ONLINE APPENDIX

Conflict and the Persistence of Ethnic Bias

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Contents

Appendix A: Data collection, coding and summary statistics

1. Data on judicial decisions

As mentioned in the body of the paper, our main source of data is online transcripts of judicial decisions (rulings). These documents first became available online in late 2000 in a handful of courts and over time coverage widened. Online coverage effectively stopped in 2005 and resumed only in 2007. We cover the universe of available documents: 26,444 from 2000–2004 and 28,576 from 2007–2010. Each document records the names of the judge and the litigants and typically includes several paragraphs that sketch the arguments made by the litigants and the ruling made by the judge. For the full set of available documents, we code whether each of the litigants is a private citizen, a business, or a government agency.

If the litigant is private, we code his or her ethnicity (Arab or Jewish) using a procedure detailed the next section of this appendix. In short, coding ethnicity employs a dataset derived from the Israel Population Registry which allows us to compute the likelihood of any first and family name being associated with an Arab or Jewish citizen. The accuracy of this procedure follows from the fact (apparent in data derived from the Registry) that there is very little overlap between Jewish and Arab names. Consistent with the ethnic breakdown reported in the body of the paper, we assume that all litigants are either Arab or Jewish. We cannot distinguish between sub-groups (e.g., Christian vs. Muslim Arabs and Ashkenazi vs. Sephardi Jews).

Having coded litigants' ethnicities for all available documents, we keep only “mixed cases”: those where at least one private plaintiff and one private defendant are of different ethnicities (N=4,038). For these cases we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the documents. Each document is coded independently by two different coders. A third (senior) coder verifies the coding and adjudicates cases where there is an incompatibility across coders in any of the fields.

For the mixed cases, we extract data on (a) court; (b) judge's name (which we use to obtain biographical information); (c) litigants (in addition to information about type – private, business or a government agency – and ethnicity, we use the wording of the decision document and litigants' names to code gender); (d) claim subject (e.g., breach of contract, traffic accident, etc.); (e) timing of decision; (f) monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff and whether a counterclaim was filed; (g) whether the claim was settled outside the court or withdrawn; and (h) monetary transfers (if any), including legal expenses.

The main analysis in this paper excludes cases that were settled outside the court (325 cases) or withdrawn (303) as well as cases that have multiple plaintiffs (or defendants) such

that one plaintiff (or defendant) is Jewish and another is Arab (305). Finally, we exclude cases where the court is located in the Occupied Territories (1). This leaves us with 3,153 cases, 1,748 for 2000–2004 and 1,405 for 2007–2010.

Our main measure of trial outcome is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the claim was accepted and zero otherwise. Out of the 3,153 cases in our main sample, 2,300 (73%) are coded as accepted. We also construct several alternative outcome measures. The first attempts to distinguish between claims that were partly or fully accepted. This distinction is not straightforward: while in all cases we have information on the monetary compensation awarded by the judge, in more than 60% of the cases we do not know the sum requested. Nonetheless, we can sometimes deduce from the wording of the decision that the claim was "fully accepted." This yields an ordered categorical variable that takes three values: rejected (coded 0), partly accepted (1), or fully accepted (2). A second alternative measure of trial outcome is the monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff net of the compensation awarded to the defendant (in case there was a counterclaim). A third alternative measure is the legal expenses awarded to the plaintiff net of the expenses awarded to the defendant. Finally, we look at the ratio between the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (inclusive of legal expenses) and the sum requested by the plaintiff.

Judges' ethnicities are coded using the same name-based procedure applied to the litigants. The main source for socio-demographic information on the judges is their biographies. Most biographies are available online; the rest were obtained from the court system using freedom of information procedures. We also collect data on judges' employment histories as explained below. Overall, our main sample has 240 judges, 30 of whom are Arab.

2. Coding ethnicity

This section details the procedure we use to code litigant (and judge) ethnicity. The legal documents do not consistently order first and last names. We therefore decompose each litigant name into its components (separated by spaces) such as Abraham+Benjamin+Cohen. There may be up to four such components. We do not impose any assumption regarding the gender of the litigant, nor whether a particular component represents a first, middle or last name. Using an external database derived from the Israel Population Registry, we compute for each component the following conditional probabilities of it being an Arab name:[1]

[1] In our calculations below we assume that all litigants are either Arab or Jewish (without distinguishing between subgroups). According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 2002 76.8% of the Israeli population were Jewish and 19.1% were Arab. The rest are classified as *other*: these are mostly immigrants from the Former Soviet Union who are not formally classified as Jewish.

$$p_{fm} = p(Arab \mid first\ name\ and\ male)$$
$$p_{ff} = p(Arab \mid first\ name\ and\ female)$$
$$p_{lm} = p(Arab \mid last\ name\ and\ male)$$
$$p_{lf} = p(Arab \mid last\ name\ and\ female).$$

A name component is designated Arab if:

$$\max\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} > 0.95 \quad \text{and} \quad \min\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} > 0.05.$$

That is, we designate a component as Arab if at least one of the conditional probabilities is very high (i.e., the name component is highly likely to belong to an Arab individual) and none of the conditional probabilities is very low (that is, none of the conditional probabilities suggests that the name component is highly likely to belong to a Jewish individual).

Similarly, a name component is designated Jewish if:

$$\min\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} \leq 0.05 \quad \text{and} \quad \max\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} \leq 0.95.$$

A litigant is coded as Arab if at least one of his or her name components is designated as Arab and *none* of the other components is designated as Jewish. Similarly, a litigant is coded as Jewish if at least one of his or her name components is designated as Jewish and *none* of the other components is designated as Arab. This procedure assigns an ethnicity to roughly 95% of private litigants. The fact that the share of names that are not assigned an ethnicity is very small is consistent with the fact that in Israel there is little overlap in naming conventions across ethnicities and there are virtually no marriages across ethnic lines.[2] To assign ethnicity to the remaining litigants we search for their names in an electronic directory service. This allows us to locate the exact addresses of people bearing these names. Relying on the fact that in Israel Arabs and Jews tend to live in different communities (either different towns and villages, or different neighborhoods within integrated towns), we are able to assign ethnicities to almost all litigants. The few remaining cases are not coded.

