

Supplemental Material for:

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany

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A Online Appendix (Not For Publication)

A.1 Propositions on Extensive and Intensive Compliance Responses

The extensive margin decision of evading, complying or donating is characterized as follows:

Proposition 1 (Extensive Margin) *Assuming smooth preferences, there exists cutoffs \bar{s}_1, \bar{s}_2 such that a fraction $F(\bar{s}_1)$ of the population are evaders ($z < \bar{z}$), a fraction $F(\bar{s}_2) - F(\bar{s}_1)$ are compliers ($z = \bar{z}$), and a fraction $1 - F(\bar{s}_2)$ are donors ($z > \bar{z}$). The cutoffs are given by,*

$$\frac{u'_T(\bar{z} - T(\bar{z}), T(\bar{z}), \bar{s}_1)}{u'_c(\bar{z} - T(\bar{z}), T(\bar{z}), \bar{s}_1)} = 1 - p[1 + \theta] \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{u'_T(\bar{z} - T(\bar{z}), T(\bar{z}), \bar{s}_2)}{u'_c(\bar{z} - T(\bar{z}), T(\bar{z}), \bar{s}_2)} = 1,$$

implying $\bar{s}_1 < \bar{s}_2$ and therefore excess bunching at $z = \bar{z}$ for any positive deterrence incentive, $p[1 + \theta] > 0$. We have:

(A) Deterrence: *stronger deterrence (larger p or θ) reduces \bar{s}_1 and does not affect \bar{s}_2 . Hence, the fraction of evaders is decreasing, the fraction of compliers is increasing, and the fraction of donors is unaffected by deterrence.*

(B) Warm Glow: *stronger warm-glow (larger u'_T all else equal) reduces both \bar{s}_1 and \bar{s}_2 . Hence,*

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the fraction of evaders is decreasing, the fraction of compliers is indeterminate, and the fraction of donors is increasing in warm glow.

Proof: This follows from (2) and the fact that u'_T/u'_c is increasing in s . We also use that there is a convex kink at $z = \bar{z}$ as the marginal deterrence incentive falls discretely from $p[1 + \theta]$ to 0. ■

We then turn to the intensive margin decision within each group. For this purpose, it is helpful to state the following (natural) assumption on preferences:

Assumption 1 *The MRS between consumption in the audited and non-audited states u'_{c_A}/u'_{c_N} and the MRS between warm glow and consumption $E[u'_T]/u'_{c_N}$ are both decreasing in $T(z)$.*

This assumption is consistent with, but stronger than, concavity of the utility function ($u''_{cc}, u''_{TT} < 0$). That is, while concavity by itself creates the effect in Assumption 1, there could be an offsetting effect under either substitutability ($u''_{cT} < 0$) or complementarity ($u''_{cT} > 0$) between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. For example, while higher tax payments directly reduce u'_{c_A}/u'_{c_N} by moving consumption from the non-audited to the audited state, the larger warm-glow benefits will have an indirect effect on u'_{c_A}/u'_{c_N} provided that u''_{cT}/u'_c is different between the two states (which depends on a *third-order* derivative of the utility function). Assumption 1 rules out situations where the indirect effect goes against the direct effect and is strong enough to overturn it.¹

With this assumption, we are able to state the following result on the intensive margin:

Proposition 2 (Intensive Margin) *Under Assumption 1, we have:*

(A) Deterrence: *stronger deterrence (larger p or θ) increases reported income z for evaders ($s < \bar{s}_1$), while it does not affect reported income z for donors ($s > \bar{s}_2$).*

(B) Warm Glow: *stronger warm-glow (larger u'_T all else equal) increases reported income z for both evaders and donors ($s < \bar{s}_1$ and $s > \bar{s}_2$, respectively).*

Proof: The evader results follow from (2) for $I\{z \leq \bar{z}\} = 1$ and Assumption 1. The donor results follow from (2) for $I\{z \leq \bar{z}\} = 0$ in which case $u'_{c_N} = u'_{c_A} = u'_c(\bar{z} - T(z), T(z), s)$ and $E[u'_T] = u'_T(\bar{z} - T(z), T(z), s)$. ■

A.2 Attrition

To investigate the correlates of attrition from our panel data, we estimate a linear probability model that has a dependent variable equal to one if the individual is in our sample in year 2008, and has

¹Formally, for the MRS between consumption in the audited and non-audited states u'_{c_A}/u'_{c_N} , the effect of $T(z)$ coming through warm glow (holding consumption c_A, c_N fixed) is given by $\frac{\partial}{\partial T} \frac{u'_{c_A}}{u'_{c_N}} \Big|_{c_A, c_N} = \left[\frac{u''_{c_A T}}{u'_{c_A}} - \frac{u''_{c_N T}}{u'_{c_N}} \right] \frac{u'_{c_A}}{u'_{c_N}}$, where $u''_{c_A T} \equiv u''_{cT}(c_A, T(z), s)$ and $u''_{c_N T} \equiv u''_{cT}(c_N, T(z), s)$. Assumption 1 implies that this effect (which depends on u''_{cTc}) cannot be so strongly positive that it dominates the direct negative effect coming through diminishing marginal returns to consumption.

attritted by 2012, the year of the field experiment. This analysis is based on the 31,238 individuals observed in 2008: 86.5% are observed in all years 2008-12. We are primarily interested in how attrition is correlated to treatment assignment, and whether there is evidence of heterogeneous attrition across treatments. The most important form of individual heterogeneity considered in our analysis is whether the individual is a baseline evader, complier or donor. Hence we control throughout for this individual type, as defined based on observed behavior in 2008.

Column 1 of Table A3 shows that those that evade in 2008 are 2.4 percentage points more likely to attrit by the 2012 tax year than exact compliers in 2008, an effect significant at the 1% level; 2008 donors are not significantly more or less likely to attrit than 2008 exact compliers. This correlation between non-compliance and attrition is intuitive: if past compliance behavior reflects baseline motivation, then non-compliance should be a predictor of opting-out in later years. Column 2 shows this to be robust to including individual controls and parish fixed effects.² Column 3 additionally controls for the treatment assignment dummies. An F-test of their joint significance does not reject the null [p -value 0.872]. Hence we find no evidence that individuals are more likely to attrit because of the treatment they are assigned to. This ameliorates concerns the field experiment caused individuals to opt-out of the Protestant church, that might have offset any gains from compliance among those that do not attrit. Finally, Column 4 includes a complete series of interactions between treatment assignments and the individual's type based on their 2008 behavior (so the reported coefficients now relate to attrition in the control group). We find there is no differential attrition across treatments by past compliance behavior: the three F-tests on the joint significance of the treatment dummies, treatment dummy-evader 2008 interactions, and treatment dummy-donor 2008 interactions, all do not reject the null.

