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  4. Winter 1995
  5. Optimal Voting Rules

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Optimal Voting Rules

  • Peyton Young
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 1995
(pp. 51–64)
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Abstract

Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters' opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.

Citation

Young, Peyton. 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (1): 51–64. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.51

JEL Classification

  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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