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[2] For example, in the data derived from the Israel Population Registry, 62.5% of first names are exclusively Jewish (i.e. the empirical probability that the name is associated with an Arab citizen is zero). At the same time, 28.2% of first names are exclusively Arab (i.e. the empirical probability that the name is associated with an Arab citizen is one).

3. Data on exposure to violence

To measure the intensity of violence we collect data on all Palestinian politically motivated fatal attacks inside Israel (i.e., excluding the Occupied Territories).[3] For each attack we have information about date, location, and number of civilian fatalities. We also collect data on civilian fatalities inside Israel during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 to be able to control for possible effects of this conflict. Our fatality dataset uses information from several sources: B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; the Israeli National Insurance Institute; and the Israeli Ministry of Defense.[4]

Our first set of measures of exposure to violence is at the level of the court. These measures are based on the number of fatalities from attacks that occurred in the vicinity of the court during the conflict period. Vicinity is defined by three alternative geographical units, defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The first is the *natural area* which is the smallest geographical unit around the court. Our data span 24 natural areas, with an average population of around 230 thousand. Two of the 25 courts in our data are located in the same natural area. The two other geographical units are the *sub-district* and the *district* (average population is about 460 thousand per sup-district and 1.1 million per district). Our data spans 15 sub-districts, and 6 districts (shown in Figure 1 in the body of the paper).

Our second set of measures of exposure to violence is at the level of the judge. We compile information on employment history since 2000 for each judge in our dataset. The procedure relies on three main sources. The first is the official biographies mentioned above. These typically list the specific courts in which the judge served after being sworn in. The biographies also provide some information on employment prior to becoming a judge, in the private or public sector. The latter type of information is usually not detailed (e.g., "lawyer in a private firm") and, importantly, does not always include place of employment. Our second data source is the lists of lawyers published annually by the Israel Bar Association.[5] The list includes virtually all members of the association. For most of the members, it provides information about place of employment. Both the official biographies and the list of lawyers provide annual

[3] We cannot use data on fatalities in the Occupied Territories since our identification strategy relies on variation in the intensity of ethnic violence in the vicinity of the courts or the judges' places of employment. Our data contains only one case from a court located in the Occupied Territories (this case is dropped from the analyses). Furthermore, only one of the judges in our data was employed in the Occupied Territories during the conflict period, and only one case in our final data was handled by this judge.

[4] The B'Tselem data cover fatalities from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and have been used in most previous studies of the conflict (see, e.g., Gould and Klor 2010). We use the National Insurance Institute and Ministry of Defense data to verify the B'Tselem data and to add information on fatalities from the Second Lebanon War.

[5] The lists are included in *The Lawyer's Calendar* published annually by The Israel Bar Publishing House (from 2002 in collaboration with Martindale-Hubbell Israel).

location data. The third source we use is a commercial computerized archive of judicial decisions in Israel.[6] The archive provides us with information about dates and locations of trials in which our judges participated, either as judges or representing litigants. This complements the information available from the first two sources.

The procedure yields monthly location data for the entire Intifada period for 196 (82%) of the 240 judges in our sample. For an additional 37 (15%) of the judges we have partial information (i.e., we have location information for only part of the conflict period) and for 7 judges we have no location information whatsoever for the conflict period. Merging the location information with the fatalities data yields a measure of the number of fatalities each judge was exposed to in her place of employment in each month of the conflict. From this measure we construct three variables: (1) mean monthly exposure to fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the entire conflict period; (2) maximum exposure in a given month; (3) mean monthly exposure during the last year of the conflict (2004).

4. Summary statistics

Tables A1-A3 provide summary statistics by cases (A1 and A2) and judges (A3) for the conflict and post-conflict periods. Table A1 shows case characteristics. As mentioned above, around 73% of the claims are accepted in both periods. Net monetary transfers rose from about NIS 3,100 to roughly NIS 4,200 while legal expenses remained roughly the same, at around NIS 180. On average, plaintiffs obtained 80% of the compensation they requested in the first period; the monetary yield declined to 70% in the second period. In terms of case characteristics, traffic accidents account for about two-thirds of the cases in both periods, although this proportion is somewhat lower in the post-conflict period (61% vs. 69%). The share of cases with missing information about the subject of the claim increased from 15% to 23% in the post-conflict period. Some documents note that the ruling was given under a condition of "no defense." This means either that no defense statement was submitted or that the defendant(s) failed to appear in court (it is not possible to distinguish between these two possibilities). This happened in 13% of the cases in the conflict period and 19% in the post-conflict period (with the others coded "defense present"). In both periods, a counterclaim was filed by the defense in roughly 9% of the cases. There is usually only one plaintiff in a case, but often more than one defendant. In both periods almost all cases were filed by private plaintiffs while the share of private litigants out of the total number of defendants is around 73%. The

[6] Accessible at: http://www.nevo.co.il/. This archive does not cover the universe of rulings but is considered the most comprehensive.

vast majority of litigants are male. Monetary compensation requested rose from about NIS 6,400 in the conflict period to approximately NIS 8,000 in the post-conflict period; note, however, that information on this variable is available only for 660 cases in the conflict period and 510 in the post-conflict period.

Table A2 reports the various measures of court exposure to violence. The first three rows show the average (per case) number of fatalities in the vicinity of the court in the year preceding the trial. The numbers demonstrate again the sharp decline in violence between the conflict period and the post-conflict period. The next six rows show descriptive statistics for court exposure during the conflict period: the first three years and the entire period. The differences here are much smaller and reflect compositional changes: in the post-conflict period a somewhat smaller share of cases come from the high-violence courts. This is important to keep in mind when comparing the conflict and the post-conflict periods: cases in the post-conflict period are not drawn from courts that experienced more violence.