A.3 Persistence in Individual Type

To provide further evidence on the degree of persistence in individual compliance behavior over time, we use a multinomial logit model to estimate the correlates of behavior in 2011, the tax year immediately prior to our field experiment. We do so among those individuals assigned to our T1 Control group, and we report relative risk ratios where the omitted base category is exact compliance in 2011. In Column 1 of Table A5 we only condition on the individuals lagged type, namely whether they evaded or donated in the 2010. This evidence suggests a high degree of persistence over time in individual types: For the extrinsically motivated, those that evade in 2010 are 83.3 times as likely to evade the following year as comply. For the intrinsically motivated, those that donate in 2010 are 10.8 times as likely to continue donating the following year than comply. Column 2 shows this finding to be robust when we additionally control for individual characteristics. The relevant relative risk ratio for persistence in evasion is 87.1, and

²The individual controls are whether the individual is male, their age, the number of children, whether they are a joint filer, receive wage income, are liable for trade taxes, and their church tax payment bin.

for persistence in donating it is 9.01. We further note that most of the individual controls do not predict compliance behavior, and those that do have relatively small relative risk ratios compared to the individual’s own past compliance behavior.

A.4 Social Norms and Moral Suasion

We here present more detailed evidence on our treatments related to social norms and moral suasion. These mirror treatments implemented in Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod (2001): while Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod (2001) found such treatments to have limited impact, we revisit the issue by probing further whether there are heterogeneous impacts across baseline extrinsically and intrinsically motivated tax payers. Our social norms treatment, denoted T12, provides individuals information on the average payments of those that made some *strictly* positive payment in the previous tax year. Table A1 shows precisely how this was communicated.³ Our moral suasion treatment emphasizes the social benefits of making a payment to the local public good of parish services (and specifically naming the parish the individual belongs to). This treatment is denoted T13 and the wording of the relevant paragraph is also shown in Table A1.

Table A8 presents the results following the same format as earlier, where the natural comparison is with the T2 Tax Simplification treatment. When considering the intrinsically motivated, we again focus on baseline donors and thus remove baseline compliers whom the evidence suggests are largely motivated by a duty-to-comply.

When pooling all taxpayers or considering baseline evaders alone, we find both treatments have weak impacts on behavior on both the extensive and total response margins.⁴ Among baseline donors, there is some weak evidence that both treatments increase tax payments. Taken together, these findings suggest that such forms of intervention are unlikely to induce large changes in tax compliance, at least among the majority of taxpayers who are baseline evaders. As such, our findings on moral suasion are in line with some of the earlier literature (Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod, 2001; Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler, 2013), and confirm these non-responses uniformly apply even when extrinsically and intrinsically motivated tax payers can be identified based on their pre-treatment behavior. Such uniform null effects of these kinds of treatment are perhaps not altogether surprising in the context of tax compliance: as discussed by Luttmer and Singhal

³We might expect such norms treatments to be effective if individuals are conditional cooperators, or they have a preference for conformity. Bénabou and Tirole (2011) overview the evidence on the effectiveness of such appeals in various contexts related to prosocial behavior. More recently, Hallsworth et al. (2014) provide evidence from a natural field experiment that providing information on norms and moral appeal accelerates actual payments among UK tax payers.

⁴We also probed both results to further explore heterogeneous responses. Among baseline donors, we tested whether the social norm treatment had heterogeneous impacts among those that paid more or less than the stated norm in 2011. We found no evidence that either subset of baseline donors responds to this information (not shown). On moral suasion, we explored whether this treatment had differential impacts depending on the church membership, or the involvement of church members in church activities, across the parishes in our data. Again, no robust heterogeneous impacts were found.


(2014), individual views on the value of public services provided through taxation are formed through a lifetime of experiences, and these kinds of treatment are unlikely to be powerful enough to induce changes in such beliefs.⁵

⁵This is of course not to suggest that appeals to social norms would not be effective in determining other forms of prosocial behavior. For example, such social norms treatments have been found to effectively raise political contributions (Frey and Meier, 2004). Perez-Truglia and Cruces (2014) show how this is driven by which peers are expected to observe such contributions. Besley, Jensen and Persson (2014) present evidence from the UK on how the short-lived switch to the politically unpopular poll tax on property, led to a short run spike in non-compliance in property taxes and had long term impacts on compliance with property taxes even when the regime was subsequently altered. This suggests social norms can be shifted when shocked by sufficiently large changes to the design of the tax system.

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Figure A1: Local Church Tax Schedule



Level	Annual income or benefits	Annual Church Tax	% of Sample in Tax Bracket, 2012
1	€ 8,005 to € 9,999	€ 5	2,37
2	€ 10,000 to € 24,999	€ 10	26,5
3	€ 25,000 to € 39,999	€ 25	32,0
4	€ 40,000 to € 54,999	€ 45	16,8
5	€ 55,000 to € 69,999	€ 70	9,43
6	€ 70,000 and above	€ 100	12,9

Notes: Figure A1 shows the local church tax schedule: the x-axis shows taxable income. This is a progressive tax schedule with six payment bins. The lower table shows the percentage of the sample in the year of the field experiment that falls into each payment bin.

Table A2: Sample Representativeness

Personal Income Tax Statistics 2007 and Our Sample in 2007

	Sample (Metropolitan Area Studied, Protestants)		Metropolitan Area Studied		Metropolitan Area Studied, Non Church Members	
	Single Filers (1a)	Joint Filers (1b)	Single Filers (2a)	Joint Filers (2b)	Single Filers (3a)	Joint Filers (3c)
Number of taxpayers	21.353	24.950	353.248	448.686	156.734	151.872
Share of taxpayers that are men	44,1%	50,0%	48,8%	50,0%	53,9%	50,0%
Share of taxpayers with children entitled to child allowances	15,1%	59,1%	16,1%	53,0%	18,9%	52,3%
Average number of children entitled to child allowances	0,2	1,0	0,2	0,9	0,3	0,9
Average age	40,4	47,0	43,3	49,2	42,9	46,8
Share of Protestants	100,0%	50,0%	16,0%	14,4%	0,0%	0,0%
Share of Catholics	0,0%		39,5%	41,5%	0,0%	0,0%
Share of taxpayers who are not member of a tax raising community	0,0%	50,0%	44,4%	43,9%	100,0%	100,0%
Average taxable income	39.034	85.090	40.709	73.942	46.177	72.126
Share of declarations with wage income	87,8%	87,8%	83,2%	91,0%	81,4%	91,8%
Share of declarations with capital income	21,8%	31,0%	26,6%	31,2%	23,3%	23,0%
Share of declarations with business income liable for trade tax	2,5%	4,8%	4,5%	7,0%	5,8%	7,2%

Notes: This table shows the mean characteristics (separately for single and joint files) in three groups: our sample (filing Protestants in the large metropolitan area in Bavaria, Columns 1a and 1b), the overall population of single and joint filers in the large metropolitan area in Bavaria (Columns 2a and 2b), and filing non-church members in the same large metropolitan area in Bavaria (Columns 3a and 3b). The source of data is in Columns 2a onwards are personal income statistics for 2007 (the last year of available data). Single filers comprise unmarried individuals and married couples who choose to file two separate tax returns. The vast majority of married couples are joint filers and benefit from the associated reduction in the progressivity of the personal income tax. One parent of each underage child (and of each child who is not older than 25 years and studies/or is in apprenticeship) is entitled to child allowances, which can either be a tax credit or a cash transfer. Tax raising communities in Germany refer to religious communities that collect taxes within the scope of the personal income tax. The Protestant and Catholic churches are by far the largest tax raising communities and cover about 60% of the population; 3.3% of the population belong to other tax raising communities.

