Religion, Minority Status and Trust: Evidence from a Field Experiment*

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Abstract

This paper reports the results from a field experiment conducted in Bangladesh and in West Bengal (India). These two regions are similar in terms of socio-economic characteristics, ethnicity and language but have different religious composition. Using this variation we examine whether identity based on religion or the relative status that it generates within the population affects behavior. We find that in both locations individuals belonging to the minority group exhibit positive in-group bias in trust, while individuals belonging to the majority group in both countries show positive out-group bias in trustworthiness. Behavior is therefore driven by relative status. Differences in the behavior of religious and non-religious individuals can explain the observed patterns.

Key words: Trust, Religion, Status, In-group and Out-group, Field Experiment, South Asia.

JEL Codes: C93, O12, D03.

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1 Introduction

Understanding how identity affects behavior is of considerable importance in many fields and disciplines. Indeed, historians have documented how societies have used different mechanisms to impress upon individuals that groups which they belong to mean something to them and that they should derive a sense of identity and pride from belonging to that group.[1] While the social psychology literature has long emphasized the importance of group identity (see Tajfel, 1970, Tajfel et al., 1971), the economics literature on this topic is fairly recent. There is now increasing evidence that economic decisions made by individuals are strongly influenced by group membership and ties to both social and cultural networks (see for example Akerlof, 1997, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2010, Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001, Hoff and Pandey, 2006, Esteban et al., 2012). However when analyzing the effect of identity on behavior, an additional layer of complexity arises from the fact that individuals can be simultaneously identified along many different dimensions of identity. Which identity will drive an individual's behavior is likely to be situation specific.

In this paper we examine the role of identities and multiple identities to explain how individuals interact with others in a segmented society. We focus on South Asia which is highly segmented in terms of religion. The question of how individuals interact with people with from their own and other religion is of immense importance in this region. Hindu-Muslim conflict has been a common occurrence here, going back at least to the riots during the partition of India in 1947, if not earlier (Mitra and Ray, 2013). The majority of Indians are Hindus, while the majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are Muslims. However there is a sizable number of Muslims residing in India and Hindus form the bulk of the minority in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Using an artefactual field experiment or an extra-lab experiment conducted in Bangladesh and in West Bengal, India, two regions that are similar in terms of socio-economic characteristics, ethnicity and language but very different religious composition we examine whether identity based on religion or the relative status that it generates within the population affects behavior [2].

We run the experiments in multiple locations because of the fact that in any one of these countries

[1] See Hoff and Pandey (2013) for a review of the evidence.

[2] We use the term *status* to specifically characterize whether a particular individual is a part of the majority group or the minority group within the population in terms of religion. Our use of majority/minority to define status in terms of relative group size is not unique. Similar definitions have been used extensively in the social psychology literature (see Simon et al., 2001).

identity based on religion and the status (minority or majority) it generates is perfectly correlated. An example will help illustrate this. Suppose we observe Muslims are behaviorally different from Hindus in West Bengal. Can we attribute this difference to religion, or is it driven by status? For us to claim that religion dictates behavior, we have to observe that this difference persists in Bangladesh. On the other hand for us to claim that status drives behavior, we have to observe in both these locations individuals with a particular status behave in the same way irrespective of their religion, i.e. Muslims (Hindus) in West Bengal as a member of minority (majority) group behave exactly the same way as Hindus (Muslims) in Bangladesh. In this paper, we first examine whether identity influences behaviour and secondly in the event of multiple identities, which identity – religion or status – drives behavior. Our approach is thus departure from the existing literature analysing multiple identities which has not focused on the possibility of interactions between multiple identities even in specific situations.

We focus on Trust, which has been documented to have a strong influence on social and economic development of societies. Economic interactions between individuals are not only governed by contractual relationships but also by trust between individuals, which often plays a crucial role in facilitating interactions and trade. This is particularly true in the regions where we conduct this analysis. Here the rule of law and hence the ability of the courts and officials to legally enforce contracts is limited. Indeed, Arrow (1972) has aruged that *virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust.* It has also been shown that trust between people, which potentially reduces transactions cost of interactions, is conducive to economic and social development (Fukuyama, 1995, Knack and Keefer, 1997, Zak and Knack, 2001, Beugelsdijk et al., 2004, Bohnet et al., 2005, 2010).[3]

To investigate trust behavior systematically, subjects in our study participate in the Investment game or the Trust game (Berg et al., 1995).[4] We utilise a set of *Information* treatments where participants are informed of the religion of their anonymous matched partner in the Trust game to tease out the effect of identity on behaviour. It is important to note that the providing information on partner's religion also makes her status salient. For example in West Bengal,

[3]See Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) and Chaudhuri (2009) for a review of results from Trust games conducted in different parts of the world. The non-academic literature has also started acknowledging the importance of trust in open societies. For example, Thomas Friedman writing in the New York Times after the Boston bombing argues that "trust is built into every aspect, every building, every interaction and every marathon in our open society" (New York Times April 2013).

[4]More details on the game are presented in Section 2.2.

informing a subject that she is paired with a Hindu also implies that she is paired with someone from the majority group. On the other hand, the same information in Bangladesh would mean that she is paired with someone from the minority group. We also have a *Control* group where we do not provide any information on the religion of the matched partner. This allows us to identify the nature of the bias in Trust and Trustworthiness as a result of making a particular identity salient. Finally using responses from the post experiment survey questions on religiosity, we analyze the differential effects of our treatments on individuals who identify more strongly and those who identfy less strongly with their relgion, i.e., the religious and the non-religious.

We therefore contribute to the literature identity on behaviour by presenting a tractable way of disentangling the interactions between multiple identities. Our paper also extends the growing literature on social identity and discrimination (see Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001, Hoff and Pandey, 2006, Chen and Li, 2009, Afridi et al., 2011, Delavande and Zafar, 2013, Hoff and Pandey, 2013), religiosity and pro-social behavior (see Tan and Vogel, 2008, Ruffle and Sosis, 2007, Anderson et al., 2010) and on the hetergenous impacts of priming on members of groups with varying levels of association (see Benjamin et al., 2010, Chen et al., 2013).

The main research questions that we seek to examine in this paper are:

1. Do individuals discriminate based on religion? Alternatively do individuals discriminate based on status it generates within the society?

2. Does discrimination, or lack of trust, or failure to reciprocate trust reflect an in-group bias or is there a systematic discrimination against individuals belonging to other groups?

3. Do religious individuals behave differently compared to non-religious individuals and to what extent can our results be explained by the heterogeneity in how individuals associate with the identity in question?

Our results show that there is a common theme across locations – it is status rather than religion that dictates behavior. We find that in both locations individuals belonging to the minority group, i.e, Muslims in West Bengal and Hindus in Bangladesh, exhibit in-group bias in trust behavior, while individuals belonging to the majority group in both countries show out-group bias in trustworthiness. Minorities are the beneficiaries in both countries – from positive in-group

bias in Trust from fellow minorities and positive out-group bias in Trustworthiness from the majority. We also find systematic evidence that religious individuals show significantly greater in-group bias compared to non-religious individuals as Proposers and non-religious individuals exhibit significant out-group bias as Responders in the Trust game. Differences in the behavior of the religious and non-religious individuals can explain our primary results. Finally we also examine the underlying motivations behind the in-group and out-group bias in Trust and Trustworthiness respectively. Using the *Control* group as the benchmark we find that in both locations the in-group bias in trust among the minority is driven by out-group discrimination i.e., the majority are treated worse that the *Control*.

2 Experimental Design

2.1 Setting

We conduct the experiment in two different countries – specifically in the state of West Bengal in India and in Bangladesh. Prior to the partition of British India in 1947, both these regions existed as one state, Bengal (see Figure 1). An overwhelming majority of people in these two locations speak the same language and share similar cultures. The only big exception is in terms of religion. See selected descriptive statistics in Table 1. In Bangladesh, the majority are Muslims (90%), where as in West Bengal the majority are Hindus (73%). Hindus form the largest minority (9.6%) and in West Bengal Muslims form the largest minority (25%).[5] It is this variation that allows us to filter out the effect of religion – being Hindu or Muslim – from the effect of status that it generates. Restricting ourselves to a single location does not allow us to do so.

This issue of trust is very pertinent in this region. Survey evidence show that neither Indians nor Bangladeshis are particularly trusting: while 40% of Indians say that people can in general be trusted, only 22% of Bangladeshis do so. The segmented nature of the society is also reflected in the fact that while 50% of Indian Muslims completely trust Non-Hindus, only 22% of Hindus do so. Trust in Hindus is similar across Indian Hindus and Muslims, at 52%.[6]. Empirical evidence on relationship between identity based on religion and trust is mixed. Johansson-Stenman et al.

[5]One other difference is worth noting: India is a secular republic while Bangladesh is an Islamic republic. Theoretically this is likely to have implications for relationships and the nature of interactions between the two groups. In practice we don't find any evidence of the nature of the state driving our results.

[6]Authors' computations using data from the World Values Surveys.