Table A3 shows judge characteristics. The share of Arab judges increased from 11% to 16% from the conflict period to the post-conflict period. On average, judges in these courts are about 48 years old with five to seven years of tenure. About half of the judges are male. Approximately 20% were born outside of Israel. It is also noteworthy that the share of judges with advanced degrees increases across periods. The bottom part of the table reports judges' personal exposure to violence during the conflict. The average (across judges) of the mean monthly number of fatalities a judge was exposed to during the conflict (in the natural area of the judge's place of employment) is about 1. This is true for judges in both periods. The maximal number of fatalities a judge was exposed to in a given month is fourteen on average (and ranges from 0 to 30). Finally, the mean monthly number of fatalities a judge (in both periods) was exposed to during the last year of the conflict is around 0.3 on average.

TABLE A1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
CASE CHARACTERISTICS (N=3,153)

			Mean		Difference
			2000–2004	2007–2010	
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Claim outcome		Claim accepted	0.734	0.724	-0.010
					[0.016]
		-partly accepted	0.530	0.482	-0.048***
					[0.018]
		Net monetary compensation	3,079	4,165	1,086***
			(3,924)	(5,325)	[165]
		Net legal expenses	188.8	178.0	-10.8
			(497.1)	(511.2)	[18.0]
		Monetary yield[1]	0.799	0.690	-0.109***
			(0.427)	(0.577)	[0.029]
Case characteristics	Claim Subject	Breach of sales contract	0.032	0.038	0.006
					[0.007]
		Breach of service contract	0.095	0.081	-0.014
					[0.010]
		Housing-related	0.011	0.012	0.001
					[0.004]
		Private conflict	0.013	0.014	0.001
					[0.004]
		Traffic accident	0.689	0.613	-0.077***
					[0.017]
		Miscellaneous	0.013	0.012	0.000
					[0.004]
		Missing	0.147	0.229	0.082***
					[0.014]
	Defense	Defense present	0.866	0.811	-0.055***
					[0.013]
		Defense made a counterclaim	0.088	0.095	0.007
					[0.010]
	Number of litigants	Plaintiffs	1.113	1.137	0.024**
			(0.318)	(0.350)	[0.012]
		Defendants	1.724	1.757	0.032
			(0.713)	(0.754)	[0.026]
	Private litigants (share of total)	Plaintiffs	0.998	0.996	-0.002
			(0.031)	(0.043)	[0.001]
		Defendants	0.737	0.730	-0.007
			(0.258)	(0.258)	[0.009]
	Male litigants (share of private)	Plaintiffs	0.821	0.812	-0.009
			(0.364)	(0.370)	[0.013]
		Defendants	0.875	0.844	-0.030***
			(0.313)	(0.342)	[0.012]
	Compensation requested[1]		6,424	7,952	1,528***
			(5,085)	(6,529)	[340]

Notes: [1] Data on compensation requested by plaintiff/s and on monetary yield are available for 1,170 cases. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in column (3).
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
FATALITIES (N=3,153)

Time window	Geographical area	Mean		Difference
		2000–2004	2007–2010	
		(1)	(2)	(3)
Previous year	Natural area	0.115	0.001	-0.114***
		(0.167)	(0.008)	[0.004]
	Sub-District	0.132	0.002	-0.130***
		(0.161)	(0.009)	[0.004]
	District	0.212	0.003	-0.209***
		(0.186)	(0.009)	[0.005]
First 3 years of conflict period	Natural area	0.402	0.351	-0.050***
		(0.455)	(0.427)	[0.016]
	Sub-District	0.462	0.411	-0.051***
		(0.418)	(0.393)	[0.015]
	District	0.776	0.735	-0.041***
		(0.439)	(0.419)	[0.015]
Entire conflict period	Natural area	0.421	0.362	-0.059***
		(0.486)	(0.455)	[0.017]
	Sub-District	0.484	0.422	-0.062***
		(0.448)	(0.422)	[0.016]
	District	0.806	0.748	-0.058***
		(0.442)	(0.436)	[0.016]

Notes: Number of civilian fatalities divided by 100. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in column (3).
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE A3: SUMMARY STATISTICS
JUDGES (N=240)

	Mean		Difference
	2000–2004	2007–2010	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Arab	0.114	0.157	0.043
			[0.040]
Age	48.368	49.151	0.784
	(9.478)	(9.248)	[1.090]
Tenure at job	4.959	7.236	2.277***
	(6.432)	(5.945)	[0.719]
Male	0.538	0.494	-0.044
			[0.058]
Immigrant (Jewish)	0.205	0.175	-0.030
			[0.046]
LLB degree from:			
- Hebrew U.	0.447	0.434	-0.013
			[0.058]
- Tel-Aviv U.	0.386	0.307	-0.079
			[0.055]
- Bar Ilan U.	0.129	0.151	0.022
			[0.041]
- Other institutions	0.038	0.108	0.071**
			[0.031]
Highest degree is:			
- LLB	0.818	0.681	-0.137***
			[0.051]
- Master	0.152	0.277	0.126***
			[0.048]
- Doctoral	0.030	0.042	0.012
			[0.022]
Personal exposure to violence during conflict:			
- Mean[1]	0.985	1.086	0.101
	(1.168)	(1.202)	[0.140]
- Maximum[2]	14.106	14.208	0.101
	(10.747)	(10.501)	[1.250]
- Late[3]	0.319	0.283	-0.035
	(0.649)	(0.571)	[0.072]
N	132	166	

Notes: [1] mean monthly exposure to civilian fatalities in judge's place of employment between 9/2000–12/2004; [2] maximum exposure in a given month; [3] mean monthly exposure between 1/2004–12/2004; see text for details. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in column (3).
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix B: Cases Withdrawn or Settled Outside the Court

TABLE B1

	Withdrawn		Settled Outside the Court	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab plaintiff	0.004	0.014	0.014	0.018
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.025)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff	-0.019	-0.034*	-0.019	-0.037
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.031)
Arab plaintiff*Court exposure		-0.021		-0.007
		(0.019)		(0.028)
Arab judge*Court exposure		0.014		0.073
		(0.268)		(0.180)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Court exposure		0.044		0.076
		(0.035)		(0.056)
Observations	3,432	3,432	3,451	3,451
R-squared	0.316	0.316	0.284	0.285