Table A3: Correlates of Attrition

	(1) Individual Type As Defined in 2008	(2) Individual Controls	(3) Treatment Assignment in 2012	(4) Heterogeneity Within Treatment
Evader in 2008 [yes =1]	0.024*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.046** (0.021)
Donor in 2008 [yes=1]	0.008 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.023 (0.032)
Parish Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Joint F-test of Significance [p-value]				
Treatment Dummies	No	No	Yes [.872]	Yes [0.628]
Treatment Dummy x Evader in 2008 Interactions	No	No	No	Yes [0.324]
Treatment Dummy x Donor in 2008 Interactions	No	No	No	Yes [0.706]
Observations	31238	31238	31238	31238

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual is in our linked sample in 2008, but has attrited by 2012, the year in which our field experiment takes place, and zero otherwise. The analysis is based on the 31,238 individuals observed in 2008. A linear probability model is estimated throughout with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. In Column 1 we control for whether the individual is an evader or donor in 2008 (exact compliers being the omitted group). Column 2 additionally controls for whether the individual is male, their age, the number of children, whether they are a joint filer, receive wage income, are liable for trade taxes, their payment bin for the local church tax and parish fixed effects. Column 3 additionally controls for the series of treatment assignment dummies, and reports the p-value on an F-test of their joint significance. The specification in Column 4 includes a complete series of interactions between treatment assignments and the individual's type based on their 2008 behavior. We report the p-values on three F-tests on the joint significance of the treatment dummies, all treatment dummy-evader 2007 interactions, and all treatment dummy-donor 2008 interactions.

Table A4: Random Assignment to Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
	Number of Individuals	Male	Age	Married	Number of Children	Joint Filer [yes=1]	Wage Income [yes=1]	Liabie for Trade Tax [yes=1]	Income (in Euro)	F-test on Joint Sign. [Relative to Control] {Relative to Simple Letter}	F-test on Joint Sign. p-value, Baseline Evaders [Relative to Control] {Relative to Simple Letter}	F-test on Joint Sign. p-value, Baseline Compilers [Relative to Control] {Relative to Simple Letter}	F-test on Joint Sign. p-value, Baseline Donors [Relative to Control] {Relative to Simple Letter}
T1: Control Group	2532	0.511 (0.500)	45.5 (13.0)	0.421 (0.494)	0.495 (0.839)	0.368 (0.482)	0.877 (0.329)	0.030 (0.170)	43644 (38040)	-	-	-	-
T2: Tax Simplification	2564	0.509 (0.500)	45.1 (13.0)	0.420 (0.494)	0.477 (0.831)	0.369 (0.482)	0.870 (0.337)	0.027 (0.161)	44573 (39572)	[0.600]	[0.521]	[0.881]	[0.875]
T3: Zero Audit Probability	5104	0.502 (0.500)	45.2 (13.4)	0.408 (0.491)	0.462 (0.805)	0.355 (0.479)	0.878 (0.327)	0.024 (0.153)	44226 (40014)	[0.642]	[0.214]	[0.474]	[0.640]
T4: Audit Probability p=0.1	2572	0.507 (0.500)	44.8 (13.1)	0.394 (0.489)	0.481 (0.830)	0.346 (0.476)	0.896 (0.306)	0.026 (0.159)	42148 (34143)	[0.540]	[0.609]	[0.438]	[0.515]
T5: Audit Probability p=0.2	2532	0.507 (0.500)	45.0 (13.5)	0.415 (0.493)	0.457 (0.825)	0.362 (0.481)	0.877 (0.329)	0.021 (0.143)	42482 (33717)	[0.161]	[0.156]	[0.392]	[0.423]
T6: Audit Probability p=0.5	2533	0.512 (0.500)	45.2 (13.3)	0.423 (0.494)	0.489 (0.833)	0.368 (0.482)	0.880 (0.325)	0.022 (0.147)	43506 (37207)	[0.828]	[0.739]	[0.760]	[0.498]
T7: Audit Probability Notch	2551	0.510 (0.500)	44.8 (13.1)	0.412 (0.492)	0.495 (0.833)	0.353 (0.478)	0.885 (0.319)	0.022 (0.147)	42710 (35746)	[0.331]	[0.325]	[0.541]	[0.106]
T8: Social Reward	2533	0.523 (0.500)	45.2 (13.2)	0.415 (0.493)	0.482 (0.819)	0.363 (0.481)	0.868 (0.339)	0.025 (0.157)	44279 (36317)	[0.466]	[0.044]	[0.411]	[0.303]
T9: Small Private Reward	2521	0.503 (0.500)	45.0 (13.1)	0.412 (0.492)	0.480 (0.823)	0.358 (0.480)	0.881 (0.323)	0.026 (0.158)	42036 (32940)	[0.640]	[0.512]	[0.516]	[0.503]
T10: Large Private Reward	2525	0.513 (0.500)	45.4 (13.1)	0.442 (0.497)	0.514 (0.839)	0.392 (0.488)	0.885 (0.319)	0.022 (0.147)	44085 (39008)	[0.611]	[0.763]	[0.599]	[0.484]
T11: Social and Private Reward Combined	2542	0.517 (0.500)	44.7 (13.0)	0.416 (0.493)	0.500 (0.852)	0.354 (0.478)	0.884 (0.320)	0.027 (0.164)	43351 (36518)	[0.383]	[0.320]	[0.406]	[0.280]
T12: Social Norm	2585	0.491 (0.500)	45.3 (13.3)	0.406 (0.491)	0.471 (0.822)	0.347 (0.476)	0.884 (0.320)	0.026 (0.160)	43520 (38166)	[0.522]	[0.426]	[0.347]	[0.003]
T13: Moral Appeal	2509	0.511 (0.500)	44.9 (13.3)	0.419 (0.493)	0.458 (0.809)	0.357 (0.479)	0.873 (0.333)	0.022 (0.148)	43397 (36753)	[0.151]	[0.198]	[0.866]	[0.723]

Notes: This table presents randomization checks for all treatments in our natural field experiment. Column 1 shows the number of individuals assigned to each treatment. Approximately twice as many individuals were purposefully assigned to the T3 Misperception (p=0) treatment. Columns 2 to 9 present the average sample characteristics for 2012 (in which the field experiment took place), and standard errors in parentheses. Column 10 shows a joint F-test on the significance of the covariate set on being assigned to that specific group relative to the T1 control group (in brackets) and relative to T2 Tax Simplification (in braces). Columns 11-13 repeat this but for the subsamples of baseline evaders, baseline compliers and baseline donors (as defined by their behavior in 2011, the year that immediately precedes our natural field experiment).

