American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 16,
no. 4, November 2024
(pp. 440–74)
Abstract
Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes impacts economic behavior and sheds light on factors that may underlie "rule legitimacy."Citation
Apffelstaedt, Arno ⓡ Jana Freundt. 2024. "Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16 (4): 440–74. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200038Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C90 Design of Experiments: General
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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