Notes: The table follows the methodology of equations (2) and (3) in the body of the paper. In columns 1–2 the dependent variable is an indicator for cases withdrawn by the plaintiff. The sample includes cases decided by a judge or withdrawn. In column 3-4 the dependent variable is an indicator for cases settled outside the court. The sample includes cases decided by a judge or settled outside the court. Court exposure is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (divided by 100). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim. Time controls include indicators for year, month, and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix C: Balancing tests

Our identification assumption in Section 4 of the paper is that given the court, the ethnicity of the plaintiff, and the ethnicity of the judge, cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff are not systematically different from cases assigned to a judge of a different ethnicity. Recall that we allow plaintiffs from different ethnicities to file cases with different (observed or unobserved) characteristics. We also allow judges of different ethnicities to receive cases with different (observed or unobserved) characteristics. Table C1 below evaluates the validity of our identification assumption using the observed case characteristics.

The first column shows mean characteristics for cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff. Column 2 shows these figures for cases where the judge and the plaintiff are from different ethnic groups. Column 3 shows the simple difference in means. While most of these differences are small in size, a few are statistically significant. This, however, may be due to systematic differences in case characteristics across plaintiffs of different ethnicities. For example, Arab plaintiffs are more likely than Jewish plaintiffs to be male. Since most judges are Jewish, Arab plaintiffs are also more likely than Jewish plaintiffs to be assigned a judge of the other ethnicity. As a result, the proportion of male plaintiffs is higher in different-ethnicity cases (column 2) than in same-ethnicity cases (column 1). However, once we control for the ethnicity of the plaintiff, the difference between same-ethnicity and different-ethnicity cases in fact vanishes (not shown). Similarly, differences across courts or across judges of different ethnicities may yield differences in mean characteristics across same- and different-ethnicity cases. In column 4, we therefore show the difference in case characteristics controlling for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects. Consistent with our identification assumption, column 4 shows little evidence of systematic differences. A broadly similar picture emerges when separately examining the conflict period and the post-conflict period, see Tables C2 and C3 below.

TABLE C1: BALANCING TESTS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF CASES: 2000–2010

	Mean		Difference in means		Obs.
	Same ethnicity	Different ethnicity	Without controls	With court FE, judge & plaintiff ethnicity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of plaintiffs	1.125	1.121	0.005	-0.003	3,153
	(0.333)	(0.333)	[0.012]	[0.013]	
Number of defendants	1.722	1.762	-0.04	0.021	3,153
	(0.723)	(0.744)	[0.026]	[0.029]	
Private plaintiffs (share of total)	0.998	0.997	0.001	0.001	3,153
	(0.035)	(0.039)	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Private defendants (share of total)	0.737	0.729	0.008	-0.018*	3,153
	(0.26)	(0.255)	[0.009]	[0.010]	
Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs)	0.782	0.866	-0.084***	-0.015	3,153
	(0.392)	(0.322)	[0.013]	[0.014]	
Male defendants (share of private defendants)	0.892	0.819	0.072***	0.001	3,153
	(0.294)	(0.363)	[0.012]	[0.013]	
Claim subject - Breach of sales contract	0.037	0.031	0.006	0.004	3,153
			[0.007]	[0.007]	
Claim subject - Breach of service contract	0.091	0.086	0.005	0.008	3,153
			[0.01]	[0.011]	
Claim subject - Housing related	0.015	0.007	0.008**	0.007	3,153
			[0.004]	[0.004]	
Claim subject - Private conflict	0.013	0.014	-0.001	-0.002	3,153
			[0.004]	[0.005]	
Claim subject - Traffic accident	0.636	0.682	-0.046***	-0.004	3,153
			[0.017]	[0.018]	
Claim subject - Miscellaneous	0.013	0.012	0.001	-0.001	3,153
			[0.004]	[0.004]	
Claim subject - Missing	0.195	0.167	0.028**	-0.011	3,153
			[0.014]	[0.015]	
Defense present	0.828	0.86	-0.033**	0.000	3,153
			[0.013]	[0.014]	
Defense made a counterclaim	0.074	0.115	-0.041***	-0.025**	3,153
			[0.01]	[0.012]	
Compensation requested	7,173	6,963	210	-148	1,170
	(5,927)	(5,621)	[347]	[378]	

Notes: "Same ethnicity"=judge and plaintiff are of same ethnicity. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in columns (3)–(4). Each entry in columns (3)–(4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variable is an indicator for same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff. Column (3) includes no controls and column (4) controls for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects.
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C2: BALANCING TESTS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF CASES: 2000–2004

	Mean		Difference in means		Obs.
	Same ethnicity	Different ethnicity	Without controls	With court FE, judge & plaintiff ethnicity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of plaintiffs	1.119	1.104	0.015	0.011	1748
	(0.324)	(0.31)	[0.015]	[0.017]	
Number of defendants	1.722	1.727	-0.004	0.044	1748
	(0.712)	(0.715)	[0.034]	[0.037]	
Private plaintiffs (share of total)	0.998	0.998	0.001	0.001	1748
	(0.027)	(0.035)	[0.002]	[0.002]	
Private defendants (share of total)	0.736	0.739	-0.003	-0.029**	1748
	(0.261)	(0.255)	[0.012]	[0.013]	
Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs)	0.787	0.867	-0.080***	-0.019	1748
	(0.390)	(0.321)	[0.018]	[0.019]	
Male defendants (share of private defendants)	0.899	0.842	0.057***	-0.004	1748
	(0.287)	(0.342)	[0.015]	[0.016]	
Claim subject - Breach of sales contract	0.035	0.028	0.007	0.004	1748
			[0.009]	[0.009]	
Claim subject - Breach of service contract	0.096	0.093	0.003	0.004	1748
			[0.014]	[0.015]	
Claim subject - Housing related	0.015	0.005	0.010*	0.009	1748
			[0.005]	[0.005]	
Claim subject - Private conflict	0.013	0.013	0.000	-0.001	1748
			[0.006]	[0.006]	
Claim subject - Traffic accident	0.677	0.705	-0.028	0.014	1748
			[0.022]	[0.023]	
Claim subject - Miscellaneous	0.014	0.011	0.003	0.001	1748
			[0.005]	[0.006]	
Claim subject - Missing	0.149	0.144	0.005	-0.030*	1748
			[0.017]	[0.017]	
Defense present	0.863	0.871	-0.008	0.030*	1748
			[0.016]	[0.016]	
Defense made a counterclaim	0.077	0.103	-0.026*	-0.010	1748
			[0.014]	[0.015]	
Compensation requested	6,573	6,214	359	189	660
	(5,281)	(4,798)	[402]	[447]	