Table A5: Persistence of Type in Control Group

Multinomial Logit Estimates, Relative Risk Ratios Reported
(Base Category = Complier in 2010 Tax Year)

Outcome:	Evader in 2010 (1) Past Behavior	Donor in 2010	Evader in 2010 (2) Individual Controls	Donor in 2010
Evader in 2009 Tax Year [yes=1]	83.3*** (16.1)	2.16*** (0.563)	87.1*** (17.5)	2.02*** (0.536)
Donor in 2009 Tax Year [yes=1]	2.32*** (0.601)	10.8*** (2.50)	2.45*** (0.672)	9.01*** (2.22)
Male			0.916 (0.168)	1.04 (0.223)
Age			1.00 (0.008)	1.03*** (0.009)
Number of Children			1.23* (0.152)	0.786 (0.117)
Joint Filer [yes=1]			0.771 (0.165)	1.03 (0.234)
Wage Income [yes=1]			1.85** (0.539)	1.29 (0.377)
Liable for Trade Tax [yes=1]			4.30*** (2.32)	3.07 (2.33)
Payment Owed = €10 [Income Bracket €10000-€25000]			1.41 (0.685)	0.858 (0.434)
Payment Owed = €25 [Income Bracket €25000 - €40000]			1.47 (0.743)	1.30 (0.691)
Payment Owed = €45 [Income Bracket €40000 - €55000]			1.10 (0.564)	1.46 (0.837)
Payment Owed = €70 [Income Bracket €55000 - €70000]			1.70 (0.953)	1.24 (0.779)
Payment Owed = €100 [Income Bracket €70000+]			1.21 (0.646)	0.292* (0.198)
Observations	2521		2521	

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is based on individuals assigned to the T1 Control Group. The outcome is the individual's compliance behavior on the extensive margin in 2011 (evader, complier, donor), the year preceding our natural field experiment. The table reports a multinomial logit model. We report relative risk ratios where the omitted base category is exact compliance in 2011. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In Column 1 we only condition on the individuals lagged type, namely whether they evaded or donated in 2010 (where exact compliers in 2010 are the omitted category). Column 2 additionally control for the individual characteristics shown.

Table A6: Robustness Checks
Baseline vs Unconditional Specification

	Full Sample							Baseline Evaders (Extrinsically Motivated)							Baseline Donors (Intrinsically Motivated)						
	Probability of Evading	Probability of Donating	Payment Amount	Probability of Payment Increase	Probability of Evading	Probability of Donating	Payment Amount	Probability of Payment Increase	Probability of Evading	Probability of Donating	Payment Amount	Probability of Payment Increase	Probability of Evading	Probability of Donating	Payment Amount	Probability of Payment Increase	Probability of Evading	Probability of Donating	Payment Amount	Probability of Payment Increase	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	
Panel A: Tax Simplification Simplification vs Control Letters																					
Baseline Specification	-2.45** (0.971)	-0.438 (6.90)	9.73** (3.73)	33.61** (10.25)	-2.66** (0.747)	6.56 (22.86)	43.40** (10.60)	64.82** (13.69)	-5.25 (19.67)	-4.04 (6.97)	-6.65 (4.85)	-37.29* (19.38)									
Unconditional Specification	-2.60* (1.47)	5.82 (8.96)	13.52** (6.48)	39.41** (10.37)	-2.66** (0.807)	14.94 (23.91)	55.64** (13.83)	72.50** (14.25)	-14.55 (20.28)	-0.585 (7.558)	2.33 (7.45)	-40.39** (18.94)									
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	79.29%	9.24%	€10.29	7.89%	94.98%	1.91%	€3.13	6.12%	17.32%	62.34%	€39.94	15.58%									
Number of Observations	5076	5076	5076	5076	4007	4007	4007	4007	476	476	476	476									
Panel B: Misperception Zero Audit Probability vs Simplification Letters																					
Baseline Specification	0.942 (0.889)	-7.23 (5.65)	-0.766 (3.05)	-10.60 (6.75)	1.53** (0.715)	-8.89 (17.47)	-9.83 (6.75)	-11.03 (7.55)	-16.75 (17.63)	1.52 (5.78)	8.79* (4.78)	32.37 (28.02)									
Unconditional Specification	1.38 (1.31)	-10.47 (7.30)	-1.75 (5.11)	-13.66** (6.83)	1.50* (0.766)	-11.53 (18.10)	-17.25** (8.49)	-14.02* (7.83)	-12.40 (18.48)	-2.49 (6.66)	16.51** (6.81)	35.34 (28.36)									
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	77.30%	9.75%	€11.65	10.92%	92.35%	2.18%	€4.84	10.53%	15.92%	61.63%	€40.16	8.57%									
Number of Observations	7641	7641	7641	7641	6049	6049	6049	6049	723	723	723	723									
Panel C: Deterrence Positive Audit Probability vs Zero Audit Probability																					
Baseline Specification	-3.13** (0.660)	13.71** (4.59)	10.45** (2.37)	26.93** (5.84)	-3.12** (0.536)	36.89** (15.22)	33.67** (6.28)	29.81** (6.64)	-0.093 (15.48)	7.07* (4.22)	2.10 (3.25)	30.85 (19.16)									
Unconditional Specification	-4.17** (0.978)	16.35** (5.93)	10.49** (3.98)	28.82** (5.92)	-3.39** (0.574)	36.01** (15.55)	38.82** (7.74)	31.82** (6.86)	9.62 (16.38)	5.76 (4.70)	-5.27 (4.74)	30.00 (19.09)									
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	78.04%	8.93%	€11.63	9.42%	93.80%	1.93%	€4.05	9.00%	12.55%	61.72%	€45.08	10.67%									
Number of Observations	12692	12692	12692	12692	9979	9979	9979	9979	1261	1261	1261	1261									
Panel D: Compliance Rewards Reward vs Simplification Letters																					
Baseline Specification	0.259 (0.821)	-0.040 (5.23)	1.24 (2.86)	-9.48 (6.21)	1.27* (0.664)	5.24 (16.17)	-5.46 (6.33)	-15.58** (6.90)	-11.64 (15.11)	2.02 (4.95)	4.87 (3.83)	48.34* (25.27)									
Unconditional Specification	-0.193 (1.21)	-1.18 (6.76)	1.62 (4.66)	-11.82* (6.27)	1.31* (0.709)	-1.49 (16.81)	-13.93* (7.88)	-18.82** (7.17)	-6.25 (16.11)	-0.627 (5.73)	5.79 (5.51)	49.00* (25.17)									
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	77.30%	9.75%	€11.65	10.92%	92.35%	2.18%	€4.84	10.53%	15.92%	61.63%	€40.16	8.57%									
Number of Observations	12632	12632	12632	12632	9909	9909	9909	9909	1247	1247	1247	1247									

Notes: Estimations at the individual taxpayer level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Strata variables: payment owed and the number of times the individual was observed in the panel at the time of the intervention. Baseline specifications account for pre-treatment payment behavior, dummies for randomization strata, and parish fixed effects. Unconditional specifications control for parish fixed effects. We use pre-treatment compliance behavior in 2011 to split the sample into evaders (paid less than the amount owed), donors (paid strictly more than the amount owed), and compliers (paid the amount owed, results not shown).

