Supplemental Appendix

The Making of Civic Virtues: A School-Based Experiment in Three Countries

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Appendix A Civic Education in Participating Countries

Instructional time

In France, citizenship education is taught as a separate subject for the whole 12 years of primary and secondary education, from age 6 to 18. In primary education, the average instructional time devoted to this subject is 30 hours per year. It is 28 hours in lower secondary education and 16 hours in upper secondary education. In primary and secondary education, citizenship education is also integrated in the curriculum of other subjects (history, geography, philosophy).

In Greece, citizenship education is taught as a separate subject for 4 years in primary and secondary education (at age 10-11, 13-14, 15-17). The instructional time devoted to this subject is on average 8 hours per year in primary education, 15 hours per year in lower secondary education and 15 hours in upper secondary education. In primary education, citizenship education is integrated in the curriculum of the other subjects.

In Spain, citizenship education is taught as a separate subject for 4 years in primary and secondary education (at age 10-12, 14-15, 16-17). The instructional time devoted to this subject is on average 8 hours per year in primary education, 17 hours per year in lower secondary education and 35 hours in upper secondary education. In primary and secondary education, citizenship education is also integrated in the curriculum of various other subjects.

Skills to be acquired and assessment

In France and Spain (as in many other countries), four skills are defined as essential by the national curriculum for students to become active and responsible citizens:

- Civic-related skills (participating in society through, for example, volunteering, and influencing public policy through voting and petitioning);
- Social skills (living and working with others, resolving conflicts);
- Communication skills (listening, understanding and engaging in discussion);
- Intercultural skills (establishing intercultural dialogue and appreciating cultural differences).

In Greece, however, civic-related skills as defined in this way are not included in the national curriculum.

In all three countries, educational authorities provide tools to help teachers assess the civic knowledge, skills and attitudes acquired by students through a range of subjects or through other school experiences. In France, students' social and civic competences are specifically evaluated by teachers at various key points in compulsory education (2nd and 5th years of primary education and last year of lower secondary education), using a standardized personal booklet. In all three countries, students' marks in citizenship education (taught as a separate compulsory subject) are generally taken into account to decide transition to the next level of education. For example, in France, the final written exam for lower secondary education addresses French language, mathematics, history-geography and civic education.

Class councils

All three countries in our experiment have established official regulations for the creation of councils at the class level. Class councils are formal bodies set up to deal with class-level matters. They usually meet several times a year, for example at the end of each term of instruction. Their composition varies depending on official regulations and/or school decisions, but they generally include representatives of teachers, students and parents. Students' representatives are elected by the students in the class. Their most common role is consultative. They help circulate information between teachers and students and bring student problems to the attention of teachers.

Student councils and school governance

The student council's mandate relates mainly to formulating rules governing every-day school activities. The acquisition of educational materials, such as textbooks and software, and the supervision of budgetary matters are also activities which fall within the remit of student councils. However, student councils do not enjoy real decision-making power in any of the activities in which they are involved. Their role is advisory and is to ensure that students' views are heard. In France and Greece, members of the student councils are directly elected by all students in the school. In Spain, student councils are composed of both class representatives and members of school governing bodies who are directly elected.

In all three countries, students also participate in school governing bodies. In France and Spain, student representatives appointed to school governing bodies are directly elected by all the students of the school. In Greece, they are nominated by the student council. As representatives on school governing bodies, students are involved in decisions concerning the development of the school educational plan, the establishment of the rules governing school life, the choice and organization of extra-curricular activities and the supervision of budgetary matters. Student representatives play a mostly consultative role.

Appendix B Experimental Sample

The experiment took place in France, Greece and Spain during the 2018-2019 school year. The program was defined jointly by the educational authorities of the three countries as well as the English ones. England was initially part of the experiment, but we had to exclude it from the evaluation because of problems recruiting enough schools and resulting implementation issues.¹ In this appendix, we provide additional information on how the schools in our experimental sample were selected and how representative they are.

As mentioned in the main text, school recruitment was limited geographically for practical reasons and to keep costs down. France and Spain targeted a subset of educational regions, scattered over the national territory, whereas in Greece, recruitment was limited to the Attica region. Specifically, we have schools from 6 different French educational regions (Aix-Marseille, Amiens, Nancy-Metz, Nantes, Orleans-Tours and Versailles) and 13 Spanish regions (Andalucia, Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y Leon, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Islas Baleares, Madrid, Murcia, Ceuta and Melilla). There was no other predefined eligibility criterion, except that all schools were public schools.

To enroll in the program, schools had to provide the name of (at least) one volunteer teacher, as well as a list of the students who would participate in the program, should the school be assigned to the treatment group. In the vast majority of volunteer schools, only one teacher volunteered to participate and enrolled a class he or she taught. However, no constraints were imposed on the number of participating teachers or classes, so in a few cases, several teachers and/or classes enrolled in the experiment. Tables B1 and B2 provide descriptive statistics about students and teachers enrolled in the experiment.

¹By September 2018 only 8 schools had been recruited and a new time table had to be agreed. This ultimately led to 42 schools recruited on a revised protocol, with class projects starting very late in the year. Thus, the statistical power and scope of the intervention are much lower in England and not easily comparable to other countries. There were also problems with attrition of schools after recruitment. See the European Commission report (Briole et al., 2020) for a full account of the evaluation process in English schools.

Although this sample was not designed to be representative of middle school students in each country, the student characteristics in our sample are not very different from population averages. In particular, the proportions of students with few (or many) books at home are quite similar in our samples and in the PISA survey. For instance, we observe about 21% of students with no more than 10 books at home in the French sample, 8% in the Greek sample and 11% in the Spanish sample, while the PISA survey reports 21%, 10% and 10% respectively. There is a long standing literature that has consistently found that the book-at-home indicator provides one of the best proxy for student socioeconomic status and subsequent academic achievement (see e.g. Eriksson et al. (2021)). This variable is measured in exactly the same way (and with very few missing values) in our three national samples and in the PISA 2018 student survey.²

We also observe about 13.2% of students who have already repeated a grade in the French, 3.5% in the Greek and 23.5% in the Spanish samples, while the OECD PISA 2018 survey reports repetition rates of 16.5%, 4% and 28.5% respectively. This result is in line with the idea that the baseline academic level of our student samples is representative of that of the general population.