(2009) find mixed results when investigating whether being Hindu or Muslim affects trust behavior in rural Bangladesh. The results of their Trust experiment show no effect of religion on trust, but results from an accompanying survey show that both Hindus and Muslims show positive in-group bias in trust behavior. An inter-ethnic trust game field experiment conducted by Chuah et al. (2013) in urban India also confirm intergroup bias.[7]

In terms of intensity of affiliation to a religious identity, or religiosity, again evidence from this region is mixed. On one hand Johansson-Stenman et al. (2009) find no effect of participation in religious ceremonies on trust behavior in rural Bangladesh. On the other, Ahmed (2009) demonstrate that religiosity increases pro social behavior in northwest India. Interestingly, this inconclusiveness with regards to the effect of religiosity on behavior is not only limited to South Asia. Indeed, while some studies show that religiosity can significantly affect pro-sociality (Tan and Vogel, 2008, Ruffle and Sosis, 2007), others find no significant effect (Eckel and Grossman, 2004, Anderson and Mellor, 2009).

2.2 Choices

The subjects in our experiment participate in three games: The Trust game, the (Triple) Dictator game and the Risk game

Trust Game

The Trust game is a two-player game in which players can play one of two roles: that of a Proposer or a Responder. Each Proposer is given an endowment, E and asked to decide to transfer any part of this endowment, x to an anonymous Responder. The experimenter triples this and gives it to the matched Responder, who in turn is asked to choose whether to transfer any money back, out of $3x$ to the Proposer. So the income of the Proposer is $E - x + R$ where R is the amount returned by the Responder; the income of the Responder is $3x - R$. In this setting, any transfer made by the Proposer to the anonymous Responder can be interpreted as

[7]Theoretically, in a society characterized by religious diversity the net effect of religion on social cooperation, including trust is ambiguous. On one hand we have all religions of the world urging their followers to extend benevolence to others, including to strangers (Neusner and Chilton, 2005). On the other, most religious traditions emphasize the importance of communities formed by followers of the same religion, which endows the follower with a specific identity while creating a distinction between followers and non-followers (Berman, 2000).

a measure of Trust; any amount returned by the Responder is a measure of Trustworthiness. The decisions of the Responder are obtained using a strategy method. To do this the Responder is asked to specify an amount to return $R(x)$ for every possible amount of x chosen by the Proposer. To keep things manageable we restrict x to specific integer amounts. Specifically, the endowment is 160 Taka in Bangladesh and 120 Rupees in West Bengal and Proposers could choose to send a percentage $s \in \{0, 12.5, 25, 37.5, 50, 62.5, 75, 87.5, 100\}$ of the endowment to his/her anonymous partner residing in a nearby (not the same) village. This translates to the following sets: $\{0, 20, \ldots, 160\}$ Taka and $\{0, 15, \ldots, 120\}$ Rupees in the case of Bangladesh and West Bengal respectively.[8] The Responder therefore had to provide responses i.e., how much they want to return to 8 possible choices made by the Proposer. For $x = 0$, there is no decision to be made.[9]

Triple Dictator/Dictator Game

Each Proposer participated in a Triple Dictator Game and each Responder participated in a Dictator Game. The Triple Dictator game is identical to the first phase of the Trust game in that the first mover is given an endowment and asked to make a transfer to an anonymous second mover. The experimenter triples the money transferred before it is passed on to the second mover. However, unlike in the Trust game, the second mover does not have the option of returning any money, which rules out trust or investment as a motive for sending money. In this setting the motivation for transferring money is unconditional kindness or altruism or indeed a taste towards for efficiency as the money is tripled. A Dictator game is similar to the Triple Dictator game, except that the contributions made by the first mover is not tripled by the experimenter before being passed onto the second mover.

Risk Game

In the Risk game, each player was given the option of investing any part of an initial endowment in a hypothetical risky project that had a 50-percent chance of tripling the amount invested; alternatively the amount invested could be lost with a 50-percent probability. The individual

[8] At the time of conducting the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately 1 Rupee = 1.5 Taka.

[9] Evidence from laboratory experiments suggests that measured trustworthiness is lower using the strategy method (see Casari and Cason, 2009). However in this paper we are not interested in the absolute level of trustworthiness; rather we focus is on the relative trustworthiness across the different groups.

could keep any amount he/she chose not to invest.

Since each subject played multiple games, the order in which the games were played was varied randomly to control for order effects. Only one game was randomly chosen for payment purposes, through a lottery conducted after all participants had taken part in all three games. If the Trust game was chosen for payment purposes, then the payoff depended on the actual amount that was chosen by the Proposer and the conditional response of the Responder; if the Risk game was chosen for payment purposes, then a coin was tossed to determine whether the project was successful or not and if the Dictator or the Triple Dictator game was chosen, then payments were made for both roles.

2.3 Treatments

We seek to examine whether

1. The individual's own religion affects his/her behavior
2. Information on the religion of the anonymous partner affects his/her behavior

In order to do achieve this we need to make both the subject's and her partner's religion salient while she is making decisions. In the first set of treatments (*Information* Treatments) each participant – Proposer and Responder – is informed whether her anonymous partner is Hindu or Muslim. We assume that each individual *knows* her own religion. Therefore no effort was made to make the individual's own religion salient. In any *Information* treatment session, the religion of all participants in a particular role were the same i.e the group of participants in a particular session was homogeneous.

In addition to information on the religion of the partner, every participant was told that they would be randomly matched with a person from a *different but nearby village*; so the Proposers and Responders always resided in different villages. We also chose to not reveal names of potential partners. All this was done to ensure complete anonymity and avoid confounds that could have arisen from past interactions.

We conducted two sets of *Information* treatments.

Information-Same **treatments:** Each participant, i.e., each Proposer and Responder, was told that he would be randomly matched with a person belonging to the same religion but from a different village. So the possible treatments were $Hindu\_Hindu$ or $Muslim\_Muslim$.

Information-Different **treatments:** Each participant was told that they would be randomly matched with a person belonging to a different religion from a different village. So the possible treatments were $Hindu\_Muslim$ or $Muslim\_Hindu$.

We also utilised a *Control* group, which is similar in every other respect to the *Information* treatments, except that no information was provided regarding the religion of the anonymous matched partner (i.e., the religion of the matched partner was not made salient). Recall however that the prime that makes religion salient also makes status salient. Table 2 summarizes the sample sizes in the different treatments.

2.4 Recruitment

We conducted sessions in 16 villages in both Bangladesh and West Bengal, a total of 32 villages. In South Asia most villages are mixed in terms of religion, but households belonging to different religions are segregated in terms of residential location i.e., within a village Hindus and Muslims reside in separate hamlets (*para*s or *muhallah*s). The proportion of minorities in our sample villages range from 5 – 85 percent. In our robustness regressions we control for the proportion of minority in the village. In most villages we conducted 3 sessions with 8 participants in each session.[10] Each session lasted for approximately 2 hours and the average payout to participants was approximately US$4, which was more than the prevailing daily wage rate in these villages. Each subject participated in only one session. For reasons of conformity, we chose villages that were approximately 80 kilometers or 2 hours of driving from the relevant capital city (Kolkata in West Bengal and Dhaka in Bangladesh). The sessions were conducted during the period May – July 2012. We randomly selected participants based on what treatment was assigned to each particular session in a village. For example, if we needed Hindu subjects for a particular session in a particular village, we recruited from the Hindu *para*. At the time of recruitment by research assistants, potential participants were informed that they were to participate in research, were

[10] In some villages we only had two sessions (because of logistical reasons) but we had more than 8 participants in each of them.

informed of the venue/time, duration of the session and the show up fee.

Our experimental protocol is similar to that used in Burns (2012). We conducted parallel sessions in two different villages. If participants from village A were randomly assigned the role of the Proposers, those from village B were assigned the role of Responders. Once all three decision tasks were completed, one of the three tasks were chosen, through a lottery, for payment purposes. The lottery was conducted only in the Proposer village and was binding in the Responder village. For purposes of transparency, the whole lottery process was relayed live to the Responder village via a mobile phone call. If the Trust or the Triple Dictator/Dictator game was chosen for payment purposes, the choices of the Proposers was relayed across using mobile phones; in the case of the Trust game, the conditional response of the Responders was also relayed across using mobile phones.[11] No other feedback was provided. Participants then filled out a questionnaire, received payments and the session concluded. Note that in all sessions, Proposers and Responders were always from the same country i.e., we do not examine whether nationality drives behavior.

3 Empirical Analysis

Table 3 presents the means and descriptive statistics for the set of variables that we include in the set of explanatory variables in our regressions: Panel A for the sample of Proposers and Panel B for the sample of Responders. We present the descriptive statistics by religion of the Proposer and the Responder in each country as well. With one major exception overall within each country, the sample characteristics are not systematically different by religion. The main exception is religiosity – Hindus in both West Bengal and Bangladesh report themselves as being more religious than Muslims.[12]

On average Proposers offer around 28 percent of their endowment in the Trust game (see Table 4). There is however no significant difference (computed using the Mann-Whitney ranksum test)

[11] It is useful to illustrate the procedure. Suppose the Trust game was chosen for payment purposes. All offers made by the Proposers were first collated and the Responders were informed of the offers via a mobile phone call to the partner village. Once the call had been initiated in the presence of the subjects, the call initiator left the room before transmitting the actual offers as decisions were all private, but left the room door open so that subjects could verify that he was still on the phone. It was explained to the participating subjects that this was being done in order to maintain the privacy of their offers by ensuring that the other subjects in their room could not hear what offers they had made. The same procedure was followed in the partner village.

[12] There are some other minor differences. For example, the Hindu sample in West Bengal is older on average than the corresponding Muslim sample and Hindus in Bangladesh are more altruistic than the Muslims in Bangladesh.

in the offers made by religion, status and location. In Bangladesh while there is no difference in offers made by Hindus and Muslims, Muslims expect more in return (Mann-Whitney $z = -2.143, p - value = 0.03$). However in terms of actual returns Muslim responders return less than what the Proposers expect. Additionally, across each of the groups, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportion sent in the Triple Dictator game or in the proportion invested in the risky asset.