Table A7: Deterrence Effects of an Audit Probability Notch

Sample: Baseline Evaders

	Effect on		Number of
	(1a) Mean Comparison	Payment (in %) (1b) Bunching Estimate	
Compared to T3 Zero Audit Probability Letter			
T7: Audit probability = 0.5 if payment \leq 10 Euro and 0 for payment above	32.1 ^{***} (9.66)	45.13 ^{***} (5.72)	6035
T6: Audit probability = 0.5	28.6 ^{***} (9.68)	-	6024
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	4.05 Euro	-	

Notes: Estimations at the individual taxpayer level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include strata variables (payment owed and the number of times the individual was observed in the panel at the time of the intervention) as well as parish fixed effects. The bunching estimates in column (2) are based on the analysis in Figure 2, Panels C and D, and show by how much (in %) the average buncher increases the payment in order to locate above the notch point at 10 Euro. All regressions are based on the sample of baseline evaders who paid strictly less than their true tax liability in 2011.

Table A8: Treatment Effects of Social Norm and Moral Appeal

	Full Sample				Baseline Evaders (Extrinsically Motivated)				Baseline Donors (Intrinsically Motivated)			
	Probability of Evading (1)	Probability of Donating (2)	Payment Amount (3)	Probability of Payment Increase (4)	Probability of Evading (5)	Probability of Donating (6)	Payment Amount (7)	Probability of Payment Increase (8)	Probability of Evading (9)	Probability of Donating (10)	Payment Amount (11)	Probability of Payment Increase (12)
Panel A: Social Norm												
Social Norm vs Simplification Letters												
Social Comparison	0.904	2.16	0.306	-8.16	1.50*	-16.51	-4.04	-12.96	-26.06	12.20*	9.47*	28.44
	(1.03)	(6.65)	(3.58)	(7.77)	(0.824)	(19.74)	(7.79)	(8.66)	(20.08)	(6.95)	(5.02)	(33.52)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	77.30%	9.75%	€11.65	10.92%	92.35%	2.18%	€4.84	10.53%	15.92%	61.63%	€40.16	8.57%
Number of Observations	5123	5123	5123	5123	4031	4031	4031	4031	492	492	492	492
Panel B: Moral Appeal												
Moral Appeal vs Simplification Letters												
Moral Appeal	-0.136	-6.89	3.01	-7.74	0.839	-27.26	-8.16	-9.51	-23.26	3.89	12.93**	20.42
	(1.05)	(6.52)	(4.14)	(7.91)	(0.855)	(19.72)	(9.24)	(8.93)	(21.24)	(6.93)	(5.41)	(34.31)
Average Outcome in Comparison Group	77.30%	9.75%	€11.65	10.92%	92.35%	2.18%	€4.84	10.53%	15.92%	61.63%	€40.16	8.57%
Number of Observations	5052	5052	5052	5052	3985	3985	3985	3985	477	477	477	477

Notes: Estimations at the individual taxpayer level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Strata variables: payment owed and the number of times the individual was observed in the panel at the time of the intervention. Estimations account for pre-treatment payment behavior, dummies for randomization strata, and parish fixed effects. We use pre-treatment compliance behavior in 2011 to split the sample into evaders (paid strictly less than the amount owed), donors (paid strictly more than the amount owed), and compliers (paid the amount owed, results not shown).

T1 (Control) Letter

[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church administration]

[place & date]

Dear Ms/Mr [addressee's family name],

As every year, we kindly ask you herewith for your annual local church tax payment, with which you directly support the work of your Evangelical-Lutheran congregation and the social work of the deaconry. The local church tax forms part of the general church tax and is collected once yearly by the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in [...].

What do you get from the local church tax?

Many congregations and services use the local church tax funds for very elementary purposes, such as church maintenance or to cover heating costs. With your local church tax you help the churches to stay open and offer a home to those who need it.

Be it the Baptism and Confirmation of your children, or a church wedding, we are always there when you need us. Or when tragedy or a crisis hits. You will always find someone who listens and provides concrete support in your congregation and at our Evangelical counselling centres. With your local church tax, you also support more than 60 Evangelical kindergartens that instil Christian values in our children and thus provide a solid basis for the development of their character.

The Evangelical Church is also engaged in the region's social hotspots. Your local church tax supports important on-going projects dedicated to the social reintegration of troubled youths, keeping them from sliding into social alienation. Your contribution also helps to sustain 17 nursing services for elderly and sick people. You can also find further examples of our work in the enclosed bulletin.

Why is the local church tax so important?

The local church tax has become increasingly important for the Church District of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of [...] because the grants received by the local parishes have declined over the years. 60% of the gross revenue goes to the congregations, 28% to the deaconry and 12% to supra-congregational services (such as counselling centres). In 2011, the local church tax collected 1.7 million euros. We express our heartfelt gratitude to all those who, with their contribution, make possible the continued provision of the various church services in [...].

How much Local church tax do you have to pay?

The Local church tax is staggered according to income and ranges from € 5 to € 100 annually, depending on your own income assessment. This letter has the legal status of a tax bill. We would therefore kindly ask that each tax bill recipient in a household (e.g., husband and wife) transfer the respective amount of local church tax separately, specifying your local church tax number (cf. remittance slip). We apologise for any inconvenience in this regard.

You will find further information on the back of this page. If you have any questions, we would be glad to answer them at our service hotline [...] or per e-mail at [...]. We appreciate your financial support.

With kind regards,

[signature in handwriting]

Regional Dean of the Church District

[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter]

Information regarding the local church tax

1. The local church tax

is, together with the church payroll tax and the church income tax, a compulsory contribution that is collected once a year and that benefits your local congregation directly. All congregation members over 18 years of age receive the local church tax payment notice, so that a family can receive several such notices. (For technical reasons, it is not possible to do otherwise. We apologize for any inconvenience.) The local church tax revenues remain in the Church District of [...] and are then allotted to the local congregations as well as to supra-congregational and deaconry projects in the [...] district, in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the District Synod. In Bavaria, the rate for both the church payroll tax and the church income tax is at 8%, lower than in most other federal states (where it is 9% of the general payroll and income tax). In Bavaria, the church collects the local church tax in addition to the aforementioned taxes.

2. The legal foundation

for collecting the local church tax is the Kirchensteuergesetz (KirchStG) as published on November 21, 1994 (GVBl, p. 250), last amended on 22 December 2008 (GVBl, p. 973) and the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of December 9, 2002 (KABl. 2003, p. 19), as well as by the Implementing Regulation on the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of October 15, 2003 (KABl. 2003 p. 306). You can find the corresponding legal texts at [...]. We would also be happy to send them to you upon request.

3. Subject to the local church tax

are all members of the Evangelical-Lutheran Congregation who, as of January 1st, fulfill all the following conditions (Article 7 para. 3 of the Church Levy Collection Act):

- Have turned 18 years old before January 1st of the current year
- Had an income of more than € 8,004 (the tax-exempt amount in accordance with Article 32a para. 1 No. 1 of the Income Tax Law [EStG]). As a general rule, this is the taxable income, but other income such as alimony or child support, benefit payments, pensions or regular stipends must also be considered.
- Residence within the area of the [...].

