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  4. Winter 1995
  5. Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition

  • Douglas W. Rae
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 1995
(pp. 65–75)
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Abstract

This is an essay about the use of districting systems to regulate electoral outcomes and the evolution of party systems. By changing the number of seats from each district, a balance can be struck between the often conflicting goals of minority representation and defractionalization. Defractionalization is the process of forming broad-based governing majorities. Special attention is given to the electoral systems of Italy, Spain, and the United States. In the case of the United States, the author recommends a proportional representation system that mixes high-magnitude districts that encourage minority representation and low-magnitude districts that promote defractionalization.

Citation

Rae, Douglas W. 1995. "Using District Magnitude to Regulate Political Party Competition." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (1): 65–75. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.65

JEL Classification

  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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