Notes: "Same ethnicity"=judge and plaintiff are of same ethnicity. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in columns (3)–(4). Each entry in columns (3)–(4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variable is an indicator for same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff. Column (3) includes no controls and column (4) controls for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C3: BALANCING TESTS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF CASES: 2007–2010

	Mean		Difference in means		Obs.
	Same ethnicity	Different ethnicity	Without controls	With court FE, judge & plaintiff ethnicity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of plaintiffs	1.133	1.142	-0.010	-0.027	1405
	(0.343)	(0.360)	[0.019]	[0.022]	
Number of defendants	1.721	1.807	-0.086**	-0.013	1405
	(0.736)	(0.778)	[0.041]	[0.047]	
Private plaintiffs (share of total)	0.996	0.996	0.000	0.002	1405
	(0.042)	(0.044)	[0.002]	[0.003]	
Private defendants (share of total)	0.739	0.716	0.022	0.001	1405
	(0.260)	(0.254)	[0.014]	[0.016]	
Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs)	0.775	0.865	-0.089***	-0.014	1405
	(0.395)	(0.323)	[0.020]	[0.023]	
Male defendants (share of private defendants)	0.882	0.789	0.093***	0.007	1405
	(0.301)	(0.387)	[0.018]	[0.021]	
Claim subject - Breach of sales contract	0.040	0.035	0.005	0.003	1405
			[0.010]	[0.012]	
Claim subject - Breach of service contract	0.084	0.076	0.008	0.015	1405
			[0.015]	[0.017]	
Claim subject - Housing related	0.014	0.009	0.006	0.003	1405
			[0.006]	[0.007]	
Claim subject - Private conflict	0.013	0.016	-0.002	-0.003	1405
			[0.006]	[0.007]	
Claim subject - Traffic accident	0.586	0.651	-0.065**	-0.035	1405
			[0.026]	[0.029]	
Claim subject - Miscellaneous	0.011	0.014	-0.003	-0.002	1405
			[0.006]	[0.007]	
Claim subject - Missing	0.251	0.198	0.053**	0.021	1405
			[0.023]	[0.024]	
Defense present	0.785	0.847	-0.062***	-0.045**	1405
			[0.021]	[0.023]	
Defense made a counter claim	0.070	0.130	-0.060***	-0.043**	1405
			[0.016]	[0.018]	
Compensation requested	7,895	8,049	-154	-566	510
	(6,557)	(6,498)	[599]	[641]	

Notes: "Same ethnicity"=judge and plaintiff are from same ethnicity. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in columns (3)–(4). Each entry in columns (3)–(4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variable is an indicator for same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff. Column (3) includes no controls and column (4) controls for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects.
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix D: Ethnic Bias - Alternative Outcome Measures

TABLE D1

Panel A: All Observations

	Claim Outcome {0,1,2}		Net Monetary Compensation		Net Legal Expenses		Monetary Yield	
	Conflict	Post-conflict	Conflict	Post-conflict	Conflict	Post-conflict	Conflict	Post-conflict
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Arab plaintiff	-0.369***	-0.537***	-662***	-1,144***	-135**	-174**	-0.052	-0.178**
	(0.107)	(0.103)	(249)	(305)	(54)	(71)	(0.041)	(0.073)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff	0.587***	0.595***	926**	391	224***	153*	0.101*	0.163*
	(0.151)	(0.142)	(448)	(635)	(85)	(79)	(0.059)	(0.087)
Observations	1,748	1,405	1,748	1,404	1,748	1,405	660	510
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared	0.401	0.313	0.430	0.315	0.229	0.344	0.568	0.497

Panel B: Excluding Outliers

Arab plaintiff			-615**	-1,072***	-91***	-151**	-0.049	-0.136**
			(251)	(214)	(30)	(60)	(0.045)	(0.056)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff			824*	814	156***	121*	0.090	0.158*
			(425)	(547)	(54)	(65)	(0.062)	(0.087)
Observations			1,711	1,374	1,705	1,375	646	498
R-squared			0.384	0.308	0.263	0.262	0.548	0.629

Notes: Columns 1–2 are estimated by Ordered Probit and columns 3–8 are estimated by OLS. Panel B excludes the top and bottom 1% of cases in terms of the outcome variable. In columns 1–2 the dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the claim was rejected, 1 if the claim was partly accepted, and 2 if the claim was fully accepted. In columns 3–4 the dependent variable is the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (compensation awarded to plaintiff minus compensation awarded to defendant). In columns 5–6 the dependent variable is the net legal expenses awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (expenses awarded to plaintiff minus expenses awarded to defendant). In columns 7–8 the dependent variable is the ratio between the net monetary compensation (including legal expenses) awarded by the judge to the plaintiff and the compensation requested by the plaintiff. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim. Time controls include indicators for year, month, and day of week. In columns 7–8 the monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff is not included in the case characteristics. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix E: Is The Estimated Bias Due to Other Judge Characteristics?