4. Exempt taxation are

- All congregants under the age of 18,
- Congregants above the age of 18 whose income does not exceed € 8,005 (see point 3 above).

Should any of the conditions above apply, you can file an objection within one month of receipt of this notification. To this end, simply return the notification, together with a short explanation, to [...], or send an e-mail with an explanatory statement, including your local church tax number (indicated on the bank transfer form), your first and family names and your address to [...].

5. The amount of local church tax

is staggered according to income from €5 to €100. We suggest that, in making the self-assessment, you take as a basis the yearly income used to sustain your livelihood (see Point 3 above). We ask you to make your payment no later than **September 15, 2012**. We thank you in advance.

Tier	Yearly Income or Benefits	Annual Local Church Tax
1	€ 8,005 to € 9,999	€ 5
2	€ 10,000 to € 24,999	€ 10
3	€ 25,000 to € 39,999	€ 25
4	€ 40,000 to € 54,999	€ 45
5	€ 55,000 to € 69,999	€ 70
6	€ 70,000 and above	€ 100

6. Tax-reducing expenditure

The local church tax payment can be claimed as a deductible church tax in your tax filing.

7. Donations

Every sum above €100 is considered a donation, which we gratefully appreciate. For donations between €100 and €300, the tax office accepts a plain certificate of donation, such as a bank transfer slip where the beneficiary institution and the intended purpose are shown. For donations above €300, we will automatically send you a donation certificate.

8. Payment already effected

Should you have already paid the local church tax, please disregard this notice. For technical reasons, it is not possible for us to identify payments made before the payment notice is issued and thus exempt you from receiving it.

9. Further information

is available at [...]

T2 (Simplification) Letter

[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church administration]

[place & date]

Dear Ms/Mr [addressee's family name],

With this letter, we want to inform you that your annual local church tax payment is due. The local church tax forms part of the general church tax and is a compulsory payment that is collected once yearly by the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in the [...] region.

Subject to the local church tax are all members of the Evangelical-Lutheran congregation who are at least 18 years of age by January 1st of the current year, earned an income of more than €8,004, and who reside within the area of the Church District. The amount of the local church tax is staggered according to income and ranges from €5 to €100 annually, depending on your own income assessment. We suggest that, in making the self-assessment, you take as a basis the yearly income used to sustain your livelihood. As a general rule, this is your taxable income, but other sources of income such as alimony or child support, benefit payments, pensions or regular stipends must also be considered.

Additional paragraph in treatments T2-T13 here

Tier	Yearly Income or Benefits	Annual Local Church Tax
1	€ 8,005 to € 9,999	€ 5
2	€ 10,000 to € 24,999	€ 10
3	€ 25,000 to € 39,999	€ 25
4	€ 40,000 to € 54,999	€ 45
5	€ 55,000 to € 69,999	€ 70
6	€ 70,000 and above	€ 100

This letter has the legal status of a tax bill. We would therefore kindly ask that each tax bill recipient in a household (e.g., husband and wife) transfer the respective amount of local church tax separately, specifying your local church tax number (cf. remittance slip). We request that your payment be made no later than September 30, 2012.

You will find further information on the back of this page. If you have any questions, we would be glad to answer them at our service hotline [...] or per e-mail at [...].

With kind regards,

[signature in handwriting]

Regional Dean of the Church District

[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter]

Information regarding the local church tax

1. The local church tax

is, together with the church payroll tax and the church income tax, a compulsory contribution that is collected once a year and that benefits your local congregation directly. The local church tax revenues remain in the Church District of [...] and are then allotted to the local congregations as well as to supra-congregational and deaconry projects in the [...] district, in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the District Synod. In Bavaria, the rate for both the church payroll tax and the church income tax is at 8%, lower than in most other federal states (where it is 9% of the general payroll and income tax). In Bavaria, the church collects the local church tax in addition to the aforementioned taxes.

2. The legal foundation

for collecting the local church tax is the Kirchensteuergesetz (KirchStG) as published on November 21, 1994 (GVBl, p. 1026), last amended on December 22, 2008 (GVBl, p. 973), and the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of December 9, 2002 (KABl. 2010, p. 9), as well as the Implementing Regulation on the Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz of December 7, 2006 (KABl. 2007 p. 18). You can find the corresponding legal texts at [...]. We would also be happy to send them to you upon request.

3. What do you get from the local church tax?

Many congregations and services use the local church tax funds for very elementary purposes, such as church maintenance or to cover heating costs. With your local church tax, you help the churches to stay open and to offer a home to those who need it. With your local church tax, you also support more than 60 Evangelical kindergartens that instill Christian values in our children and thus provide a solid basis for the development of their character.

The Evangelical Church is also engaged in the region's social hotspots. Your local church tax supports important on-going projects dedicated to the social reintegration of troubled youths, keeping them from sliding into social alienation. Your contribution also helps to sustain 17 nursing services for elderly and sick people. You can also find further examples of our work in the enclosed bulletin.

4. Why is the local church tax so important?

The local church tax has become increasingly important for the Church District of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of [...] because the grants received by the local parishes have declined over the years. 60% of the gross revenue goes to the congregations, 28% to the deaconry and 12% to supra-congregational services (such as counselling centres). In 2011, the local church tax collected 1.7 million Euros.

5. Exempt from taxation are

- all congregants under the age of 18,
- congregants above the age of 18 whose income does not exceed €8,005.

Should any of the conditions above apply, you can file an objection within one month of the receipt of this notification. To this end, simply return the notification, together with a short explanation, to the Church District of [...], or send an e-mail with an explanatory statement, including your local church tax number (indicated on the bank transfer form), your first and family names and your address to [...].

6. Tax-reducing expenditure

The local church tax payment can be claimed as a deductible church tax in your tax filing.

7. Donations

Every sum above €100 is considered a donation, which we gratefully appreciate. For donations between €100 and €300, the tax office accepts a plain certificate of donation, such as a bank transfer slip where the beneficiary institution and the intended purpose are shown. For donations above €300, we will automatically send you a donation certificate.

8. Payment already effected

Should you have already paid the local church tax, please disregard this notice. For technical reasons, it is not possible for us to identify payments made before the payment notice is issued and thus exempt you from receiving it.

9. Further Information

is available at [...]

T1 (Control) Letter in German

[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church administration]

[place & date]

Sehr geehrte/r Frau/Herr [Nachname],

mit diesem Brief bitten wir Sie auch dieses Jahr um Ihr Kirchgeld, mit dem Sie direkt die Arbeit Ihrer Gemeinde und die sozialdiakonischen Dienste der evangelischen Kirche unterstützen. Das Kirchgeld ist ein Teil der Kirchensteuer, der einmal im Jahr von der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in der Region [...] erhoben wird.

Was haben Sie vom Kirchgeld?

Viele Gemeinden und Dienste verwenden das Kirchgeld für ganz elementare Dinge wie die Instandhaltung ihrer Kirchen oder für Heizkosten. Mit dem Kirchgeld tragen Sie dazu bei, dass die Kirchen offen sind und den Menschen ein Zuhause bieten.