In the French sample, we also observe eligibility for the financial aid received by students with low-income parents: the proportions are about 24% in our sample, compared to about 25.5% for all French students in middle school.³

Another feature to judge the external validity of this experiment is that, although this is a small sample of countries, it is striking that our results are very homogeneous across the three countries, in spite of differences in their education systems and civic education traditions. In Greece, the historical pre-eminence of Orthodox Church is enshrined in the constitution. The law organizing the education system states that one of the aims of education is to help pupils have belief in the authentic elements of the Christian Orthodox tradition. In Spain, Catholicism was also for a long time the state religion, but it has not been since the end of the dictatorship

 $^{^{2}} See https://www.oecd.org/education/pisa-2018-assessment-and-analytical-framework-b25efab8-en.htm$

 $^{^{3}}$ See: https://www.education.gouv.fr/reperes-et-references-statistiques-sur-les-enseignements-la-formation-et-la-recherche-2019-3806

and the approval of the Spanish constitution in 1978. Religion classes are still taught in schools by teachers appointed by the bishops and paid by the state. In France, Catholicism is no longer a state religion since 1905, but secular civic education must deal with a much larger Muslim minority than in Spain or Greece.

	(1) All	(2) France	(3) Greece	(4) Spain
Female	$\begin{array}{c} 0.51 \\ (0.50) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.52 \\ (0.50) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.50 \\ (0.50) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.51 \\ (0.50) \end{array}$
Age (September 2018)	14.06 (0.72)	$13.63 \\ (0.68)$	$14.04 \\ (0.35)$	14.51 (0.67)
European origin only	0.81 (0.40)	$0.76 \\ (0.43)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.90 \\ (0.30) \end{array}$	$0.79 \\ (0.41)$
Experience as student representative	$\begin{array}{c} 0.35 \\ (0.48) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.30 \\ (0.46) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.53 \\ (0.50) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.30 \\ (0.46) \end{array}$
Nb of books at home	1.97 (1.27)	1.77 (1.32)	2.16 (1.20)	2.06 (1.23)
Ν	4,299	1,649	932	1,718

Table B1: Student characteristics

Note: This table shows the average characteristics of students enrolled in the experiment, namely their gender, age, a dummy indicating that all parents and grand-parents were born in Europe, a dummy indicating experience as a student representative and the number of books at home. These statistics are displayed for our main sample (Column 1) and separately by country (Columns 2 to 4). Standard deviations are in parentheses.

	(1) All	(2) France	(3) Greece	(4) Spain
Teaching experience (years)	18.02 (7.63)	15.34 (6.65)	21.13 (5.94)	19.48 (8.24)
Seniority in the school (years)	8.10 (6.63)	8.25 (6.06)	9.64 (6.87)	7.42 (7.02)
Citizenship teaching experience (years)	9.50 (9.28)	9.84 (8.94)	$4.33 \\ (4.95)$	$11.02 \\ (10.15)$
Female teacher	$0.67 \\ (0.47)$	$0.72 \\ (0.45)$	$0.85 \\ (0.37)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.56 \ (0.50) \end{array}$
Age	45.06 (7.91)	40.46 (6.80)	49.92 (6.19)	47.74 (7.18)
Subjects taught				
National language	$\begin{array}{c} 0.10 \\ (0.30) \end{array}$	$0.08 \\ (0.27)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.33 \\ (0.48) \end{array}$	$0.04 \\ (0.19)$
History-Geography	$\begin{array}{c} 0.35 \\ (0.48) \end{array}$	$0.61 \\ (0.49)$	$0.15 \\ (0.37)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \\ (0.38) \end{array}$
Foreign or ancient language	$\begin{array}{c} 0.12 \\ (0.33) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.12 \\ (0.33) \end{array}$	$0.23 \\ (0.43)$	$0.08 \\ (0.28)$
Social sciences	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \\ (0.35) \end{array}$	$0.00 \\ (0.00)$	$0.85 \\ (0.37)$	$0.03 \\ (0.16)$
Philosophy, citizenship, religion	$\begin{array}{c} 0.39 \\ (0.49) \end{array}$	$0.07 \\ (0.25)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.13 \\ (0.34) \end{array}$	$0.79 \\ (0.41)$
Other (science, math, art, sport, technology)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.18 \\ (0.39) \end{array}$	$0.24 \\ (0.43)$	$0.00 \\ (0.00)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.19 \\ (0.39) \end{array}$
Ν	254	105	39	110

Table B2: Teacher characteristics

Note: This table shows the average characteristics of teachers in our sample, for the pooled sample of countries participating in the experiment (column (1)) and separately by country (columns (2) to (4)). Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Appendix C Administrative Data

In this appendix we provide additional information on how administrative data on absenteeism, disciplinary problems and teacher grades are collected in France. We also provide information on the official curriculum of subjects taught in French middle schools, particularly those that foster the development of skills close to those promoted by the ACT program.

Data on absences and disciplinary problems

The measurement of absenteeism and disciplinary problems by the school administration corresponds to a legal obligation. In particular, French law is very specific about the legal responsibilities of schools and how they should record and handle truancy. At the beginning of each class, teachers must inform the school principal immediately of any unauthorized absence and the principal must contact the parents as soon as possible to identify the cause of the absence. In case an accident happens to an absent child, the school remains responsible until parents are informed of the absence. In such a context, it is not likely that recorded truancy could be affected by teachers' subjective perceptions or by the empathy that they may have for some parents or children. Similarly, the exclusion of students (temporary or permanent) can only be decided after a fairly formal procedure. It involves the meeting of a disciplinary council led by the school principal and composed of elected representatives of teachers, parents and students, during which the student threatened with exclusion has the opportunity to explain his or her behavior.

Table C1 provides descriptive statistics about the measures of absenteeism, late arrivals and sanctions, as observed in our French sample. It shows that about 25% of students in our control group experienced at least one exclusion from school during the school year, in line with the fact that incivility and violence represent a significant problem in many public schools (Fréchou, 2023). Table C1 also shows that there is an average of about 8 unjustified absences per year per student, in line with national trends. In our sample, about 3.9% of students are absent at least 4 halfdays per month, a proportion of high-absenteeism students very similar to the 3.5% that the Ministry of Education reports on average for French middle schools (Cristofoli, 2020).