TABLE E1

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.140***	-0.032	-0.117***	-0.108***	-0.132***	-0.127***
	(0.025)	(0.089)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge	0.186***	0.164***	0.176***	0.175***	0.191***	0.182***
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Arab plaintiff*Judge age		-0.002				
		(0.001)				
Arab plaintiff*Judge tenure			-0.003			
			(0.002)			
Arab plaintiff*Male judge				-0.061		
				(0.038)		
Arab plaintiff*Judge HU					-0.022	
					(0.034)	
Arab plaintiff*Judge>LLB						-0.114**
						(0.053)
Observations	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153
R-squared	0.220	0.221	0.221	0.221	0.220	0.221

Notes: Analysis includes cases from both periods. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week. "Judge HU" and "Judge>LLB" are indicators for whether judge attained LLB at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and whether judge has a master or PhD degree, respectively.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix F: Evolution of Bias by Judge Ethnicity

TABLE F1: DIFFERENTIAL CASE OUTCOMES BY PERIOD

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	Jewish judges		Arab judges	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab plaintiff	-0.144***	-0.115***	0.037	0.070**
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.033)
Post conflict	-0.025	0.298	0.066	0.890***
	(0.033)	(0.302)	(0.051)	(0.242)
Arab plaintiff*Post conflict	-0.024	-0.042	-0.031	-0.076
	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.066)	(0.052)
Court FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes
Judge FEs & tenure	No	Yes	No	Yes
Case characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,253	2,253	900	900
R-squared	0.029	0.237	0.004	0.215

Notes: Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim. Time controls include indicators for year, month, and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE F2: DIFFERENCES IN OBSERVED CASE QUALITY

	Conflict period	Post conflict period	Difference
Arab plaintiff	0.699	0.717	0.018**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
	[N=765]	[N=571]	[N=1,336]
Jewish plaintiff	0.744	0.751	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
	[N=983]	[N=834]	[N=1,817]
Difference	0.044***	0.034***	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)
	[N=1,748]	[N=1,405]	[N=3,153]

Notes: Observed Case Quality is the predicted probability of a case being accepted based on observed case characteristics, excluding the ethnicity variables. Predicted probabilities are obtained from a Probit regression on the following case characteristics: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix G: Does the Ethnic Makeup of the Court Affect the Quality of Claims?

TABLE G1: OBSERVED CASE QUALITY AND THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE COURT

Dependent variable: observed case quality

	Both periods		Conflict period		Post-conflict period		Post-conflict period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Arab plaintiff	-0.048***	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.043***	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.046	-0.048
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Proportion Arab	0.078	0.111	0.013	-0.047	0.135	0.208***	0.026	0.108
	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.115)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.138)
Arab plaintiff*Proportion Arab	0.021	0.024	0.016	-0.018	0.043	0.052	0.132	0.134
	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.111)	(0.117)
Court Bias							-0.218***	
							(0.047)	
Arab plaintiff*Court Bias							0.051	0.054
							(0.102)	(0.106)
Proportion Arab*Court Bias							1.303***	0.334
							(0.241)	(0.611)
Arab plaintiff*Proportion Arab*Court Bias							-0.488	-0.502
							(0.431)	(0.442)
Court FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,153	3,153	1,748	1,748	1,405	1,405	956	956
R-squared	0.030	0.100	0.023	0.113	0.051	0.143	0.142	0.154

Notes: Observed Case Quality is the predicted probability of a case being accepted based on observed case characteristics, excluding the ethnicity variables. Predicted probabilities are obtained from a Probit regression on the following case characteristics: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim. Proportion Arab is the proportion of Arab judges in each court and year, including judges that did not end up ruling in mixed-ethnicity cases. The data are derived from the official biographies of all current and retired judges and the computerized archive of judicial decisions described in Appendix A. Court Bias is computed using the following procedure. We regress trial outcomes on court fixed effects interacted with the ethnicity dummies (controlling for the full set of judge, case and time controls). We do this for the conflict period as a whole rather than year by year since the analysis requires a large number of observations per court (in particular, to identify bias within a court we need cases with all the judge-plaintiff ethnicity combinations). This yields a measure of bias for seven relatively large courts.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix H: Heterogeneity in Ethnic Bias

TABLE H1

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.140***	-0.061	-0.119***	-0.117***	-0.127***	-0.125***
	(0.025)	(0.093)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge	0.186***	0.420	0.187***	0.199***	0.169**	0.175***
	(0.036)	(0.269)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.038)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Judge age		-0.006				
		(0.006)				
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Judge tenure			-0.002			
			(0.007)			
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Male judge				-0.061		
				(0.080)		
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Judge HU					0.043	
					(0.077)	
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Judge>LLB						0.077
						(0.090)
Additional interactions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153
R-squared	0.220	0.221	0.221	0.221	0.220	0.221

Notes: Analysis includes cases from both periods. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. For each judge characteristic *z*, "Additional interactions" include *ArabPlaintiff***z* and (for time varying *z*'s) *ArabJudge***z*. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week. "Judge HU" and "Judge>LLB" are indicators for whether judge attained LLB at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and whether judge has a master or PhD degree, respectively.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix I: Balancing Tests for the Assignment of Cases by Past Exposure to Violence, 2007–2010

Our identification assumption in Sections 5 and 6 of the paper is that as local exposure to violence during the conflict period increases, cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff do not become systematically different from cases assigned to a judge of a different ethnicity. Table I1 below examines this assumption with respect to observed case characteristics. For ease of interpretation, column 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables. Column 2 presents the results for court exposure (measured by the cumulative number of fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period, divided by 100). Column 4 presents the results for personal exposure (measured by the mean monthly number of fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period).[7] Each entry in columns 2 and 4 is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variables include court fixed effects, indicators for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff, as well as the exposure variable fully interacted with the ethnicity indicators. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction term *Exposure*SameEthnicity*. That is, we report the estimated α_7 from an equation of the form:

$$characteristic_{ijc} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 ArabPlaintiff_i + \alpha_2 ArabJudge_i + \alpha_3 SameEthnicity_i + \alpha_4 Exposure_c + \alpha_5 Exposure_c * ArabPlaintiff_i + \alpha_6 Exposure_c * ArabJudge_i + \alpha_7 Exposure_c * SameEthnicity_i + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ijc}$$

where i indexes cases, j indexes judges, and c indexes courts. In column 4 we report the corresponding coefficient when exposure is at the personal (j) level.[8] Overall, there is little evidence of a systematic relationship between exposure to violence during the conflict and post-conflict differences in case characteristics between cases assigned to same vs. other ethnicity judges.[9]

[7] Results are qualitatively similar when using the alternative measures of court and personal exposure mentioned above and used in Tables 3-6 in the body of the paper.