Ob bei der Taufe und Konfirmation Ihres Kindes oder bei Trauungen: Wir sind für Sie da, wenn Sie uns brauchen. Auch im Trauerfall und in Krisenzeiten stehen wir Ihnen bei. In Ihrer Gemeinde und unseren evangelischen Beratungsstellen finden Sie Gehör und konkrete Hilfestellungen. Mit dem Kirchgeld unterstützen wir auch über 60 evangelische Kindergärten, die unseren Kindern christliche Werte vermitteln und so zu einer stabilen Basis ihrer Persönlichkeit beitragen.

Die evangelische Kirche kümmert sich zudem um die sozialen Brennpunkte in der Region. Mit dem Kirchgeld können wichtige Projekte im Rahmen der Jugendsozialarbeit zur Resozialisierung von Jugendlichen weitergeführt werden. Wir verhindern so, dass junge Menschen ins soziale Abseits geraten. Darüber hinaus unterstützen Sie mit Ihrem Beitrag beispielsweise 17 Pflegedienste für alte und kranke Menschen. Konkrete Beispiele unserer Arbeit finden Sie auch in der beigefügten Mitgliederzeitung.

Warum ist das Kirchgeld so wichtig?

Das Kirchgeld gewinnt für die [...] zunehmend an Bedeutung, weil die Zuweisungen der Landeskirche an die Gemeinden zurückgegangen sind. 60 % des Reinertrags gehen an die Gemeinden, 28 % an die Diakonie und 12 % an die übergemeindlichen Dienste (z.B. Beratungsstellen). Im Jahr 2011 wurden 1,7 Millionen Euro Kirchgeld eingezahlt. Herzlichen Dank sagen wir allen, die mit ihrem Beitrag die vielfältigen Angebote der evangelischen Kirche in der Region [...] ermöglicht haben.

Wie hoch ist der Kirchgeldbeitrag?

Der Pflichtbeitrag Kirchgeld ist nach Einkommen gestaffelt und beträgt einmal jährlich entsprechend Ihrer Selbsteinstufung 5 bis 100 Euro. Da der Kirchgeldbrief ein Steuerbescheid ist, bitten wir Sie, den entsprechenden Betrag für jeden Bescheid gesondert (z.B. Herr und Frau) und mit Angabe der Kirchgeldnummer (siehe Überweisungsformular) zu überweisen. Vielen Dank für Ihr Verständnis.

Weitere Hinweise finden Sie auf der Rückseite. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich gerne an unser Servicetelefon [...] oder schreiben Sie eine E-Mail an [...]. Wir bitten Sie um Ihre finanzielle Unterstützung.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen

Ihre

[signature in handwriting]

Stadtdekanin

[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter]

Informationen zum Kirchgeld

1. Das Kirchgeld

ist neben der Kirchenlohn- und Kircheneinkommensteuer ein Pflichtbeitrag, der einmal jährlich erhoben wird und direkt Ihrer Kirchengemeinde vor Ort zu Gute kommt. Alle Kirchenmitglieder über 18 Jahren erhalten den Kirchgeldbrief, so dass eine Familie mehrere Briefe erhalten kann. (Aus technischen Gründen ist das nicht anders möglich. Wir bitten um Verständnis.) Das Kirchgeld verbleibt in [...], die den Ertrag nach den Vorgaben der Dekanatsynode an die Kirchengemeinden sowie übergemeindliche und diakonische Projekte im Dekanatsbezirk [...] verteilt. In Bayern liegt der Hebesatz für die Kirchenlohn- bzw. Kircheneinkommensteuer mit 8 % niedriger als in den meisten anderen Bundesländern (dort 9 % von der Lohn- und Einkommensteuer). In Bayern gibt es zusätzlich das Kirchgeld.

2. Gesetzliche Grundlage

für die Erhebung des Kirchgeldes ist das staatliche Kirchensteuergesetz (KirchStG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 21.11.1994 (GVBl. S. 1026), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22.12.2008 (GVBl. S. 973) und das Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz vom 09.12.2002 (KABl. 2003, S. 19) sowie die Ausführungsverordnung zum Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz vom 15.10.2003 (KABl. 2003 S. 306). Sie finden die entsprechenden Gesetzestexte im Internet unter [...]. Wir sind auch gerne bereit, sie Ihnen zuzusenden.

3. Kirchgeldpflichtig

sind evangelisch-lutherische Gemeindeglieder, die am 1. Januar alle folgenden Voraussetzungen erfüllen (§ 7 Abs.3 Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz)

- Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres vor dem 1. Januar des laufenden Jahres
- Jährlich mehr als 8.004 € eigene Einkünfte (Grundfreibetrag gemäß §32a Abs.1 Satz 2 Nr.1 EStG) , in der Regel das zu versteuernde Einkommen. Zu berücksichtigen sind aber auch andere Bezüge zur Bestreitung
- des Lebensunterhalts wie Unterhaltsleistungen, Versorgungsbezüge, Renten oder regelmäßige Stipendien.
- Wohnsitz im Bereich der [...]

4. Befreit vom Kirchgeld sind

- Alle Gemeindeglieder unter 18 Jahren
- Gemeindeglieder über 18 Jahre, wenn ihre jährlichen Einkünfte (s. Punkt 3) unter 8.005 € liegen.

Sollte einer dieser Punkte auf Sie zutreffen, können Sie innerhalb eines Monats Einspruch einlegen. Dazu schicken Sie einfach diesen Brief mit einer kurzen Begründung zurück an die Evangelisch-Lutherische [...], [...], oder eine entsprechende E-Mail mit Angabe Ihrer Kirchgeldnummer (s. Überweisungsträger), Ihrem Vor- und Nachnamen und Ihrer Anschrift an [...].

5. Die Höhe des Kirchgelds

ist nach dem Einkommen gestaffelt zwischen 5 € und 100 €. Wir empfehlen, bei Ihrer Selbsteinschätzung Ihre jährlichen Einkünfte zur Bestreitung des Lebensunterhalts (s. Punkt 3) zu Grunde zu legen. Wir erbitten Ihre Kirchgeldzahlung bis zum **30.09.2012** und bedanken uns im Voraus.

Stufe	Jährliche Einkünfte oder Bezüge	Jährliches Kirchgeld
1	8.005 bis 9.999 €	5 €
2	10.000 bis 24.999 €	10 €
3	25.000 bis 39.999 €	25 €
4	40.000 bis 54.999 €	45 €
5	55.000 bis 69.999 €	70 €
6	70.000 € und mehr	100 €

6. Steuermindernde Sonderausgabe

Die Kirchgeldzahlung können Sie bei Ihrer Steuererklärung als Kirchensteuer geltend machen.

7. Spenden

Jeder Betrag, der die Höchstgrenze von 100 € übersteigt, gilt als Spende (Zuwendung), für die wir herzlich danken. Bei Zahlung eines Betrages zwischen 100 € und 300 € gilt der vereinfachte Zuwendungsnachweis. Hier genügt die Buchungsbestätigung des Kreditinstitutes für das Finanzamt, wenn daraus die begünstigte Körperschaft und der Zweck ersichtlich sind. Bei Zahlung über 300 € erhalten Sie von uns automatisch eine Zuwendungsbescheinigung.

