American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Polity Size and Local Government Performance: Evidence from India
American Economic Review
vol. 114,
no. 11, November 2024
(pp. 3385–3426)
Abstract
Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization (polity size) using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite capture.Citation
Narasimhan, Veda, and Jeffrey Weaver. 2024. "Polity Size and Local Government Performance: Evidence from India." American Economic Review, 114 (11): 3385–3426. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221712Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 Public Goods
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
- R50 Regional Government Analysis: General