[8] The un-interacted exposure variable is dropped in column 2 due to the inclusion of court fixed effects.

[9] The main exception is that cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff seem to have a higher proportion of "defense present" in courts that experienced more fatalities during the conflict (column 2, third-to-last row). Since defense presence lowers the probability of the claim being accepted (this is one of the unreported controls in Tables 2-6 in the body of the paper), then to the extent that "defense present" is positively correlated with unobservables that also lower the probability of a claim being accepted, this might bias downward our estimate of the effect of past exposure to violence on judicial ethnic bias.

TABLE I1: BALANCING TESTS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF CASES BY PAST EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE, 2007–2010

	Mean	Court Exposure	N	Personal Exposure	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of plaintiffs	1.137	0.147**	1,405	0.084	1,322
	(0.35)	[0.061]		[0.057]	
Number of defendants	1.757	0.115	1,405	-0.235*	1,322
	(0.754)	[0.129]		[0.123]	
Private plaintiffs (share of total)	0.996	0.010	1,405	0	1,322
	(0.043)	[0.008]		[0.007]	
Private defendants (share of total)	0.730	-0.068	1,405	0.046	1,322
	(0.258)	[0.044]		[0.041]	
Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs)	0.812	-0.085	1,405	-0.048	1,322
	(0.370)	[0.063]		[0.060]	
Male defendants (share of private defendants)	0.844	0.104*	1,405	0.031	1,322
	(0.342)	[0.057]		[0.054]	
Claim subject - Breach of sales contract	0.038	-0.012	1,405	0.004	1,322
		[0.033]		[0.031]	
Claim subject - Breach of service contract	0.081	-0.016	1,405	0.026	1,322
		[0.047]		[0.044]	
Claim subject - Housing-related	0.012	0.002	1,405	-0.001	1,322
		[0.019]		[0.018]	
Claim subject - Private conflict	0.014	-0.005	1,405	-0.027	1,322
		[0.021]		[0.020]	
Claim subject - Traffic accident	0.613	0.073	1,405	-0.055	1,322
		[0.08]		[0.075]	
Claim subject - Miscellaneous	0.012	0.002	1,405	0.010	1,322
		[0.019]		[0.018]	
Claim subject - Missing	0.229	-0.046	1,405	0.041	1,322
		[0.067]		[0.062]	
Defense present	0.811	0.166***	1,405	0.037	1,322
		[0.063]		[0.059]	
Defense made a counter claim	0.095	0.024	1,405	-0.025	1,322
		[0.051]		[0.048]	
Compensation requested	7,952	998	510	-489	472
	(6529)	[1,513]		[1379]	

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses in column (1). Standard errors in brackets in columns (2) and (4). Each entry in columns (2) and (4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variables include court fixed effects, indicators for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff, as well as the exposure variable fully interacted with the ethnicity indicators. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction *Exposure*SameEthnicity*. The exposure variable in columns 2–3 is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (divided by 100). The exposure variable in columns 4–5 is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period.
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix J: Placebo Tests

TABLE J1: IS BIAS ASSOCIATED WITH FUTURE EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE?

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	Natural area		Sub-district		District	
Cases from	2000–2003	2007–2010	2000–2003	2007–2010	2000–2003	2007–2010
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.074*	-0.166***	-0.072*	-0.167***	-0.032	-0.174***
	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.047)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff	0.133**	0.187***	0.126*	0.169***	0.077	0.165**
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.064)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*	-0.892	2.026***	-1.039	2.007**	-0.373	0.996
Court exposure in 2004	(0.900)	(0.675)	(0.797)	(1.008)	(0.451)	(0.950)
Observations	1,159	1,405	1,159	1,405	1,159	1,405
R-squared	0.264	0.266	0.264	0.262	0.267	0.264

Notes: Analysis includes cases from the period indicated in the column title. Court exposure is the number of civilian fatalities (divided by 100) in the vicinity (natural area/sub-district/district) of the court during 2004. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the same set controls as in the corresponding columns of Table 4 in the body of the paper.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE J2: IS BIAS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR?

Cases from the conflict period (2000–2004)

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	Natural Area	Sub-district	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Arab plaintiff	-0.103***	-0.104***	-0.098**
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.045)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff	0.132***	0.112**	0.112**
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.055)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*	0.697***	0.739***	0.475**
Court exposure in preceding year	(0.193)	(0.206)	(0.210)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*	-0.057	-0.060	-0.040
Court exposure in following year	(0.290)	(0.314)	(0.215)
Observations	1,748	1,748	1,748
R-squared	0.251	0.251	0.251

Notes: Court exposure is the number of civilian fatalities in the vicinity (natural area/sub-district/district) of the court in the year preceding/following the trial (divided by 100 for clarity). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the same set controls as in columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 3 in the body of the paper, as well as the court exposure variables and their interactions with the *Arab plaintiff* and *Arab judge* indicators.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix K: Judge Movements

TABLE K1: TRANSITION MATRIX FOR JUDGE LOCATION BY QUINTILES OF EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT PERIOD

PANEL A: ALL JUDGES

	Post-conflict Period					
Conflict period	1	2	3	4	5	Total
1	27	5	3	3	0	38
2	7	13	1	4	1	26
3	3	7	25	2	0	37
4	3	0	0	32	0	35
5	2	0	0	0	21	23
Total	42	25	29	41	22	159

PANEL B: "MOVERS" ONLY

	Post-conflict Period					
Conflict period	1	2	3	4	5	Total
1	5	5	3	3	0	16
2	7	0	1	4	1	13
3	3	7	2	2	0	14
4	3	0	0	0	0	3
5	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total	20	12	6	9	1	48

Notes: The table shows transitions across periods by quintiles of total fatalities in the judge's modal place of employment during the conflict period. Panel B includes only judges whose modal place of employment in the conflict period differs from their modal place of employment in the post-conflict period. The table is based on information we compile on each judge's place of employment (natural area) in each month, focusing on judges who handled cases in the post-conflict period and for whom we have location information for the conflict period.

