171.20	27012.40	250

Note: Only 161 of the 250 cities had experienced entry as of the time of our data collection. Summary statistics for $UberEntry$ are reported for the ones that did experience entry, where their entry is coded as the number of days after March 1, 2009 they entered.

Table 3: Results: Profit Function

Exp. Variables	Dep Variable: *UberEntry*							
	Missing Excluded				**Missing Imputed to Zero**			
	Est Coeff	Std Err	Est Coeff	Std Err	Est Coeff	Std Err	Est Coeff	Std Err
Barriers	0.85*	0.47	0.54	0.45	0.96**	0.42	0.65*	0.40
Safety	0.15	0.52	0.32	0.51	−0.15	0.42	0.04	0.40
Operations	0.20	0.40	0.47	0.39	0.58**	0.28	0.68**	0.26
Subway	1.61**	0.79	1.49**	0.69	1.67**	0.59	1.49**	0.54
Bus	0.65*	0.35	0.68**	0.33	0.73**	0.29	0.89**	0.28
LightRail	0.49	0.39	0.22	0.36	0.53	0.34	0.25	0.32
CommuterRail	0.98**	0.45	1.24**	0.41	0.34	0.38	0.57	0.36
Ferry	0.17	0.41	0.09	0.39	0.55	0.36	0.45	0.34
Trolley	0.73	0.47	0.59	0.46	0.33	0.42	0.28	0.41
AnnualMeanWage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00
log(Population)	0.65**	0.13	0.70**	0.13	0.60**	0.12	0.65**	0.12
PopDensity	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00
PercentNoVeh	−0.07**	0.02			−0.06**	0.02		
Observations	152		170		209		250	
Number of cities entered	121		126		151		161	
Goodness of fit								

Note: Significance at the 10% level is denoted with *, 5% level with **.

Table 4: Order of Inclusion, LASSO procedure

$log(Population)$
$PopDensity$
$CommuterRail$
$AnnualMeanWage$
$Subway$
$LightRail$
$Ferry$
$Trollley$
$DictatedFare$
$24/7Service$
$Insignia$
$MinimumFleet$
$MaximumFleet$
$Fingerprint$
Bus
$PhysicianCertif$
$RadioDispatch$
$LicenseFee$
$MaxAgeCar$
$StartFee$
$DriverFee$
$PercentNoVehicle$
$MaxFare$
$Background$
$MaxWorkDay$
$MinAgeDriver$
$PublicNeed$
$RestrictAdvert$
$CabStand$
$VehPerHouse$

Note: The horizontal line indicates the default cutoff below which the LASSO procedure would not include variables in a model meant to predict Uber entry.

Fig 1. Medallion Markets



Legend

- **3-mo rolling average of medallion price**
- **Monthly medallion price actuals**
- **3-mo rolling average of sales volume**
- **Monthly sales volume actuals**

Notes– While reliable data on Philadelphia's medallion market post-Jan 2015 could not be obtained, several publications noted that they were sold for as little as $80,000 in May 2015.

Source notes–

- Chicago and NYC data are current as of Dec 2015
- Boston data are current as of Apr 2015
- Miami and Philadelphia data are current as of Jan 2015