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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (Forthcoming)
Abstract
We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient
outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks
agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player
choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of
payments, from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions.
First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of
play. Second, our results extend to a model without quasi-linear utility, to a setting
with an outside option, robustness to max-min behavior and caps on prices.