3.1 Proposer Behavior

Panel A in Figure 2 presents the distribution of the proportion of the endowment sent by the Proposers in West Bengal and Bangladesh, separately for Hindus and Muslims. There is very little difference in the two distributions in either location and the null hypothesis that the distributions are not different cannot be rejected using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. But this is not the end of the story because of two important reasons. First, the proportion sent by the Proposers as presented in Figure 2 is not conditional on the identity of the Responder; and second, the proportion sent by the Proposer is potentially confounded by preferences for altruism, taste for efficiency and risk preference.

It is important to note that our controls for altruism, taste for efficiency and risk may not be orthogonal to our treatment. There are two reasons for this: (i) individual's preference towards risk, altruism or taste for efficiency may be affected by status or religion and (ii) knowledge about the partner's religion or status may lead a subject to use a different norm for fairness or putting higher value on the fairness norm, thus affecting other regarding preferences.[13] Therefore, it is important to interact these control variables with our treatments in our analysis.

3.1.1 Trust Regressions

The starting point is the regression results for the West Bengal and Bangladesh sample presented in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5. We present the coefficient estimates from a Tobit regression and the standard errors are clustered at the session level to account for within session correlations.

[13]For the rest of the paper we use the term trust to denote pure trust, which describes the transfers made by the Proposers after controlling for altruism or/and taste for efficiency or risk preference and trustworthiness to denote pure trustworthiness that describes the transfers made by the Responders after controlling for altruism.

Note that in the analysis and discussions in sections 3.1 – 3.4 we restrict ourselves to the *Information* treatments where the Proposers know the religion of their anonymous partner. The dependent variable is the proportion of the endowment sent in the Trust game. The set of explanatory variables include the proportion of the endowment sent in the Triple Dictator game, the proportion of the endowment allocated to the risky asset in the Risk game, a set of demographic characteristics of the Proposer – age, years of schooling, household income and a set of order of Trust game dummies to control for order effects. We include interactions of the proportion of the endowment sent in the Triple Dictator game with the treatment to account for the fact that altruism could potentially vary with the identity of the Proposer and Responder. The proportion of the endowment allocated to the risky asset in the Risk game is interacted with the Muslim dummy to account for the fact that risk preferences could vary by religion.

To examine how the religion of the matched partner affects the Proposer's choices, we look at the difference estimates presented in Panel B in Table 5. These differences are computed using the coefficient estimates presented in Panel A. They reveal that in West Bengal, Muslim Proposers exhibit significant in-group bias, while in Bangladesh Hindu Proposers exhibit significant in-group bias: in West Bengal, Muslim Proposers send 27.5 percentage points more to Muslim Responders than to Hindu Responders, $p - value = 0.02$; in Bangladesh Hindu Proposers send almost 8 percentage points more to Hindu Responders than to Muslim Responders, $p - value = 0.02$. Recall that Hindus are the minority in Bangladesh while Muslims are the minority in West Bengal. So we have a common *minority effect* in Trust behavior in both locations.

Result 1 *In both locations, minority Proposers exhibit significant in-group bias.*

This common *minority effect* in Trust behavior is further corroborated by the pooled regression results presented in column 1 of Table 6. The difference estimates presented in Panel B show that minority Proposers transfer around 19 percentage points more to minority Responders than to majority Responders, $p - value = 0.01$. This in-group bias in Trust by the minority is perhaps not surprising, given the history of communal riots and religious violence aimed at minorities in these societies.

There is one other result in Table 5 worth noting. In Bangladesh, Muslim Proposers exhibit out-group bias in Trust – Muslim Proposers send 20 percentage points more to Hindu Responders

than to Muslim Responders. The effect is however quite weak with a $p - value = 0.08$, i.e., the effect is imprecisely estimated. We do not find any evidence of out-group bias in Trust by Hindus in West Bengal or by the majority in the pooled sample (Table 6). This result from Bangladesh is consistent with evidence from social psychology, which finds that members of the higher status group (majority) engage in out-group bias or *reverse discrimination* favoring the lower status out-group or the minority (see Mullen et al., 1992, page 106). Additionally Hewstone et al. (2002) argue, members of the high status group or the majority show in-group bias when the relative size of the two groups is similar; the majority are more willing to exhibit magnanimity towards the minority when the relative size difference of the two groups is large. In Bangladesh Hindus comprise a much small percentage of the population than Muslims do in West Bengal. This size difference can explain the difference in out-group bias in Trust behavior of the majority in Bangladesh and West Bengal.

3.2 Responder Behavior

Panel B in Figure 2 presents the distribution of the average proportion returned by the Responders in West Bengal and Bangladesh, by religion of the Responder.[14] Again the null hypothesis that the distributions are identical cannot be rejected using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Again this figure does not tell us the full story because it does not account for the identity of the Proposer each Responder is matched with and also because the proportion returned by the Responder could potentially be confounded by altruism.

3.2.1 Trustworthiness Regressions

We now turn to the regression results for Trustworthiness. Recall that the amount returned by the Responder in the Trust game, after controlling for altruism can be interpreted as a measure of Trustworthiness. We present in Tables 7 and 8 the coefficient estimates from Tobit regressions where we pool the data for the data for the 8 conditional choices made by the Responders, and the standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The dependent variable is the proportion returned by the Responder and the set of explanatory variables are similar to those included in the Trust regressions, except here we include proportion sent in the Dictator game and we do not

[14] Recall that Responders had to choose the proportion they choose to return for every possible level of transfer made by the Proposer. This average is computed over the Responder decisions over all possible choices.

include the risk preference dummy. Additionally the regressions control for the different levels of s – the proportion of endowment sent by the matched Proposer.

We seek to examine two questions here. First, are there systematic patterns in Trustworthiness? Second, are the expectations of the Proposers validated? Possibly the easiest way to answer both questions would be to look at the difference estimates presented in Panel B of Tables 7 and 8. First, consider the location specific regressions presented in Table 7. We find evidence of significant out-group bias in Trustworthiness by the Hindus in West Bengal – Hindu Responders in West Bengal return 15 percentage points more to Muslim Proposers than to Hindu Proposers, $p - value = 0.04$. In the case of Bangladesh while the out-group bias on the part of Muslims is positive, it is not statistically significant at any conventional level of significance. However in the case of Bangladesh when we stratify the sample on the basis of low and high s, we find evidence of a statistically significant out-group bias in Trustworthiness on the part of the Muslims for high s, $p - value = 0.07$. Here low s denotes the Proposer choosing to send at most 50 percent and high s denotes the Proposer choosing to send more than 50 percent of her endowment. One could therefore argue that Muslims in Bangladesh exhibit *conditional* out-group bias in Trustworthiness, conditional on the Proposer choosing a high s. For low s the difference effects are imprecisely estimated. These results are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The results for the pooled data, presented in Table 8, column 1 show that the majority exhibit significant out-group bias in Trustworthiness – majority Responders return 11.5 percentage points more to minority Proposers than to majority Proposers, $p - value = 0.02$. Minority Responders never discriminate on the basis of the religion of the Proposer.

As in the case of Trust, we find evidence of a common theme in Trustworthiness. We call this a common *majority effect*.

Result 2 *Majority Responders exhibit out-group bias in Trustworthiness; the effect is highly significant in West Bengal but weaker and conditional on the behavior of the Proposer in Bangladesh. Minority Responders do not discriminate.*

So while there are systematic patterns in Trustworthiness, the expectations of the minority Proposers are not validated. That said, both the Trust and the Trustworthiness regressions show that minorities benefit: through significant in-group bias in Trust by the minority in both locations;

and through out-group bias in Trustworthiness by the majority.

The positive out-group bias in Trustworthiness on the part of the majority requires further explanation. Suppose that the behavior of the Proposers is the norm in the society: members of the minority group trust other members minority group more than they trust members of the majority group and members of the majority group on the other hand do not favor or discriminate against either group. Assume also that everyone in the society is aware of this norm. One consequence of this norm is that majority Responders expect to receive lower transfer from minority Proposers than from majority Proporsers. Then for a majority Responder, any $s > 0$ received from a minority Proposer has greater information content than the same s received from a majority Proposer because the minority Proposer is going against the societal norm. Applying the notion of sequential reciprocity (see Dufwenberg and Kirschsteiger, 2004), this implies that conditional on receiving the same amount from both a majority and a minority Proposer, a majority Responder would treat the contribution from the minority Proposer as more kind and reciprocate by returning more. Also, for higher levels of s the difference in reciprocity is going to be larger.