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Ν
Unjustified absences (half-days)	7.893	19.061	944
At least 1 unj. absence	0.693	0.462	944
At least 4 unj. absences per month	0.039	0.194	944
Nb of late arrivals	4.088	7.332	999
Nb of exclusions	0.677	2.202	958
At least 1 exclusion	0.252	0.434	958
At least 3 exclusions	0.078	0.269	958
Nb of other sanctions	1.417	3.205	1013
At least one other sanction	0.479	0.5	1013
At least 3 other sanctions	0.174	0.379	1013

Table C1: School behavior: Descriptive statistics

Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the total number of unjustified absences, late arrivals, exclusions and other disciplinary sanctions over the school year for students in French administrative sample. These statistics are computed using the control group only.

Data on teacher grades

For each of the schools in the French site of the experiment, we had access to the administrative register that includes the grades received by students at the end of each of the three terms of the school year. For each of the 11 subjects that students are required to take in middle school, we observe the grades received in the first quarter (before the implementation of the program) and at the end of the last quarter (after the implementation), so that it is possible to test the impact of the program on end-of-year grades holding initial grades constant.

To the extent that the program may affect civic skills and change students' attitudes, it can be expected to have an effect on their academic effort, the quality of the relationships with teachers and, ultimately, on teachers' evaluations. This is particularly the case for History-Geography, since the curriculum of this discipline includes civic education and since the majority of the teachers who volunteer for the program are HistoryGeography teachers. Specifically, two-thirds of the teachers involved in the program are History-Geography teachers.⁴ In this subject, the improvement in student performance could be the consequence of a pedagogy that is considered more enjoyable by the students, but also of a teaching content that is considered more interesting. To the extent that the intervention is able to elicit deeper changes in students' attitudes and behaviors, the effect should also be detected in other subjects, even if their teaching methods are unchanged and their teachers hardly ever participate in the program. This is, for example, the case in Sports.

In the French system, Sports is as much focused on the quality of social interactions and respect, as it is on athletic performance. The curriculum for Sports states: "Sports education develops access to a rich field of practices, with strong cultural and social implications, important in the development of the personal and collective life of the individual. Throughout schooling, Sports education aims to form a lucid, autonomous, physically and socially educated citizen, with a view to living together. It leads children and adolescents to seek well-being and to care about their health. It ensures the inclusion in the class of students with special educational needs or with disabilities. Sports education initiates to the pleasure of sports practice."

In the end, the social skills required to succeed in Sports are not far removed from some of those that the ACT program seeks to promote and, as a result, Sports scores may provide an indicator of program effectiveness.

The program can also be expected to have an impact in subjects where students are assessed on their ability to express personal views and listen to those of others, such as in French language or Arts. In French language, for instance, the curriculum states explicitly that students are assessed in part on their ability to "participate in a debate constructively and with respect for the other's speech". Also, one of the major themes that students must address with their French language teachers through novels, poetry and plays is called : "Living in society and participating in society".

In each school, we also know the subjects taught by teachers participating in the experiment, so that it is possible to test whether the impact of

 $^{^4\}mathrm{In}$ contrast, only about 8% are French language teachers and less than 2% for Sports or Arts.

the program on grades is similar in the subjects of teachers participating in the experiment compared to the subjects of teachers outside the experiment. If the impact on grades is only perceptible for volunteer teachers, it cannot be completely ruled out that it reflects an effort on their part to make the intervention appear successful (a "social desirability bias"). If, on the other hand, the impact on grades is perceptible even for teachers who are not involved in the experiment, it can be interpreted as reflecting a deeper change in the students themselves, namely the acquisition of behavioral skills whose effects are felt beyond the context in which they are taught.

Appendix D Sample characteristics and citizenship projects implemented

	(1) All	(2) France	(3) Greece	(4) Spain	
Number of schools				_	
Total	217	75	47	95	
Treated schools	108	37	23	48	
Control schools	109	38	24	47	
Number of volunteer teachers of	on inita	ial lists			
Total	323	123	67	133	
Teachers in Treated school	161	60	35	66	
Teachers in Control schools	162	63	32	67	
Number of students on initial lists					
Total	6211	2269	1808	2134	
Students in Treated school	3194	1202	884	1108	
Students in Control schools	3017	1067	924	1026	

Table D1: Number of Schools, Teachers and Students, by TreatmentStatus and Country

Note: This table shows the number of schools, students and teachers in the sample of the experiment, by country and treatment status.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Represent.	Non represent.	Diff.
0.118	-0.078	0.196***
0.245	-0.188	0.433^{***}
0.031	-0.015	0.046
0.022	-0.000	0.022
0.158	-0.122	0.280***
0.153	-0.118	0.271^{***}
0.167	-0.123	0.290***
1872	3291	
0.070	0.034	0.036
0.073	0.079	-0.006
0.025	0.029	-0.004
0.100	-0.002	0.102
-0.001	0.027	-0.029
0.249	-0.077	0.326***
0.293	-0.112	0.405^{***}
0.240	-0.112	0.353***
282	657	
	$\begin{array}{c} (1)\\ \hline Represent.\\ 0.118\\ 0.245\\ 0.031\\ 0.022\\ 0.158\\ 0.153\\ 0.153\\ 0.167\\ 1872\\ 0.070\\ 0.073\\ 0.025\\ 0.100\\ -0.001\\ 0.249\\ 0.293\\ 0.240\\ 282 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c ccccc} (1) & (2) \\ \hline Represent. & Non \ represent. \\ 0.118 & -0.078 \\ 0.245 & -0.188 \\ 0.031 & -0.015 \\ 0.022 & -0.000 \\ 0.158 & -0.122 \\ 0.153 & -0.118 \\ 0.167 & -0.123 \\ 1872 & 3291 \\ \hline 0.070 & 0.034 \\ 0.073 & 0.079 \\ 0.025 & 0.029 \\ 0.100 & -0.002 \\ -0.001 & 0.027 \\ 0.249 & -0.077 \\ 0.293 & -0.112 \\ 0.240 & -0.112 \\ 282 & 657 \\ \end{array}$