8. Bereits erfolgte Zahlung

Sollten Sie das Kirchgeld bereits gezahlt haben, betrachten Sie diese Kirchgeldaufforderung als gegenstandslos. Aus technischen Gründen ist es uns nicht möglich, eine bereits vor der Kirchgeldaufforderung getätigte Zahlung für das Jahr 2012 zu erfassen und damit zu verhindern, dass Sie einen Kirchgeldbrief erhalten.

9. Weitere Informationen

finden Sie im Internet unter [...]

T2 (Simplification) Letter in German

[Letter head, including addressee, postal address, phone number of service hotline, and email address of local church administration]

[place & date]

Sehr geehrte/r Frau/Herr [Nachname],

mit diesem Brief möchten wir Sie darüber informieren, dass Ihre diesjährige Kirchgeldzahlung fällig ist. Das Kirchgeld ist ein Teil der Kirchensteuer und damit ein Pflichtbeitrag, der einmal im Jahr von der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in der Region [...] erhoben wird.

Kirchgeldpflichtig sind alle evangelisch-lutherischen Gemeindeglieder, die am 1. Januar des laufenden Jahres das 18. Lebensjahr vollendet haben, deren eigene Einkünfte den Betrag von 8.004 Euro übersteigen und deren Wohnsitz im Bereich der [...] liegt. Die Höhe des zu zahlenden Kirchgeldes ist nach Einkommen gestaffelt und beträgt einmal jährlich entsprechend Ihrer Selbsteinstufung 5 bis 100 Euro. Wir empfehlen, bei Ihrer Selbsteinschätzung Ihre jährlichen Einkünfte zur Bestreitung des Lebensunterhalts zu Grunde zu legen. In der Regel entsprechen diese dem zu versteuernden Einkommen. Zu berücksichtigen sind aber auch andere Bezüge zur Bestreitung des Lebensunterhalts wie Unterhaltsleistungen, Versorgungsbezüge, Renten oder regelmäßige Stipendien.

Additional paragraph in treatments T2-T13 here

Stufe	Jährliche Einkünfte oder Bezüge	Jährliches Kirchgeld
1	8.005 bis 9.999 €	5 €
2	10.000 bis 24.999 €	10 €
3	25.000 bis 39.999 €	25 €
4	40.000 bis 54.999 €	45 €
5	55.000 bis 69.999 €	70 €
6	70.000 € und mehr	100 €

Da der Kirchgeldbrief ein Steuerbescheid ist, bitten wir Sie, den entsprechenden Betrag für jeden Bescheid gesondert (z.B. bei Ehepaaren) und mit Angabe der Kirchgeldnummer (siehe Überweisungsformular) zu überweisen. Ihre Kirchgeldzahlung ist zum 30.09.2012 fällig.

Weitere Hinweise finden Sie auf der Rückseite. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich gerne an unser Servicetelefon [...] oder schreiben Sie eine E-Mail an [...].

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihre

[signature in handwriting]

Stadtdekanin

[bank transfer slip printed on lower part of letter]

Informationen zum Kirchgeld

1. Das Kirchgeld

ist neben der Kirchenlohn- und Kircheneinkommensteuer ein Pflichtbeitrag, der einmal jährlich erhoben wird und Ihrer Kirchengemeinde vor Ort zu Gute kommt. Das Kirchgeld verbleibt in der [...], die den Ertrag nach den Vorgaben der Dekanatsynode an die Kirchengemeinden sowie übergemeindliche und diakonische Projekte im Dekanatsbezirk verteilt. In Bayern liegt der Hebesatz für die Kirchenlohn- bzw. Kircheneinkommensteuer mit 8 % niedriger als in den meisten anderen Bundesländern (dort 9 % von der Lohn- und Einkommensteuer). In Bayern gibt es zusätzlich das Kirchgeld.

2. Gesetzliche Grundlage

für die Erhebung des Kirchgeldes ist das staatliche Kirchensteuergesetz (KirchStG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 21.11.1994 (GVBl. S. 1026), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz vom 22.12.2008 (GVBl. S. 973) und das Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz vom 09.12.2002 (zuletzt geändert mit Gesetz vom 11.12.2009, KABL. 2010 S. 9) sowie die Ausführungsverordnung zum Kirchensteuererhebungsgesetz vom 15.10.2003 (zuletzt geändert durch Verordnung vom 07.12.2006, KABL. 2007 S. 18). Sie finden die entsprechenden Gesetzestexte im Internet unter [...]. Wir sind auch gerne bereit, sie Ihnen zuzusenden.

3. Was haben Sie vom Kirchgeld?

Viele Gemeinden und Dienste verwenden das Kirchgeld für ganz elementare Dinge wie die Instandhaltung ihrer Kirchen oder für Heizkosten. Mit dem Kirchgeld tragen Sie dazu bei, dass die Kirchen offen sind und den Menschen ein Zuhause bieten. Mit dem Kirchgeld unterstützen wir auch über 60 evangelische Kindergärten, die unseren Kindern christliche Werte vermitteln und so zu einer stabilen Basis ihrer Persönlichkeit beitragen.

Die evangelische Kirche kümmert sich zudem um die sozialen Brennpunkte in der Region. Mit dem Kirchgeld können wichtige Projekte im Rahmen der Jugendsozialarbeit zur Resozialisierung von Jugendlichen weitergeführt werden. Wir verhindern so, dass junge Menschen ins soziale Abseits geraten. Darüber hinaus unterstützen Sie mit Ihrem Beitrag beispielsweise 17 Pflegedienste für alte und kranke Menschen. Konkrete Beispiele unserer Arbeit finden Sie auch in der beigefügten Mitgliederzeitung.

4. Warum ist das Kirchgeld so wichtig?

Das Kirchgeld gewinnt für die Evang.-Luth. [...] zunehmend an Bedeutung, weil die Zuweisungen der Landeskirche an die Gemeinden zurückgegangen sind. 60 % des Reinertrags gehen an die Gemeinden, 28 % an die Diakonie und 12 % an die übergemeindlichen Dienste (z.B. Beratungsstellen). Im Jahr 2011 wurden 1,7 Millionen Euro Kirchgeld eingezahlt.

5. Befreit vom Kirchgeld sind

- Alle Gemeindeglieder unter 18 Jahren
- Gemeindeglieder über 18 Jahre, wenn ihre jährlichen Einkünfte unter 8.005 € liegen.

Sollte einer dieser Punkte auf Sie zutreffen, können Sie innerhalb eines Monats Einspruch einlegen. Dazu schicken Sie einfach diesen Brief mit einer kurzen Begründung zurück an die Evangelisch-Lutherische [...], [...], oder eine entsprechende E-Mail mit Angabe Ihrer Kirchgeldnummer (s. Überweisungsträger), Ihrem Vor- und Nachnamen und Ihrer Anschrift an [...].

6. Steuermindernde Sonderausgabe

Die Kirchgeldzahlung können Sie bei Ihrer Steuererklärung als Kirchensteuer geltend machen.

7. Spenden

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