Since information on Responder behavior is collected using the strategy method, we can test this assertion directly. For this argument to be valid, the *Majority_Minority* − *Majority_Majority* difference should be larger for higher values of s. To test this we re-run the regressions for trustworthiness (i.e., proportion returned by the Responder) by stratifying the sample by $s : s \leq 0.5$ (low); $s > 0.5$ (high) and compute the difference effect *Majority_Minority* − *Majority_Majority*. The regression results are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In West Bengal, for $s \leq 0.5$ (low), Hindu Responders return 14 percentage points more to Muslim Proposers than to Hindu Proposers. This increases to 16.3 percentage points for $s > 0.5$ (high). In Bangladesh the corresponding differences are 10 and 13 percentage points respectively. It is important to note however that the proportion returned by the Responder decreases with s, irrespective of the identity of the matched partner in both West Bengal and Bangladesh. The 14 percentage point difference in proportion returned by the majority Responders for $s \leq 0.5$ (low) in West Bengal therefore translates to a 51 percent difference, given that on average Hindu Responders return 27.5 percent to Hindu Proposers for low $s \leq 0.5$ (low); on the other hand a 16.3 percentage point difference in proportion returned by the majority Responders for $s > 0.5$ (high) translates to a 109 percent difference given that on average Hindu Responders return 14 percent to Hindu Proposers for $s > 0.5$ (high). Figure 3 presents these difference for the low and high values of s in percent

terms, separately for the West Bengal sample, the Bangladesh sample and the pooled sample. It is clear from this figure that the out-group bias on the part of the majority Responder (captured by *Majority_Minority* − *Majority_Majority* as a proportion average *Majority_Majority* transfer) is higher for higher levels of s chosen by the Responder. The choices by the minority Proposer that are perceived as more kind is reciprocated more by the majority Responder.[15]

3.3 Robustness

We examine the robustness of our results by conducting a number of additional regressions. We start with the Trust regressions, presented in Table 9. In column 2 we include *stated high trust* as an additional explanatory variable in the Trust regressions.[16] As a part of the survey that accompanied the experiment, participants had to answer a question on their general trust level. The variable *stated high trust* was based on the response of this question.[17] In the regression results presented in column 3 we include a set of village characteristics: proportion of minority in the village, connectedness of the village, measured by the distance of the village from a highway and three dummies for the presence of a primary school, a secondary school and a health centre in the village.[18] Next we interact each of these village characteristics with the minority dummy (column 4). Finally we add dummies for exposure to riots (in the village and anywhere) in columns 5 and 7 respectively; and the interaction of the exposure to riots with the minority dummy (columns 6 and 8). Comparing the robustness results in columns 2 – 8 to the baseline results presented in column 1 we see that the minority in-group bias is robust to the inclusion of these additional characteristics. The difference estimates in Panel B show that $Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Minority$ are generally statistically significant and even when they are not, the $p - values$ are close to 0.1. Additionally quantitative terms these estimates are not very different from the baseline results presented in column 1.

Table 10 presents the corresponding results for Trustworthiness (decisions made by the Responder). Again comparing the results to those in column 1 we see that our main result (major-

[15] We would like to thank John List for suggesting this.

[16] In column 1 we present, for ease of comparison, the baseline results from Tables 6.

[17] Participants were asked their opinion about this particular statement: In general, people can be trusted. They were asked to respond along a likert scale between 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree, 2 is disagree, 3 is neutral, 4 is agree and 5 is strongly agree. The dummy variable *stated high trust* = 1 if the answer to the above question was either 4 or 5.

[18] Specifically connectedness is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the village is less than 10 kms from a highway.

ity out-group bias in Trustworthiness) is robust - the difference estimate $Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$ is always positive and statistically significant and not very different from those presented in column 1.

The regression results presented in Tables 9 and 10, show that the main results (see Result 1 and Result 2) are robust to the inclusion of these additional characteristics. Minorities exhibit significant in-group bias in trust; and while their expectations are not validated they continue to benefit as the majority exhibit significant out-group bias in trustworthiness.

3.4 Religiosity and Priming

Groups are typically heterogeneous, even if they are formed on the basis of some common characteristics. For example even though groups consist of individuals of the same religion, there are members in the group who associate more strongly with the identity in question than others; i.e., some individuals are more religious than others. The next question that we seek to answer is as follows: To what extent are the results driven by this heterogeneity? To do this, we re-examine the behavior of the Proposers and the Responders, by categorizing them as religious or non-religious. We do this depending on their response to the question: how often do you pray or perform *namaaz*? Individuals who pray or perform *namaaz* everyday are categorized are religious, those that do not are categorized as non-religious. Note that both in West Bengal and in Bangladesh, Hindus are more religious than Muslims using this definition (see Table 3).

Panel A in Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents the distribution of the proportion sent by the Proposers by location and religiosity. Panel B presents the corresponding proportion returned by the Responders. Once again these do not control for the identity of the matched partner or for other regarding preferences. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the null hypothesis that religiosity has no effect on Trust and Trustworthiness cannot be rejected for 7 out of the 8 comparisons. In Bangladesh, non-religious Muslims exhibit significantly higher Trustworthiness compared to religious Muslims, $p - value = 0.07$. However, as before this is not the end of the story.

Columns 1 – 3 in Table 11 presents the Tobit regression results for Trust behavior, while columns 4 – 6 present the corresponding results for Trustworthiness. Note that the Proposers do not know whether the Responders are religious or not and vice versa. They only know the religion of their

anonymous partner. Again we focus on the difference estimates, presented in Panel B.

The Trust Regression results, presented in columns 1 – 3 in Table 11 show that the religious minority in both West Bengal and Bangladesh exhibit strong in-group bias: in West Bengal religious Muslims send 54 percentage points more to Muslims than to Hindus, $p - value = 0.00$; in Bangladesh religious Hindus send 11 percentage points more to Hindus than to Muslims, $p - value = 0.00$. In the pooled data this translates to religious minority Proposers sending 32 percentage points more to minority Responders than to majority Responders, $p - value = 0.00$. The non-religious minority Proposers however do not discriminate and this holds for all three samples. The overall in-group bias in Trust on the part of the minority (Result 1) is therefore driven by the strong in-group bias exhibited by the religious minority Proposers in both locations. Majority Proposers, irrespective of whether they are religious or non-religious, never discriminate.

The results from the Trustworthiness regressions, presented in columns 4 – 6 in Table 11 show that the minority, irrespective of whether they are religious or non-religious, do not discriminate, i.e., do not show any evidence of bias. While the religious majority do not discriminate, the non-religious majority Responders exhibit significant out-group bias. In West Bengal, the non-religious Hindu Responders return 30 percentage points more to Muslim Proposers than to Hindu Proposers, $p - value = 0.00$; and in Bangladesh non-religious Muslim Responders return 20 percentage points more to Hindu Proposers than to Muslim Proposers, $p - value = 0.04$. This pattern of behavior on the part of the non-religious majority therefore drives the overall out-group bias in Trustworthiness on the part of the majority (Result 2).

Our results therefore imply that individuals who associate more strongly with their religion behave differently compared to individuals who do not associate as strongly. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the existing models on priming (see Benjamin et al., 2010), which suggests that individuals with a higher level association with a category, will exhibit stronger tendencies towards adhering to the category norm. Result 1 suggests that the category norm for minorities is to exhibit in-group bias. This implies that religious minority Proposers will show stronger positive in-group bias compared to their non-religious counterparts. Our result relating to minority behavior is thus consistent with this implication. With regards to the majority out-group bias in Trustworthiness it is not clear what the category norm is, because of the inherent reciprocity associated with the behavior of the Responder. Nevertheless, results showing non-religious major-

ity exhibiting positive out-group bias while their religious counterparts not discriminating is good news for minorities. Additionally the nature of this behavior across religious and non-religious majority Responders is instinctively reasonable: evidence from the psychology literature suggests that group members who value own group membership less, i.e., associate less strongly with the category norm, are more likely to display out-group favoritism (see for example Mullen et al., 1992).[19]

3.5 Decomposing in-group and out-group bias in Trust and Trustworthiness

It is worth examining the mechanisms and underlying motivations behind the in-group and out-group bias in Results 1 and 2. For example in the context of Trust, is the in-group bias on the part of the minority triggered by the in-group members' treating their own group better than the "other" group – in-group favoritism – or by their treating the "other" group worse than their own group – out-group discrimination.[20] The economics literature has has actually paid very little attention to disentangling in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.[21] Identifying the mechanisms behind the observed in-group and out-group bias is important because whether the driver is favoritism or discrimination can have important social and economic consequences and thus have crucial policy implications. For example, whether there is discrimination against a group or favoritism towards them can affect the relative wages and other labor market outcomes. See Feld et al. (2013) for more examples.

To disentangle discrimination and favoritism, we use data from the *Control* treatment. In all other ways, i.e., recruitment, experimental protocol, operationalization, the *Control* treatment sessions were similar to the *Information* treatment sessions; except here the subjects were given

[19] It is important to distinguish our categorization of valuation in terms of religiosity to that in the psychology literature. In the psychology literature valuation of group membership is based on status. The argument is that membership in a low status group is valued lower than a membership in a high status group. Our categorization is different. We argue that within the same group different members value the group membership differently and thus people who value group membership less are more likely to show out-group favoritism.

[20] These have been defined as *exophobia* and *endophilia* by Feld et al. (2013) and as *in-group love* and *out-group hate* by Halevy et al. (2008)

[21] There are only a few exceptions. The one closest to our paper is the one by Abbink and Harris (2012), who examine whether individuals behave differently towards their own group or others compared to how they treat the neutral subject who do not belong to any group in a multi-recipient dictator game. They apply it to the context of political parties in Thailand – the "Red Shirts" versus "Yellow Shirts". In their recent paper Feld et al. (2013) conduct a field experiment to use grading of examination papers at a Dutch University to estimate the extent of endophilia and exophobia in marking examination scripts. A somewhat related paper is one by Falk and Zehnder (2007), who conduct a field experiment to examine the prevalence and determinants of discrimination and favoritism in trust behavior.

no information about the religion of their anonymous matched partner. Using the *Control* group as a benchmark, we argue that in-group favoritism is observed if the in-group is treated more favorably than the *Control* group and out-group discrimination is observed if the out-group is treated worse than the *Control* group.