Table D2: Outcomes at baseline (standardized), by student experience as representatives

Note: This table shows the average baseline civic skills and academic performance of students in our sample, by student experience as representative, for the pooled sample of countries participating in the experiment. Statistics for the School Behavior index and sub-indexes and for grades are computed on the control group only. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Female	Male	Diff.	High SES	Low SES	Diff.
Civic Attitudes Social Engagement Tolerance Equal rights	$\begin{array}{c} 0.099 \\ 0.065 \\ 0.085 \\ 0.160 \end{array}$	-0.110 -0.121 -0.085 -0.157	0.209*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 0.317***	$0.069 \\ 0.019 \\ 0.075 \\ 0.115$	-0.079 -0.077 -0.067 -0.102	0.148*** 0.096*** 0.142*** 0.217***
Democratic Participation Political self efficacy Interest in political life	0.004 -0.052 0.062	-0.041 0.022 -0.100	0.044 -0.074** 0.161***	$0.136 \\ 0.112 \\ 0.158$	-0.172 -0.151 -0.189	0.308*** 0.263*** 0.348***
N	2588	2543		2655	2500	
School Behavior Absence Punctuality Exclusion Smaller sanctions	$\begin{array}{c} 0.118 \\ 0.033 \\ 0.122 \\ 0.171 \\ 0.174 \end{array}$	-0.091 0.004 -0.087 -0.163 -0.145	0.208*** 0.030 0.209*** 0.335*** 0.319***	$\begin{array}{c} 0.122 \\ 0.124 \\ 0.091 \\ 0.125 \\ 0.139 \end{array}$	-0.056 -0.041 -0.084 -0.060 -0.067	0.177^{***} 0.166^{**} 0.175^{**} 0.184^{**} 0.206^{***}
Av. Grade History-Geography Sport N	0.097 0.097 -0.042 505	-0.099 -0.118 0.022 530	0.197*** 0.216*** -0.064	$\begin{array}{c} 0.136 \\ 0.130 \\ 0.042 \\ 521 \end{array}$	-0.110 -0.122 -0.021 479	0.247*** 0.252*** 0.063

Table D3: Outcomes at baseline (standardized), by student type

Note: This table shows the average baseline civic skills and academic performance of students in our sample, by student gender and social origin, for the pooled sample of countries participating in the experiment. Statistics for the School Behavior index and sub-indexes and for grades are computed on the control group only. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

	(1) All	(2) France	(3) Greece	(4) Spain
Hours spent in class on the project				
Total hours spent	21.26 (10.44)	20.86 (6.04)	21.17 (8.08)	21.74 (14.61)
Preparation phase	9.47 (5.46)	9.51 (3.92)	$8.92 \\ (3.81)$	9.70 (7.32)
Implementation phase	$11.40 \\ (8.54)$	10.94 (5.66)	$13.04 \\ (6.56)$	11.02 (11.46)
Implementation of ACT protocol key features				
Students voted to chose project	$0.98 \\ (0.16)$	$0.94 \\ (0.24)$	$1.00 \\ (0.00)$	$1.00 \\ (0.00)$
Students worked in small groups	$0.94 \\ (0.24)$	$0.98 \\ (0.15)$	$1.00 \\ (0.00)$	$0.87 \\ (0.34)$
Student groups formed randomly	$\begin{array}{c} 0.86 \\ (0.35) \end{array}$	$0.95 \\ (0.22)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.89 \\ (0.32) \end{array}$	$0.76 \\ (0.43)$
N	122	50	24	48

Table D4: Citizenship Projects: Additional Features

Note: This table describes the average characteristics of citizenship projects implemented over the 2018-2019 year by students in the treatment group, based on the endline teacher survey. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Mean	Std. Dev.	\mathbf{N}
0.485	0.143	605
0.382	0.23	578
0.453	0.184	615
0.695	0.179	615
0.277	0.161	615
0.436	0.301	609
0.189	0.274	609
0.413	0.294	609
0.715	0.275	609
0.286	0.275	609
0.212	0.271	552
0.202	0.299	552
0.417	0.317	552
0.622	0.33	552
0.186	0.251	552
	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{Mean} \\ \hline 0.485 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.453 \\ 0.695 \\ 0.277 \\ \hline 0.436 \\ 0.189 \\ 0.413 \\ 0.715 \\ 0.286 \\ \hline 0.212 \\ 0.202 \\ 0.417 \\ 0.622 \\ 0.186 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Table D5: Peers' Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics

Note: This table shows the average characteristics of peers in the class, in the small working groups formed for the project and in the group of friends at baseline, for students in the treatment group for which the composition of the small working group is known.

	(1) High-involvement	(2) Low-involvement
Teaching experience (years)	$ 19.11 \\ (9.23) $	16.71 (8.12)
Seniority in the school (years)	$7.68 \\ (5.99)$	$6.96 \\ (5.16)$
Citizenship teaching experience (years)	7.05 (8.46)	$6.99 \\ (7.78)$
Female teacher	$0.68 \\ (0.47)$	$0.80 \\ (0.40)$
Teacher Pedagogy (baseline)	$0.05 \\ (0.96)$	-0.05 (1.04)
Observations	181	193

Table D6: Teacher Characteristics by Teacher Involvement

Note: This table shows the average number of years of teaching experience (in total, in their current school, and specific to citizenship), gender and baseline Teacher Pedagogy index of teachers in our sample, separately on the half of the most involved teachers (Column 1) and the half of the least involved teachers (Column 2).

