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  5. Persistent Protests

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Persistent Protests

  • Sofia Correa
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (Forthcoming)

Abstract

A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government does not concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a “veteran reward”. Every equilibrium with protest displays: a build-up stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them; a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability; and a decay stage in which the government concedes with some density, and citizens continuously drop out. The set of equilibria is fully described by the peak time.

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