There is however an additional issue to consider in this case. Given the distribution of religion in the country, even when no information is provided on the religion of the matched partner, subjects might have priors about the religion of who they are matched with, priors that are based on the overall distribution of Hindus and Muslims in the population. For example, Muslims in Bangladesh know that they form the significant majority in the country and therefore, in the absence of any other information, could reasonably expect that they are matched with another Muslim. This could therefore result in an upward bias in estimated in-group favoritism and a downward bias in out-group discrimination. To account for this bias we present and discuss the results on a *restricted* sample, where we include subjects who explicitly reported that *they did not think of or consider the religion of their partner while making their decisions.* Approximately 50 percent of the participants in the *Control* treatment report that the religion of their partner did not play a role in their decision making.

In the Trust regression results presented in columns 3 – 6 in Table 5, *Muslim_Control - Hindu_Control* denote the percentage of the endowment sent by a Muslim/Hindu Proposer when she has no information on the religion of the partner. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 6 present the corresponding regression results for the pooled sample. We focus on the results for the restricted sample – columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 and column 3 in Table 6. Both in West Bengal and in Bangladesh the in-group bias in Trust by the members of the minority group Proposers is driven by significant out-group discrimination. In West Bengal, Muslims transfer 32 percentage points less to Hindus compared to when they have no information, $p - value = 0.00$. In Bangladesh, this difference is 14 percantage points, which is statistically different from zero, $p - value = 0.03$. In the pooled regression, we also find that *Minority_Majority – Minority_Control* difference is negative and statistically significant, $p - value = 0.00$. The behavior of the minority in both locations is therefore consistent with the notion of *realistic threats* (see Stephan and Stephan, 2000) – minorities are fearful of the economic and political power of the majority. It is also consistent with the idea of lack of cultural assimilation on the part of the ethnic and religious minorities that one observes in many parts of the world. On the other hand, the out-group bias by the majority Proposers

in Bangladesh is driven by in-group discrimination. Muslim proposers send 18 percentage points less to Muslim Responders than to the Control.

Results are considerably weaker when we look at Trustworthiness, either by location (columns 5 and 6 in Table 7) or on the pooled data (column 3 in Table 8). In particular, we are unable to disentangle the out-group bias on the part of the majority Responders. There is however weak evidence of out-group favoritism among the Muslims in Bangladesh and in-group discrimination on the part of the Muslims in India, though it is not reflected in any overall out-group or in-group bias.

4 Conclusion

We conduct a field experiment in two different locations in South Asia to untangle the interaction between multiple identities based on religion and their differential impacts on trust behavior. This is a departure from the existing literature which have often assumed that such interactions do not exist. Our results show that it is identity based on status rather than religion *per se* that dictates both trust and trustworthiness. The fact that our results consistent across the two locations despite the existence of officially recognized state religion in Bangladesh and not West Bengal gives credence to our argument that behavior is indeed being dictated by status. In general our results highlight the importance of identifying the interactions between multiple identities in segmented societies and disentangling the influence of each of these identities on behavior.

We also find that priming has heterogeneous impacts on members of the same group. Religious minorities systematically exhibit stronger in-group bias in Trust than their non-religious counterparts. On the other hand, the non-religious majority Responders exhibit stronger out-group bias in Trustworthiness than the religious majority, who do not discriminate. This is certainly good news for the minority, who have often been at the receiving end of negative discrimination and violence in these regions. However, the minorities in both these locations still show out-group discrimination in trust behavior which is consistent with the notion of *realistic threats* which could arise from the economic and political power of the majority

Sen (2006) argues that a general sense of social identity and priorities plays a considerable part in individuals' economic decisions. Therefore a better insight of identities will facilitate our under-

standing of fractionalization within the communities. Trust is a crucial component of economic interaction between individuals and it is not inconceivable that bias or discrimination in Trust that we observe in our experimental setting will be reflected in discrimination in other spheres of life. Understanding the nature of the bias will certainly help in designing appropriate policies and thus is a crucial first step in integrating segmented societies.

This paper has adopted an experimental approach towards understanding and examining the effects of identity and multiple identities on behavior. Using experiments allows us to collect data and information on actual behavior rather than what respondents report to be their behavior. Indeed it has been shown that there could, in principle, be a fair amount of divergence between the two (see Glaeser et al., 2000). However how generalizable these results are remains an open question. Does behavior in a laboratory setting translate to similar behavior outside? Findings of a few studies that combine data from laboratory experiments with behavior in real settings show that predictions based on behavior in laboratories translate to real life interactions (Karlan, 2005, Benz and Meier, 2008, Baran et al., 2010).

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Figure 1: West Bengal and Bangladesh pre-independence and now



Table 1: Comparison between West Bengal and Bangladesh

	West Bengal	**Bangladesh**
Ethnicity of the majority	Bengali	Bengali
Political System	Democratic	Democratic
State Religion	Secular	Islam
Official Languages	Bengali and English	Bengali and English
Population	91,347,736	161,083,804
Urban population (%)	28 (as of 2001)	28 (as of 2011)
Literacy (%)	77	56.8
Per capita income (USD) (PPP equivalent - 2011 Estimated)	2300	1700
Infant Mortality rate	38 (2005)	49 (2011)
Life Expectancy	65-69 (2001)	60.5(2001)
People under poverty line (2004-5) (%)	28	40
HDI Ranking (2001)	0.625	0.5
Daily wage rate for manual labor (2012)	200 Rs	300 Tk
Percentage Hindu	73 (2001)	9.6 (2005)
Percentage Muslim	25 (2001)	89.5 (2005)

Table 2: Sample Sizes

Treatment	Proposer	Responder	Total
$Hindu\_Hindu$	49	49	98
$Hindu\_Muslim$	49	49	98
$Muslim\_Hindu$	51	51	102
$Muslim\_Muslim$	45	45	90
Control	116	116	232

Notes:
X_Y denotes the Proposer is X and the Responder is Y.

Table 3: Average Sample Characteristics by Country and Religion

	West Bengal			Bangladesh		
	Hindus	Muslims	Difference	Hindus	Muslims	Difference
Panel A: Proposer						
Age	35.22	33.75	1.47	37.08	40.10	-3.02
	(11.05)	(8.71)		(16.34)	(14.91)	
Education	8.85	8.01	0.84	6.36	6.46	-0.09
	(3.51)	(3.53)		(4.06)	(4.59)	
Income	5062.50	4463.33	599.17	7655.41	7660.29	-4.89
	(4491.52)	(2023.34)		(7895.03)	(5207.38)	
Proportion Sent in Trust Game	30.99	32.12	-1.13	23.14	28.31	-5.17
	(25.39)	(28.98)		(20.97)	(22.71)	
Proportion Sent in Triple Dictator Game	16.80	19.62	-2.82	20.27	21.32	-1.05
	(19.52)	(24.36)		(22.26)	(21.49)	
Proportion Allocated to Risky Asset	35.55	36.63	-1.09	38.01	31.62	6.39
	(22.09)	(25.55)		(30.23)	(22.07)	
Expected Return	27.08	31.94	-4.86	23.99	32.65	-8.66
	(24.35)	(35.81)		(30.44)	(33.52)	
Stated Trust	3.15	3.42	-0.27	3.16	3.06	0.10
	(1.49)	(1.39)		(1.18)	(1.12)	
Religious	0.72	0.50	0.22**	0.50	0.34	0.16*
	(0.45)	(0.50)		(0.50)	(0.48)	
Panel B: Responder						
Age	35.48	30.15	5.33***	39.00	35.35	3.65
	(10.25)	(10.77)		(16.47)	(15.59)	
Education	8.25	7.67	0.58	5.39	6.01	-0.62
	(4.00)	(4.18)		(4.91)	(4.61)	
Income	4797.93	5331.65	-533.72	7157.14	7300.00	-142.86
	(2382.19)	(3490.63)		(6198.17)	(5078.39)	
Average Proportion Returned in Trust Game	24.89	24.85	0.03	23.46	21.65	1.82
	(15.52)	(14.39)		(12.65)	(15.39)	
Proportion Sent in Dictator Game	24.29	24.84	-0.55	22.50	16.02	6.48**
	(26.49)	(21.42)		(17.24)	(15.41)	
Religious	0.77	0.42	0.36***	0.56	0.28	0.28***
	(0.42)	(0.50)		(0.50)	(0.45)	

Notes:
$^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$. Significance of difference computed using t-test. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.

Table 4: Choices and Expectations by Proposer's Religion/Status

	Offer in Trust Game (1)	Offer in Triple Dictator Game (2)	Proportion in Risky Asset (3)	Expected Return (4)	Actual Return (5)
West Bengal					
Proposer Hindu	30.99	16.80	35.55	27.08	24.60
	(25.39)	(19.52)	(22.09)	(24.35)	(20.07)
Proposer Muslim	32.12	19.62	36.63	31.94	25.58
	(28.98)	(24.36)	(25.55)	(35.81)	(18.49)
Bangladesh					
Proposer Hindu	23.14	20.27	38.01	23.99	23.45
	(20.97)	(22.26)	(30.23)	(30.44)	(17.69)
Proposer Muslim	28.31	21.32	31.62	32.65	21.65
	(22.71)	(21.49)	(22.07)	(33.52)	(18.75)
Pooled					
Proposer Majority	28.31	21.32	31.62	32.65	23.29
	(22.71)	(21.49)	(22.07)	(33.52)	(19.54)
Proposer Minority	23.14	20.27	38.01	23.99	24.58
	(20.97)	(22.26)	(30.23)	(30.44)	(18.14)
All Proposers	28.79	19.27	35.52	28.69	23.11
	(24.87)	(21.77)	(25.03)	(30.85)	(18.89)

Notes:
Figures in parenthesis denote standard deviations.