	(1)	(2)
	High-involvement	Low-involvement
Project topics		
Discrimination	$0.62 \\ (0.49)$	$0.67 \\ (0.47)$
Social inclusion	$0.53 \\ (0.50)$	$0.53 \\ (0.50)$
Cultural diversity	$0.31 \\ (0.47)$	0.27 (0.45)
Targeted population		
Elderly	$0.15 \\ (0.36)$	$0.15 \\ (0.36)$
Homeless	0.13 (0.34)	0.11 (0.31)
Migrants	$0.28 \\ (0.45)$	0.24 (0.43)
Women	0.21 (0.41)	$0.16 \\ (0.37)$
LGBT	0.13 (0.34)	0.09 (0.29)
Disabled	0.29 (0.46)	0.22 (0.42)
Other	0.24 (0.43)	0.27 (0.45)
No specific group	0.22 (0.42)	0.18 (0.39)
Observations	68	55

Table D7: Citizenship Projects: By Teacher Involvement

Note: This table shows the percentage of citizenship projects implemented in the treatment group that relate to each of the three topics covered by the ACT intervention, the population targeted by these projects and the share of in-school and out-of-school oriented projects, computed on the subsample of the half of the most involved teachers (Column 1) and the half of the least involved teachers (Column 2). One project may correspond to multiple topics and/or targeted population. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Appendix E Attrition and balancing checks

	(1) ACT training	(2) ACT implementation	(3) Pedaqoqy
Attrition			
Observation not missing	-0.024 (0.042) [0.806]	-0.011 (0.041) [0.799]	0.008 (0.040) [0.822]
Ν	323	323	323
Balancing			
Female	-0.040 (0.068)	-0.029 (0.067)	-0.035 (0.066)
Experience	[0.690] -0.911 (0.926)	[0.687] -1.112 (0.937)	[0.691] -0.982 (0.915)
Seniority	$\begin{bmatrix} 18.28 \\ 0.216 \\ (0.886) \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} 18.22 \\ 0.220 \\ (0.875) \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} 18.36 \end{bmatrix}$ 0.184 (0.838)
School responsibilities	[7.82] -0.126 (0.117)	[7.88] -0.139 (0.116)	[7.91] -0.132 (0.116)
Engagement out of school	[0.066] 0.013 (0.150)	[0.057] -0.001 (0.147)	[0.046] 0.014 (0.145)
Years teaching citizenship	[0.130) [0.042] 0.348 (1.116)	$ \begin{array}{c} (0.147)\\ [0.043]\\ 0.540\\ (1.130) \end{array} $	(0.143) [0.038] 0.376 (1.089)
Studied citizenship init. training	$[8.937] \\ 0.059 \\ (0.060)$	$ \begin{bmatrix} 9.010\\ 0.066\\ (0.059) \end{bmatrix} $	[9.048] 0.046 (0.058)
Studied citizenship professional development	[0.358] -0.022 (0.057)	$[0.361] \\ -0.035 \\ (0.059)$	[0.356] -0.032 (0.055)
Citizen project over last 2 years	$[0.492] \\ 0.014 \\ (0.062)$	$\begin{bmatrix} 0.496 \\ 0.009 \\ (0.062) \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} 0.489 \\ 0.023 \\ (0.060) \end{bmatrix}$
Teacher Pedagogy index (Baseline)	$[0.623] \\ -0.243 \\ (0.124) \\ [0.000]$	$ \begin{array}{c} [0.620] \\ -0.219 \\ (0.126) \\ [0.000] \end{array} $	$[0.610] \\ -0.237 \\ (0.118) \\ [0.000]$
Ν	247	245	254

Table E1: Attrition Analysis and Baseline Balance Checks for the TeacherSamples used in Table 2

Note: The top panel of the table refers to the sample of teachers who participate in the experiment (N=323). For each of the three outcomes that measure the implementation of the program (i.e., training participation, project implementation, pedagogy), this top panel shows the result of regressing a variable indicating that the observation for this outcome is not missing on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. For each of the three outcomes, the bottom panel of the table refers to the sample of teachers who participate in the experiment for which the observation is not missing. For each outcome and each baseline variable, the bottom panel shows the result of regressing the baseline variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. Variable means in the control are within brackets.

	(1)	(2)
	Citizen. project	Friendship
Attrition		
Observation not missing	-0.005	-0.000
	(0.022)	(0.022)
	[0.721]	[0.750]
Ν	6,211	6,211
Balancing		
Civic Attitudes index	0.006	0.001
	(0.036)	(0.035)
	0.000	0.000
Democratic Participation index	-0.045	-0.047
*	(0.046)	(0.044)
	0.000	0.000
Age	-0.008	0.000
0	(0.045)	(0.046)
	[14.07]	[14.07]
Female	-0.006	-0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)
	[0.520]	[0.517]
European origin	-0.031	-0.030
	(0.016)	(0.017)
	[0.831]	[0.828]
High SES	-0.008	-0.009
0	(0.021)	(0.020)
	[0.530]	[0.525]
Nb siblings	-0.061	-0.068
0	(0.054)	(0.054)
	[1.802]	[1.817]
Representative	0.007	0.008
•	(0.013)	(0.013)
	[0.352]	[0.352]
Ν	4,133	4,299

Table E2: Attrition Analysis and Baseline Balance Checks for theStudent Samples used in Tables 2 and 4

Note: The top panel of the table refers to the sample of students who participate in the experiment (N=6,211). For each of the two outcomes that measure the implementation of the program (i.e., participation in a citizenship project, friendship), this top panel shows the result of regressing a variable indicating that the observation for this outcome is not missing on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. For each of the two outcomes, the bottom panel of the table refers to the sample of students who participate in the experiment for which the observation is not missing. For each outcome and each baseline variable, the bottom panel shows the result of regressing the baseline variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. Variable means in the control group are within brackets.

	(1) CB Idx	(2) Absence	(3) Punctuality	(4) Exclusion	(5) Smaller sanc.
Attrition					
Observation not missing	0.003 (0.006) [0.982]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.959] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.031 \\ (0.025) \\ [0.959] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.033 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.921] \end{array}$	0.010 (0.010) [0.973]
Ν	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290
Balancing					
Age	-0.073 (0.095)	-0.051 (0.095)	-0.051 (0.095)	-0.098 (0.096)	-0.071 (0.096)
Female	$ \begin{array}{c} [13.09] \\ 0.008 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.400] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [15.08] \\ 0.010 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.407] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [13.08] \\ 0.010 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.407] \end{array} $	$\begin{bmatrix} 13.71 \\ 0.009 \\ (0.018) \\ \begin{bmatrix} 0.402 \end{bmatrix}$	$ \begin{array}{c} [13.08] \\ 0.007 \\ (0.018) \\ [0.401] \end{array} $
High SES	$[0.490] \\ -0.029 \\ (0.027)$	$[0.487] \\ -0.035 \\ (0.027)$	$[0.487] \\ -0.035 \\ (0.027)$	$[0.489] \\ -0.027 \\ (0.027)$	[0.491] -0.030 (0.027)
Financial aid	$[0.507] \\ 0.044 \\ (0.038)$	$[0.510] \\ 0.044 \\ (0.038)$	$[0.510] \\ 0.044 \\ (0.038)$	$[0.501] \\ 0.039 \\ (0.040)$	$[0.507] \\ 0.043 \\ (0.039)$
Nb siblings	$[0.216] \\ -0.168 \\ (0.081)$	$[0.216] \\ -0.160 \\ (0.081)$	$[0.216] \\ -0.160 \\ (0.081)$	$[0.223] \\ -0.176 \\ (0.083)$	$[0.218] \\ -0.171 \\ (0.081)$
Grade 8	$ \begin{array}{c} [2.338] \\ 0.069 \\ (0.096) \\ [2.614] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [2.333] \\ 0.069 \\ (0.096) \\ [2.614] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [2.333] \\ 0.069 \\ (0.096) \\ [0.011] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [2.357] \\ 0.099 \\ (0.096) \\ [0.504] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [2.346]\\ 0.069\\ (0.097)\\ [0.010]\\ 0.010\\ \end{array} $
Delayed student	$ \begin{array}{c} [0.614] \\ 0.032 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.127] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [0.614] \\ 0.032 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.127] \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{c} [0.614] \\ 0.032 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.127] \end{array} $	$[0.584] \\ 0.033 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.129]$	$\begin{array}{c} [0.610] \\ 0.034 \\ (0.027) \\ [0.124] \end{array}$
Ν	2,251	2,227	2,227	2,186	2,241

Table E3: Attrition Analysis and Baseline Balance Checks for the
Samples used in Table 3

Note: The top panel of the table refers to the French sample of students for which administrative data was collected. For each of the 5 civic outcomes measured in this data (i.e., School Behaviour index, Absence, Punctuality, Exclusion and Smaller sanctions), this top panel shows the result of regressing a variable indicating that the observation for this outcome is not missing on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. For each of the 5 outcomes, the bottom panel of the table refers to the sample of students who participate in the experiment for which the observation is not missing. For each outcome and each baseline variable, the bottom panel shows the result of regressing the baseline variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. Variable means in the control group are within brackets.

Attrition Observation not missing 0.005	raae 51	ort .	Biology	For. Lang. 1	Art	Music	For. Lang. 2	French	Hist-Geo	(10) $Math$	(11) Phys-Chem	(12) Techno
Observation not missing 0.003												
0.00(0)	0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0	002 006) 982]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.006) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.006) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.006) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$	-0.004 (0.008) [0.982]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \\ [0.982] \end{array}$				
N 2, 29	90 2,	290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290	2, 290
Balancing												
Age -0.07	73 -0.	.074	-0.074	-0.073	-0.074	-0.074	-0.079	-0.073	-0.073	-0.073	-0.073	-0.073
(0.09)	 (0) 	(260)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
[13.68	38] [15	3.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]	[13.68]
Female 0.008)8 . 0.	008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
(0.01	18) (0.	018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
[0.48	89] [0.	(489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]	[0.489]
High SES -0.02	29 -0.	029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.032	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029
(0.02	(0. 28)	(22)	(0.U28)	(0.U28)	(0.028) [0 202]	(0.028) [0 702]	(0.028)	(0.028) [0 202]	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028) [0.028]	(0.028) [0.025]
[0.50]	07] [0.	507] 242	0.507	[0.507]	0.507	[0.507]	[0.507]	0.507	0.507	0.507	0.507	0.507
Financial aid	14 0.	043 262)	0.043 /0.043	0.044	0.043	0.043	0.040	0.044 (0.020)	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
(0.03	38) (0.	039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
0.210	16] [0.	216	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]	[0.216]
Nb siblings -0.16	68	.171	-0.168	-0.171	-0.171	-0.165	-0.165	-0.168	-0.168	-0.168	-0.168	-0.168
0.08	81) (0.	080)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
[2.31	14] [2.	314]	[2.314]	[2.314]	[2.314]	[2.314]	[2.338]	[2.314]	[2.314]	[2.314]	[2.314]	[2.314]
Grade 8 0.069	59 O.	020	0.070	0.069	0.069	0.070	0.070	0.077	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.069
(0.09	96) (0.	060	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)
[0.61	14] [0.	614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]	[0.614]
Delayed student 0.032	32 0.	032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
(0.02	27) (0.	027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
[0.12	27] [0.	127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]	[0.127]
N 2,25	51 2,	250	2,250	2,251	2,250	2,250	2,242	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	female	high SES	French origin
Proportion of female	0.029		
	(0.032)		
Proportion of high SES		-0.030	
		(0.041)	
Proportion of students with French origin			0.110*
			(0.051)