Figure 2: Proportion sent by the Proposer (Panel A) and Responder (Panel B) in West Bengal and Bangladesh, by Religion



Table 5: Trust Regressions by Country

	Information Treatment Only		Includes *Control* Treatment			
	West Bengal	Bangladesh	West Bengal	Bangladesh	West Bengal	Bangladesh
					Restricted Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Regression Results						
Hindu_Muslim	-4.768	-7.873**	2.361	-9.963	5.891	-14.365**
	(15.342)	(3.316)	(8.798)	(6.732)	(10.097)	(6.646)
Muslim_Hindu	-18.318	14.313	-5.568	8.444	-5.451	8.148
	(11.098)	(11.167)	(9.768)	(9.765)	(12.357)	(10.708)
Muslim_Muslim	9.177	-5.276	26.480***	-6.868	25.796**	-12.823
	(12.509)	(7.089)	(9.570)	(7.523)	(11.811)	(9.228)
Hindu_Hindu			2.352	-3.840	3.510	-7.344
			(11.678)	(4.802)	(13.465)	(5.315)
Muslim_Control			15.070	-13.074**	26.140**	5.175
			(11.701)	(6.436)	(12.939)	(3.863)
Proportion Sent in TD game	0.889*	0.843***	0.686***	0.728***	0.825***	0.861***
	(0.458)	(0.118)	(0.224)	(0.098)	(0.294)	(0.161)
Proportion Sent in TD game ×	-0.456	0.042	-0.192	0.171	-0.302	0.040
Hindu_Muslim	(0.562)	(0.142)	(0.500)	(0.150)	(0.531)	(0.203)
Proportion Sent in TD game ×	-0.034	-0.519	0.181	-0.348	-0.011	-0.544
Muslim_Hindu	(0.529)	(0.400)	(0.260)	(0.329)	(0.314)	(0.353)
Proportion Sent in TD game ×	-0.783	-0.196	-0.658**	-0.080	-0.794**	-0.209
Muslim_Muslim	(0.493)	(0.160)	(0.258)	(0.158)	(0.319)	(0.201)
Proportion Sent in TD game ×			0.228	0.095	0.038	-0.009
Hindu_Hindu			(0.536)	(0.151)	(0.556)	(0.185)
Proportion Sent in TD game ×			-0.096	0.174	0.249	-1.726***
Muslim_Control			(0.260)	(0.175)	(0.969)	(0.545)
Proportion in risky asset	0.670***	0.139	0.708***	0.141**	0.664***	0.130*
	(0.162)	(0.094)	(0.146)	(0.066)	(0.147)	(0.077)
Proportion in risky asset ×	-0.163	0.279*	-0.255	0.197	-0.189	0.285*
Muslim	(0.248)	(0.167)	(0.237)	(0.128)	(0.243)	(0.146)
Constant	0.840	5.633	-10.504	12.149*	-20.855	8.052
	(16.642)	(10.898)	(9.391)	(6.733)	(14.715)	(7.847)
σ	22.416***	13.945***	24.060***	13.914***	24.938***	14.182***
	(2.559)	(1.480)	(2.452)	(1.165)	(2.364)	(1.297)
Proportion of censored observation	0.20	0.15	0.20	0.17	0.21	0.15
Sample Size	96	98	168	142	134	117
Panel B: Difference Estimates						
Muslim_Hindu − *Muslim_Muslim*	-27.50**	19.59*	-32.05***	15.31*	-31.25***	20.97**
Muslim_Hindu − *Muslim_Control*			-20.64**	21.52**	-31.59***	2.973
Muslim_Muslim − *Muslim_Control*			11.41	6.206*	-0.344	-18.00**
Hindu_Muslim − *Hindu_Hindu*	-4.768	-7.873**	0.00886	-6.123	2.381	-7.020*
Hindu_Muslim − *Hindu_Control*			2.361	-9.963	5.891	-14.36**
Hindu_Hindu − *Hindu_Control*			2.352	-3.840	3.510	-7.344

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent variable is proportion of the endowment sent by the Proposer. Regressions control for set of household and individual characteristics and order in which games were played. Standard Errors, clustered at the session level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$. *X_Y*: *X* Proposer, *Y* Responder; $X \in$ (Hindu, Muslim); $Y \in$ (Hindu, Muslim, Control). Restricted Sample includes individuals in the *Control* treatments who report that they *did not think of or consider the religion of their partner while making their decisions.*

Table 6: Trust Regressions by Majority/Minority Status. Pooled Data

	Information Treatment only	Includes *Control* Treatment	
			Restricted Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Regression Results			
Majority_Minority	7.053	10.036	11.271
	(7.118)	(7.182)	(9.173)
Minority_Majority	-10.063*	-1.662	-4.169
	(5.762)	(5.823)	(8.704)
Minority_Minority	8.678	18.220***	14.834
	(6.648)	(6.661)	(9.309)
Majority_Majority		3.675	2.378
		(5.661)	(8.142)
Minority_Control		11.973*	19.007*
		(7.203)	(11.053)
Proportion sent in TD Game	0.638***	0.735***	0.800***
	(0.183)	(0.161)	(0.263)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×	-0.188	-0.291	-0.385
Majority_Minority	(0.302)	(0.301)	(0.369)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×	0.181	0.124	0.026
Minority_Majority	(0.200)	(0.173)	(0.273)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×	-0.319	-0.442*	-0.491
Minority_Minority	(0.270)	(0.251)	(0.321)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×		-0.049	-0.137
Majority_Majority		(0.265)	(0.329)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×		-0.004	-0.029
Minority_Control		(0.175)	(0.294)
Proportion in risky asset	0.575***	0.580***	0.578***
	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Proportion in risky asset ×	-0.258*	-0.303**	-0.285**
Minority	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.134)
Constant	3.340	-0.257	-3.325
	(5.973)	(4.640)	(9.006)
σ	20.283***	21.639***	22.315***
	(1.863)	(1.898)	(1.976)
Proportion of censored observation	0.18	0.18	0.18
Sample Size	194	310	251
Panel B: Difference Estimates			
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Minority$	-18.74**	-19.88***	-19.00**
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Control$		-13.64**	-23.18***
$Minority\_Minority - Minority\_Control$		6.247	-4.173
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$	7.053	6.361	8.893
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Control$		10.04	11.27
$Majority\_Majority - Majority\_Control$		3.675	2.378

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent variable is proportion of the endowment sent by the Proposer. Regressions control for set of household and individual characteristics, Bangladesh dummy and order order in which games were played. Standard Errors, clustered at the session level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$. X_Y: X Proposer, Y Responder; $X \in$ (Majority, Minority); $Y \in$ (Majority, Minority, Control). Restricted Sample includes individuals in the *Control* treatments who report that they *did not think of or consider the religion of their partner while making their decisions.*

Table 7: Trustworthiness Regressions by Country

	Information Treatment Only		Includes *Control* Treatment			
	West Bengal	Bangladesh	West Bengal	Bangladesh	West Bengal	Bangladesh
					Restricted Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Regression Results						
Hindu_Muslim	15.158**	-0.142	8.396	2.601	7.257	13.291
	(7.280)	(6.852)	(6.850)	(7.312)	(9.055)	(11.358)
Muslim_Hindu	4.162	10.255	-1.417	5.707	-3.114	19.306*
	(10.237)	(8.701)	(8.242)	(7.115)	(10.936)	(11.715)
Muslim_Muslim	-4.650	-1.276	-7.429	-2.615	-10.919	9.310
	(9.827)	(7.120)	(7.173)	(6.447)	(9.819)	(10.732)
Hindu_Hindu			-6.717	-0.103	-7.352	11.340
			(7.737)	(7.558)	(9.511)	(11.259)
Muslim_Control			4.207	-7.047	4.698	-3.008
			(6.148)	(7.298)	(8.558)	(14.352)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game	0.403***	0.383*	0.441***	0.282**	0.530**	1.142*
	(0.109)	(0.197)	(0.106)	(0.144)	(0.217)	(0.616)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×	-0.398**	-0.072	-0.315*	0.105	-0.466*	-0.769
Hindu_Muslim	(0.164)	(0.275)	(0.165)	(0.222)	(0.250)	(0.655)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×	0.190	-0.151	0.123	0.061	0.030	-0.834
Muslim_Hindu	(0.219)	(0.322)	(0.212)	(0.275)	(0.284)	(0.658)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×	-0.024	0.138	0.090	0.237	-0.062	-0.613
Muslim_Muslim	(0.185)	(0.246)	(0.207)	(0.198)	(0.286)	(0.632)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×			-0.033	0.048	-0.127	-0.779
Hindu_Hindu			(0.150)	(0.241)	(0.234)	(0.632)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×			-0.160	0.276	-0.333	0.706
Muslim_Control			(0.157)	(0.357)	(0.232)	(1.036)
Constant	19.990	23.698***	27.401***	21.539***	29.526**	10.434
	(13.228)	(8.098)	(10.217)	(7.621)	(13.129)	(11.766)
σ	19.059***	18.154***	19.204***	18.234***	19.199***	18.658***
	(1.059)	(1.711)	(0.897)	(1.383)	(0.937)	(1.591)
Proportion of censored observation	0.18	0.10	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.13
Sample Size	768	776	1,336	1,120	1,032	896
Panel B: Difference Estimates						
$Muslim\_Hindu - Muslim\_Muslim$	8.812	11.53	6.012	8.322	7.806	9.996
$Muslim\_Hindu - Muslim\_Control$			-5.624	12.75	-7.812	22.31*
$Muslim\_Muslim - Muslim\_Control$			-11.64*	4.432	-15.62**	12.32
$Hindu\_Muslim - Hindu\_Hindu$	15.16**	-0.142	15.11**	2.703	14.61	1.951
$Hindu\_Muslim - Hindu\_Control$			8.396	2.601	7.257	13.29
$Hindu\_Hindu - Hindu\_Control$			-6.717	-0.103	-7.352	11.34