Table E5: Student Working Groups' Composition: Balancing Tests

Note: This table shows the results of regressing student characteristics on the characteristics of other students in the same working group, on the sample of students for which group composition is known. These regressions control for the characteristics of other students in the class and for class fixed-effects to get rid of the bias due to correlations between individual characteristics and characteristics of the other members of the working group. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the school level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Attrition $-0.002 - 0.002 - 0.002$ $-1.002 - 0.002 - 0.002$ Observation not missing $(0.022) (0.002) (0$	0.003 0.718] 0.718] 5,211 5,211 0.06 0.06 0.043 0.045)	-0.008 (0.023) [0.718] 6,211	-0.001 (0.022)	0.001	100.0	
$\begin{array}{c ccccc} \text{Observation not missing} & -0.002 & -0.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.002 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.001 & -1.00001 & -1.00001 & -1.$	0.003 1.023) 1.718] 5,211 5,211 0.06 0.06 0.043 0.045)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.008\\ (0.023)\\ [0.718]\\ 6,211\end{array}$	-0.001 (0.022)	0.001	0.001	
N $6,211$ $6,211$ $6,211$ 6 Balancing -0.001 -0.001 0.035 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.002) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.005) $(0.005$	5,211 0.006 0.037) 0.043 0.043	6,211	[0.749]	(0.022) [0.738]	-0.001 (0.022) [0.749]	$\begin{array}{c} 0.002 \\ (0.022) \\ [0.738] \end{array}$
$ \begin{array}{c c} Balancing & -0.001 & -0.001 & (\\ Civic Attitudes index & -0.001 & -0.001 & (\\ (0.035) & (0.035) & (() \\ (0.000] & [0.000] & [0.000] \\ Democratic Participation index & -0.042 & -0.042 & (0.044) & (() \\ 0.001 & [0.000] & [0.000] & [0.000] \\ Age & -0.005 & -0.005 & -1 \\ \end{array} $	0.006 0.037) 0.000] 0.043 0.045)		6,211	6,211	6,211	6,211
Civic Attitudes index -0.001 -0.001 (0.035) (0.035) (0. [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0. Democratic Participation index -0.042 -0.042] ([0.004] [0.004] (0.044) (0. Age -0.005 -0.005 -1.005] [0.000	0.006 0.037) 0.000] 0.043 0.045)					
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	0.037) 0.000] 0.043 0.045)	0.008	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.004
Democratic Participation index [0.042] [0.042] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.000]	0.043 0.045)	(0.036) [0.000]	(0.035) [0.000]	(0.035) [0.000]	(0.035) [0.000]	(0.035) [0.000]
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0 [0.000] [0.000] [0 Age -0.005 -0.005 -1	0.045)	-0.041	-0.047	-0.046	-0.047	-0.046
Age -0.005 -0.005 -1		(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
	0.005	-0.012	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
(0.046) (0.046) (0	0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
[14.07] [14.07] [14.07]	14.07]	[14.08]	[14.07]	[14.07]	[14.07]	[14.07]
Female $-0.007 -0.007$ -1	0.005	-0.006	-0.011	-0.009	-0.011	-0.005
$V_{1} = \{0, 1, 0, 0\}$ $\{0, 1, 0, 0\}$ $\{0, 1, 0, 0\}$	0.520]	[0.522]	[0.517]	[0.517] [0.517]	[0.517]	(0.017) [0.517]
European origin -0.032 -0.032 -1	0.031	-0.031	-0.031	-0.032	-0.031	-0.034
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)	0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
[0.802] [0.802] [0	0.804	[0.806]	[0.800]	[0.802]	[0.800]	[0.802]
High SES -0.008 -0.004 -1	0.004	-0.006	-0.008	-0.004	-0.008	-0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)	0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
[0.525] [0.525] [0.525] [0.526] [0.525] [0.526] [0.5	0.525	[0.529]	[0.529]	[0.525]	[0.525]	[0.525]
-0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.0570 -0.0570 -0.0570 -0.0570 -0.0570 -0.0570 -0.0570 -0.055	U.U03 1.054)	-0.011 (0.055)	-0.001	-0.048 (0.054)	-0.053)	(0.054) 100.0-
[1, 809] [1, 809] [1, 809] [1, 809] [1, 809] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1	1.804]	[1.807]	(0.000) [1.813]	[1.804]	(0.000) [1.813]	[1, 804]
Representative 0.003 0.003 0.003	1.007	0.011	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)	0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
[0.354] $[0.354]$ $[0.354]$ $[0.354]$	0.352]	[0.350]	[0.351]	[0.353]	[0.351]	[0.353]
N 4,244 4,244 ¢	110	0		1 0.11	1 90A	4.944

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	ble E0: Attrition Analysis and Baseline B	
	able Eo: Attrition Analysis and Baseline B	
	Table E0: Attrition Analysis and Baseline B	

Appendix F Robustness checks and heterogeneity of Treatment effect

	(2) T-C	$\begin{array}{c} (3) \\ \text{S.E.} \end{array}$	(4) Unadj. p-val	(5) Adj. p-val	(6) N
.000	-0.039	0.041	0.332	-	2251
000	-0.002	0.055	0.971	0.971	2250
000	-0.037	0.038	0.322	0.708	2248
000	-0.132	0.074	0.073	0.399	2251
000	0.033	0.060	0.580	0.797	2251
000	-0.091	0.077	0.241	0.662	2248
000	-0.012	0.072	0.868	0.955	2250
000	-0.039	0.059	0.508	0.797	2242
000	0.082	0.053	0.122	0.446	2250
000	0.019	0.059	0.748	0.914	2251
000	-0.159	0.059	0.007	0.078	2250
000	0.052	0.064	0.411	0.753	2251
	1) C 0000	$\begin{array}{ccccc} (1) & (2) \\ T-C & T-C \\ 000 & -0.039 \\ 000 & -0.002 \\ 000 & -0.037 \\ 000 & -0.132 \\ 000 & 0.033 \\ 000 & -0.091 \\ 000 & -0.012 \\ 000 & -0.039 \\ 000 & 0.082 \\ 000 & 0.019 \\ 000 & -0.159 \\ 000 & 0.052 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Table F1: Treatment Effects on Grades in the First Quarter

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects. The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school level. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted p-value while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

	(1) C	(2) T-C	(3) S.E.	(4) Unadj. p-val	(5) Adj. p-val	(6) N
Av. Grade	0.000	0.126	0.040	0.002	-	2251
History-Geography	0.000	0.196	0.056	0.000	0.005	2251
Sport	0.000	0.118	0.055	0.032	0.109	2250
Biology	0.000	0.032	0.068	0.636	0.778	2250
Foreign Lang. 1	0.000	0.040	0.053	0.452	0.624	2251
Art	0.000	0.138	0.067	0.040	0.109	2250
Music	0.000	0.057	0.076	0.450	0.624	2250
Foreign Lang. 2	0.000	0.010	0.052	0.854	0.879	2242
French	0.000	0.170	0.068	0.012	0.067	2251
Math	0.000	0.048	0.064	0.454	0.624	2251
Physics-Chemistry	0.000	0.077	0.049	0.114	0.252	2251
Technology	0.000	-0.009	0.057	0.879	0.879	2251