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent Variable: Proportion of the amount received by the Responder that is returned to the Proposer. Regressions also control for percentage sent by Proposer (strategy method) set of household and individual characteristics, and order of games. Standard Errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$. X_Y: X Responder, Y Proposer; $X \in$ (Hindu, Muslim); $Y \in$ (Hindu, Muslim, Control). Restricted Sample includes individuals in the *Control* treatments who report that they *did not think of or consider the religion of their partner while making their decisions.*

Table 8: Trustworthiness Regressions by Majority/Minority Status. Pooled Data

	Information Treatment Only	Includes *Control* Treatment	
			Restricted Sample
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Regression Results			
Majority_Minority	11.512**	9.367**	7.583
	(5.091)	(4.771)	(6.625)
Minority_Majority	6.461	3.817	2.792
	(5.719)	(4.998)	(6.926)
Minority_Minority	0.581	-1.603	-3.339
	(5.134)	(4.801)	(6.670)
Majority_Majority		-2.085	-4.025
		(4.586)	(6.258)
Minority_Control		5.873	5.146
		(4.399)	(6.887)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game	0.440***	0.465***	0.620***
	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.176)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×	-0.250*	-0.275**	-0.435**
Majority_Minority	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.198)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×	0.035	0.006	-0.145
Minority_Majority	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.210)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×	-0.002	-0.015	-0.185
Minority_Minority	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.219)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×		-0.033	-0.181
Majority_Majority		(0.131)	(0.198)
Proportion sent in Dictator Game ×		-0.203	-0.350*
Minority_Control		(0.129)	(0.197)
Constant	16.284**	21.568***	21.198***
	(6.946)	(5.079)	(6.833)
σ	19.028***	19.007***	19.285***
	(1.095)	(0.836)	(0.962)
Proportion of censored observation	0.14	0.16	0.15
Sample Size	1,544	2,456	1,928
Panel B: Difference Estimates			
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Minority$	5.880	5.420	6.132
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Control$		-2.056	-2.353
$Minority\_Minority - Minority\_Control$		-7.476	-8.485
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$	11.51**	11.45**	11.61
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Control$		9.367**	7.583
$Majority\_Majority - Majority\_Control$		-2.085	-4.025

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent Variable: Proportion of the amount received by the Responder that is returned to the Proposer. Regressions control for percentage sent by Proposer (strategy method), set of household and individual characteristics Bangladesh dummy, and order in which games were played. Standard Errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$. X_Y: X Responder, Y Proposer; $X \in$ (Majority, Minority); $Y \in$ (Majority, Minority, Control). Restricted Sample includes individuals in the *Control* treatments who report that they *did not think of or consider the religion of their partner while making their decisions.*

Figure 3: Majority out-group bias for low and high s



Notes:
Height of bars denote the magnitude of the difference estimate $Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$ for low and high s, as a proportion of the average proportion sent by a majority Proposer to a majority Responder.

Table 9: Robustness (Trust)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Results								
Majority_Minority	7.053	7.533	16.281**	-0.212	14.112**	-0.747	14.845**	-0.428
	(7.118)	(7.193)	(7.216)	(7.444)	(6.963)	(7.336)	(7.145)	(7.250)
Minority_Majority	-10.063*	-10.024*	-7.789	2.822	-8.580	1.897	-8.758	1.553
	(5.762)	(5.809)	(5.956)	(6.517)	(6.044)	(7.336)	(6.102)	(7.237)
Minority_Minority	8.678	8.471	16.047	18.401	13.669	17.146	14.337	16.699
	(6.648)	(6.758)	(10.181)	(13.955)	(10.381)	(14.144)	(10.617)	(13.985)
Proportion sent in TD Game	0.638***	0.648***	0.669***	0.670***	0.675***	0.673***	0.665***	0.669***
	(0.183)	(0.176)	(0.168)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.169)	(0.170)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×	-0.188	-0.192	-0.239	-0.153	-0.227	-0.152	-0.210	-0.147
Majority_Minority	(0.302)	(0.298)	(0.314)	(0.305)	(0.314)	(0.306)	(0.311)	(0.299)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×	0.181	0.161	0.150	0.130	0.161	0.137	0.172	0.145
Minority_Majority	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.208)	(0.195)	(0.208)	(0.190)	(0.199)
Proportion sent in TD Game ×	-0.319	-0.335	-0.370	-0.377	-0.358	-0.370	-0.355	-0.365
Minority_Minority	(0.270)	(0.268)	(0.272)	(0.282)	(0.271)	(0.284)	(0.266)	(0.278)
Proportion in risky asset	0.575***	0.549***	0.540***	0.490***	0.538***	0.489***	0.532***	0.488***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.110)
Proportion in risky asset ×	-0.258*	-0.237	-0.179	-0.147	-0.181	-0.149	-0.173	-0.147
Minority	(0.143)	(0.154)	(0.143)	(0.147)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.147)
Stated high trust		4.506						
		(6.062)						
Proportion Minority in village			-28.929***	-48.205***	-26.765***	-45.518***	-28.047***	-47.654***
			(7.008)	(10.739)	(7.113)	(12.713)	(7.010)	(11.053)
Proportion Minority in village				58.970**		55.527**		58.492**
× Minority				(22.920)		(25.068)		(23.446)
Connectedness			4.479	16.043***	4.980	15.738***	4.481	15.855***
			(5.494)	(5.871)	(5.430)	(5.809)	(5.452)	(5.779)
Connectedness				-21.642***		-20.684***		-21.208***
× Minority				(7.566)		(7.585)		(7.598)
Primary school in village			-8.424	14.274	-6.516	14.556	-7.594	14.015
			(8.242)	(10.817)	(8.505)	(10.961)	(8.741)	(10.710)
Primary school in village				-18.183		-17.832		-17.269
× Minority				(11.887)		(12.107)		(12.154)
Secondary school in village			3.200	4.634	2.021	3.873	2.866	4.767
			(6.283)	(6.163)	(6.517)	(6.645)	(6.362)	(6.367)
Secondary school in village				-19.135**		-17.893*		-18.961**
× Minority				(9.124)		(9.261)		(7.895)

Continued . . .

Table 9 (Continued). Robustness (Trust)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Health centre in village			-4.181	3.497	-5.002	2.276	-5.005	3.174
			(5.394)	(7.259)	(5.232)	(8.114)	(5.447)	(7.394)
Health centre in village				7.523		7.850		7.293
× Minority				(9.512)		(9.572)		(8.763)
Witness riot in village					5.542	3.013		
					(3.767)	(5.565)		
Witness riot in village						0.424		
× Minority						(7.442)		
Witness riot anywhere							3.190	0.861
							(4.432)	(5.234)
Witness riot anywhere								2.789
× Minority								(6.222)
Constant	3.340	2.836	6.300	-7.235	4.745	-7.520	5.475	-7.503
	(5.973)	(5.803)	(8.464)	(6.663)	(8.413)	(6.584)	(8.887)	(6.578)
σ	20.283***	20.237***	19.600***	19.262***	19.528***	19.238***	19.566***	19.248***
	(1.863)	(1.824)	(1.812)	(1.824)	(1.783)	(1.804)	(1.797)	(1.800)
Sample Size	194	194	194	194	194	194	194	194
Panel B: Difference Estimates								
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Minority$	-18.74**	-18.5**	-23.83***	-15.58	-22.25***	-15.24	-23.09***	-15.15
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$	7.053	7.53	16.28**	0.21	14.11**	0.75	14.84**	0.43

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent variable is proportion of the endowment sent by the Proposer. Regressions control for set of household and individual characteristics, Bangladesh dummy and order in which games were played. Standard Errors, clustered at the session level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$. X_Y: X Proposer, Y Responder; $X, Y \in$ (Majority, Minority). Column 1: Baseline results. See results presented in column 1 of Table 6. Sample restricted to *Information* treatments only.