Table F2: Treatment Effects on Grades in all Subjects

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects as well as for a set of controls selected from the full set of baseline variables through a Lasso procedure (Belloni et al. (2014)). The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school level. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted p-value while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

	(1) C	(2) T-C	(3) S.E.	(4) p-val	(5) N
France					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.254	0.541	0.048	0.000	1560
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.199	0.070	0.004	1619
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.077	0.060	0.197	1647
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.155	0.059	0.009	1649
Greece					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.380	0.430	0.031	0.000	906
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.101	0.071	0.158	922
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.128	0.086	0.138	930
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.080	0.119	0.504	932
Spain					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.298	0.392	0.041	0.000	1667
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.115	0.054	0.033	1703
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.080	0.048	0.098	1717
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.141	0.057	0.013	1718

Table F3: Treatment Effects by Country

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects as well as for a set of controls selected from the full set of baseline variables through a Lasso procedure (Belloni et al. (2014)). The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school level. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted p-value while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

	(1) C	(2) T-C	(3) S.E.	(4) Unadj. p-val	(5) Adj. p-val	(6) N
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.071	0.038	0.062	-	3469
Social Engagement	0.000	0.081	0.051	0.114	0.234	3469
Tolerance	0.000	0.002	0.036	0.957	0.957	3370
Equal rights	0.000	0.058	0.041	0.156	0.234	3360
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.079	0.036	0.028	-	3509
Political self efficacy	0.000	0.083	0.032	0.010	0.030	3466 2500
Participation in Climate strike	0.000	0.001 0.050	0.039	0.225	0.338	3469

Table F4: Replication of Table 6 after dropping Projects Related to our
Measure of Social Engagement

Note: This table replicates Table 6 when we drop the 40 schools that implemented a project directly related to our endline measure of social engagement or which project could not be classified.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	С	T-C	S.E.	p-val	Ν
Female					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.317	0.462	0.029	0.000	2081
School Behaviour	0.000	0.284	0.102	0.005	1093
Av. Grade	0.000	0.163	0.037	0.000	1093
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.045	0.045	0.314	2119
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.066	0.042	0.118	2139
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.117	0.051	0.021	2140
Male					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.286	0.422	0.028	0.000	1977
School Behaviour	0.000	0.219	0.105	0.037	1135
Av. Grade	0.000	0.076	0.053	0.151	1135
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.170	0.045	0.000	2043
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.089	0.040	0.025	2072
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.101	0.046	0.028	2075

Table F5: Treatment Effects by Student Gender

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects as well as for a set of controls selected from the full set of baseline variables through a Lasso procedure (Belloni et al. (2014)). The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school level. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted p-value while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	С	T-C	S.E.	p-val	Ν
High SES					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.307	0.476	0.029	0.000	2183
School Behaviour	0.000	0.256	0.106	0.016	1057
Av. Grade	0.000	0.205	0.043	0.000	1057
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.095	0.048	0.047	2225
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.102	0.045	0.022	2247
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.071	0.047	0.130	2251
Low SES					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.294	0.400	0.029	0.000	1949
School Behaviour	0.000	0.228	0.091	0.013	1119
Av. Grade	0.000	0.071	0.062	0.251	1119
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.110	0.042	0.008	2018
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.082	0.043	0.055	2045
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.097	0.045	0.033	2046

Table F6: Treatment Effects by Student Family Background

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects as well as for a set of controls selected from the full set of baseline variables through a Lasso procedure (Belloni et al. (2014)). The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted pvalue while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	С	T-C	S.E.	p-val	Ν
Representatives					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.382	0.379	0.029	0.000	1423
School Behaviour	0.000	0.244	0.110	0.027	586
Av. Grade	0.000	0.235	0.069	0.001	586
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.190	0.050	0.000	1464
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.082	0.048	0.089	1480
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.092	0.052	0.075	1483
Non Representatives					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.258	0.454	0.030	0.000	2649
School Behaviour	0.000	0.215	0.080	0.007	1374
Av. Grade	0.000	0.107	0.044	0.016	1374
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.037	0.041	0.376	2716
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.061	0.039	0.117	2749
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.097	0.044	0.026	2750

Table F7: Treatment Effects by Experience as Representative

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects as well as for a set of controls selected from the full set of baseline variables through a Lasso procedure (Belloni et al. (2014)). The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school level. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted p-value while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	С	T-C	S.E.	p-val	Ν
High baseline Social Engagement					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.356	0.434	0.030	0.000	2058
School Behaviour	0.000	0.212	0.094	0.024	985
Av. Grade	0.000	0.142	0.056	0.012	985
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.167	0.041	0.000	2114
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.121	0.043	0.005	2135
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.097	0.051	0.055	2136
Low baseline Social Engagement					
Participation in a citizenship project	0.243	0.458	0.028	0.000	2049
School Behaviour	0.000	0.166	0.074	0.025	996
Av. Grade	0.000	0.128	0.045	0.004	996
Civic Attitudes	0.000	0.041	0.050	0.411	2104
Democratic Participation	0.000	0.044	0.038	0.255	2132
Friendship Heterophily	0.000	0.109	0.045	0.014	2136

Table F8: Treatment Effects by Student Baseline Social Engagement

Note: For each of the 12 row variables, the first column (column C) displays the mean of the row variable in the control group; the second column (column T-C) displays the coefficient from the regression of the row variable on a treatment dummy, controlling for strata fixed effects as well as for a set of controls selected from the full set of baseline variables through a Lasso procedure (Belloni et al. (2014)). The third column shows the standard errors clustered at the school level. The fourth column shows the corresponding unadjusted p-value while the fifth column shows the p-value adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)). The last column displays the size of the analysis sample, namely the sample of individuals who are observed at baseline and for whom the row variable is measured at endline. Each line corresponds to a separate regression.

Appendix G Student Outcomes by Treatment Status: Kernel Distributions





Note: Figure G1 show the kernel distribution of the standardized student friendship heterophily index, by treatment status.

Figure G2: Distribution of Civic Attitudes by Treatment Status



 $\it Note:$ Figure G2 show the kernel distribution of the standardized student civic attitudes index, by treatment status.





Note: Figure G3 show the kernel distribution of the standardized student democratic participation index, by treatment status.

Additionnal References

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