Table 10: Robustness (Trustworthiness)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Regression Results							
Majority_Minority	11.512**	12.682**	11.782**	12.961**	12.028**	13.121**	12.746**
	(5.091)	(5.955)	(5.894)	(5.994)	(5.930)	(5.990)	(5.956)
Minority_Majority	6.461	-2.904	31.046*	-2.458	31.771*	-2.054	34.322**
	(5.719)	(7.314)	(16.532)	(7.301)	(16.574)	(7.430)	(17.247)
Minority_Minority	0.581	-8.968	23.700	-8.886	23.993	-8.372	26.404
	(5.134)	(6.457)	(16.490)	(6.430)	(16.556)	(6.580)	(17.185)
Proportion set in Dictator game	0.440***	0.445***	0.447***	0.454***	0.453***	0.453***	0.454***
	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.096)
Proportion set in Dictator game ×	-0.250*	-0.347**	-0.299**	-0.355**	-0.303**	-0.354**	-0.302**
Majority_Minority	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.132)	(0.144)	(0.134)	(0.144)	(0.133)
Proportion set in Dictator game ×	0.035	0.028	0.023	0.022	0.019	0.017	0.004
Minority_Majority	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.151)
Proportion set in Dictator game ×	-0.002	0.024	-0.005	0.018	-0.008	0.017	-0.019
Minority_Minority	(0.159)	(0.161)	(0.154)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.157)
Proportion minority in village		19.529**	26.063	19.421**	26.099	18.633**	21.533
		(8.542)	(20.069)	(8.480)	(20.193)	(8.512)	(19.916)
Proportion minority in village			-6.748		-6.853		-5.826
× Minority			(15.953)		(16.086)		(15.872)
Connectedness		2.573	6.070	1.988	5.358	1.751	5.168
		(3.170)	(6.033)	(3.184)	(6.210)	(3.464)	(6.297)
Connectedness			-7.702		-7.434		-7.975
× Minority			(8.024)		(8.080)		(8.096)
Primary school in village		2.497	-2.414	3.060	-2.061	3.012	0.547
		(8.011)	(12.853)	(8.141)	(12.964)	(8.079)	(13.374)
Primary school in village			-24.095		-24.036		-24.185
× Minority			(21.881)		(22.186)		(22.481)
Secondary school in village		-5.266	-2.037	-5.837	-2.326	-5.882	-4.016
		(5.286)	(7.806)	(5.385)	(7.876)	(5.357)	(8.255)
Secondary school in village			-6.339		-6.907		-4.706
× Minority			(14.922)		(15.149)		(15.259)

Continued . . .

Table 10 (Continued). Robustness (Trustworthiness)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Primary health centre in village		4.052	5.435	4.325	5.687	4.572	7.394
		(4.652)	(9.628)	(4.631)	(9.636)	(4.596)	(9.924)
Primary health centre in village			-0.508		-0.651		-2.659
× Minority			(9.611)		(9.595)		(10.084)
Witness riot in village				-1.952	-1.447		
				(3.495)	(4.669)		
Witness riot in village					-0.842		
× Minority					(6.943)		
Witness riot anywhere						-1.979	-1.572
						(3.417)	(4.590)
Witness riot anywhere							-5.203
× Minority							(6.252)
Constant	16.284**	9.426	5.216	9.048	4.812	9.502	3.564
	(6.946)	(9.587)	(13.629)	(9.630)	(13.660)	(9.603)	(13.724)
σ	19.028***	18.811***	18.493***	18.804***	18.486***	18.802***	18.433***
	(1.095)	(1.034)	(0.986)	(1.031)	(0.986)	(1.031)	(0.986)
Sample Size	1,544	1,544	1,544	1,544	1,544	1,544	1,544
Panel B: Difference Estimates							
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Minority$	5.879	6.06	7.34	6.42	7.78	6.31	7.91
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$	11.512**	12.68**	11.78**	12.96**	12.02**	13.12**	12.74**

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent Variable: Proportion of the amount received by the Responder that is returned (to the Proposer). Regressions control for percentage sent by Proposer (strategy method), set of household and individual characteristics Bangladesh dummy, and order in which games were played. Standard Errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$. X_Y: X Responder, Y Proposer; $X \in$ (Majority, Minority); $Y \in$ (Majority, Minority). Column 1: Baseline results. See results presented in column 1 of Table 8. Sample restricted to *Information* treatments only.

Table 11: Religiosity and Priming.

	Proposers†			Responders‡		
	West Bengal	Bangladesh	Pooled	West Bengal	Bangladesh	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Regression Results						
$Minority^R\_Majority$	-49.36*	1.93	-25.67**	-12.39	-9.21	3.09
	(25.932)	(8.318)	(12.909)	(13.493)	(7.694)	(7.912)
$Minority^{NR}\_Majority$	-17.15	-2.18	-17.37	8.13	9.83	11.63*
	(25.996)	(12.625)	(25.996)	(13.992)	(6.724)	(6.752)
$Minority^R\_Minority$	4.29	12.97	5.83	-13.02	-8.78	-5.15
	(19.367)	(8.705)	(10.644)	(10.453)	(8.420)	(6.253)
$Minority^{NR}\_Minority$	0.36	-7.05	-7.59	-1.38	13.67**	6.00
	(26.190)	(14.479)	(14.570)	(11.354)	(6.622)	(7.043)
$Majority^{NR}\_Majority$	-3.62	15.97	-1.23	-5.22	0.16	0.044
	(24.011)	(9.775)	(12.339)	(8.068)	(8.340)	(6.556)
$Majority^R\_Minority$	-12.69	21.72	-2.26	12.43	-7.35	6.87
	(21.293)	(15.441)	(11.394)	(7.903)	(12.832)	(6.047)
$Majority^{NR}\_Minority$	0.86	27.05**	10.96	25.23***	20.60***	20.01***
	(27.786)	(12.038)	(12.860)	(7.657)	(7.657)	(6.933)
Constant	10.98	-7.47	5.98	16.49	25.25***	15.68**
	(24.522)	(16.191)	(13.746)	(14.367)	(8.398)	(7.460)
σ	21.17***	13.48***	19.48***	18.65***	17.38***	18.76***
	(2.714)	(1.330)	(1.788)	(1.067)	(1.586)	(1.054)
Sample Size	96	98	194	768	776	1544
Panel B: Difference Estimates						
$Minority^R\_Minority-$ $Minority^R\_Majority$	53.67***	11.04***	31.5***	-0.62	0.43	-8.23
$Minority^{NR}\_Minority-$ $Minority^{NR}\_Majority$	17.51	-4.87	9.78	-9.5	3.84	-5.63
$Majority^R\_Majority-$ $Majority^R\_Minority$	12.68	-21.72	2.25	-12.42	7.34	-6.87
$Majority^{NR}\_Majority-$ $Majority^{NR}\_Minority$	-4.48	-11.07	-12.19	-30.4***	-20.44**	-19.56**

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$. Results presented from pooled regression with $Majority^R\_Majority$ as the reference category. In West Bengal majority denotes Hindu and minority denotes Muslim. In Bangladesh majority denotes Muslim and minority denotes Hindu.
†: Dependent Variable in columns 1 – 3 is the Proportion of the endowment sent by the Proposer. Regressions control for the proportion sent in the Triple Dictator game and it interaction with religiosity and the treatments (as in Tables 5 and 6), set of household and individual characteristics, Bangladesh dummy and order of games. X_Y: X Proposer, Y Responder. Standard Errors, clustered at the session level, in parenthesis.
‡: Dependent Variable in columns 4 – 6 is proportion of the amount received by the Responder that is returned to the Proposer. Regressions control for proportion sent in the Dictator Game and its interaction with religiosity and the treatments (as in Tables 7 and 8), percentage sent by Proposer (strategy method), set of household and individual characteristics Bangladesh dummy, and order of games. Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis. X_Y: X Responder, Y Proposer. Standard Errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis.

Table A.1: Trustworthiness Regressions by Country and level (s)

	West Bengal		Bangladesh		Pooled	
	Low s	High s	Low s	High s	Low s	High s
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Regression Results						
$Hindu\_Muslim$	14.111*	16.285**	3.348	-3.564		
	(7.747)	(7.730)	(7.302)	(6.923)		
$Muslim\_Hindu$	-1.594	10.071	8.256	12.221		
	(10.739)	(10.280)	(9.286)	(8.722)		
$Muslim\_Muslim$	-14.108	3.979	-1.840	-0.995		
	(10.925)	(9.454)	(8.268)	(6.810)		
$Majority\_Minority$					11.242**	11.918**
					(5.715)	(5.181)
$Minority\_Majority$					6.863	6.241
					(6.337)	(5.679)
$Minority\_Minority$					-2.649	3.633
					(5.759)	(5.069)
Constant	13.401	-2.987	17.205**	13.578	9.873	-0.339
	(13.504)	(13.472)	(8.330)	(8.269)	(7.456)	(6.702)
σ	21.549***	17.282***	20.166***	16.672***	21.383***	17.321***
	(1.417)	(1.120)	(1.770)	(1.873)	(1.210)	(1.177)
Sample Size	384	384	388	388	772	772
Panel B: Difference Estimates						
$Muslim\_Hindu - Muslim\_Muslim$	12.51	6.092	10.10	13.22*		
$Hindu\_Muslim - Hindu\_Hindu$	14.11*	16.29**	3.348	-3.564		
$Minority\_Majority - Minority\_Minority$					9.513	2.608
$Majority\_Minority - Majority\_Majority$					11.24**	11.92**

Notes:
Coefficient estimates from Tobit regression presented. Dependent Variable: Proportion of the amount received by the Responder that is returned to the Proposer. Regressions also control for proportion sent in the Dictator Game and its interaction with the treatment (as in Tables 7 and 8), percentage sent by Proposer (strategy method), set of household and individual characteristics Bangladesh dummy, and order of games. Standard Errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$. In columns $1-4$, X_Y: X Responder, Y Proposer; $X \in$ (Hindu, Muslim); $Y \in$ (Hindu, Muslim).In columns 5 and 6, X_Y: X Responder, Y Proposer; $X \in$ (Majority, Minority); $Y \in$ (Majority, Minority). Estimation conducted on the *Information* Treatment sample only. s denotes the proportion of endowment sent by the Proposer.

Figure A.1: Proportion sent by the Proposer (Panel A) and Responder (Panel B) by Religiosity