TABLE K2: PERSONAL- AND COURT-LEVEL EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE CONTROLLING FOR MOVERS

Cases from the post-conflict period (2007–2010)

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Court exposure	0.316***		0.312*		0.336**		0.341*
	(0.121)		(0.158)		(0.136)		(0.200)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Mean personal exposure		-0.033	-0.015				
		(0.129)	(0.119)				
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Peak personal exposure				-0.005	-0.004		
				(0.009)	(0.008)		
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Late personal exposure						0.379***	-0.036
						(0.102)	(0.186)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Mover	-0.081	0.011	-0.073	0.017	-0.074	0.006	-0.072
	(0.126)	(0.140)	(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.134)
Court FEs*ethnicity variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	1,299	1,299	1,299	1,299	1,299	1,270	1,270
R-squared	0.267	0.284	0.267	0.284	0.267	0.285	0.267

Notes: The analysis excludes courts in which none of the judges moved from other areas between the conflict period and the post-conflict period. We define "movers" as judges whose modal place of employment (natural area) in the conflict period differs from their modal place of employment in the post-conflict period. Court exposure is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (28/9/2000–31/12/2004). Fatality figures are divided by 100 for clarity. Mean personal exposure is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period. Peak exposure is the maximal monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period. Late exposure is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the last year of the conflict (2004). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls from column 1 of Table 4 as well as interactions between the "mover" indicator and the indicators for Arab judge and Arab plaintiff.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE K3: PERSONAL- AND COURT-LEVEL EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE
USING A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF MOVERS

Cases from the post-conflict period (2007–2010)

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Court exposure	0.288**		0.294*		0.323**		0.307*
	(0.116)		(0.159)		(0.137)		(0.183)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Mean personal exposure		-0.053	-0.042				
		(0.114)	(0.108)				
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Peak personal exposure				-0.007	-0.006		
				(0.008)	(0.007)		
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Late personal exposure						0.339***	-0.043
						(0.064)	(0.175)
Court FEs*ethnicity variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	1,317	1,317	1,317	1,317	1,317	1,288	1,288
R-squared	0.267	0.285	0.267	0.285	0.267	0.286	0.267

Notes: The analysis excludes courts in which none of the judges moved from other areas between the conflict period and the post-conflict period. We define "movers" based on a month-by-month comparison of place of employment across periods. A mover is defined as someone with at least one month in the conflict period and one month in the post-conflict period with different locations. Court exposure is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (28/9/2000–31/12/2004). Fatality figures are divided by 100 for clarity. Mean personal exposure is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period. Peak exposure is the maximal monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period. Late exposure is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the last year of the conflict (2004). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls from column 1 of Table 4.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE K4: EFFECT OF COURT EXPOSURE – MOVERS VS. NON-MOVERS

Cases from the post-conflict period (2007–2010)

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	"Modal Movers"		"Any Movers"	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Court exposure	0.282**	0.345*	0.288**	0.410
	(0.116)	(0.197)	(0.116)	(0.311)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Mover		0.022		0.077
		(0.140)		(0.125)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*Court exposure*Mover		-0.282		-0.263
		(0.221)		(0.343)
Observations	1,299	1,299	1,317	1,317
R-squared	0.266	0.271	0.267	0.268

Notes: The analysis excludes courts in which none of the judges moved from other areas between the conflict period and the post-conflict period. In columns 1-2 we define "movers" as judges whose modal place of employment (natural area) in the conflict period differs from their modal place of employment in the post-conflict period. In columns 3-4 we define "movers" based on a month-by-month comparison of place of employment across periods. A mover is defined as someone with at least one difference. Court exposure is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (28/9/2000–31/12/2004). Fatality figures are divided by 100 for clarity. Mean personal exposure is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period. Peak exposure is the maximal monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the conflict period. Late exposure is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge's place of employment during the last year of the conflict (2004). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls from column 1 of Table 4 as well as interactions between the "mover" indicator and the indicators for Arab judge and Arab plaintiff. The regressions also include the "Court exposure*Mover" term and its interactions with the indicators for Arab judge and Arab plaintiff.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix L: Judicial Bias and Violence in the Judge's Future Location

TABLE L1

Cases from the conflict period (2000–2004)

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	(1)	(2)
Arab plaintiff	-0.079**	-0.082**
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff	0.124**	0.132**
	(0.048)	(0.053)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*	0.609***	0.877**
Recent court exposure	(0.178)	(0.388)
Arab plaintiff*Arab judge*		-0.289
Recent court exposure in judge's future location		(0.407)
Observations	1,583	1,583
R-squared	0.252	0.252

Notes: Recent court exposure is the number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court in the year preceding the trial (divided by 100 for clarity). Recent court exposure in judge's future location is the number of fatalities in the preceding year in the natural area where the judge will work in the post-conflict period (divided by 100; see text for details). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the same set controls as in column 1 of Table 3 in the body of the paper, as well as the court exposure variables and their interactions with the *Arab plaintiff* and *Arab judge* indicators.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

Appendix M: Do More Biased Judges Move to More Violent Areas?

TABLE M1

IS CONFLICT PERIOD BIAS HIGHER AMONG JUDGES WHO MOVED TO MORE VIOLENT AREAS?

Cases from the conflict period (2000–2004)

Dependent variable: claim accepted

	(1)	(2)
Arab plaintiff	-0.105***	-0.100**
	(0.035)	(0.040)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff	0.183***	0.185***
	(0.050)	(0.056)
Arab judge*Arab plaintiff*Judge moved to a more violent area		-0.023
		(0.086)
Other ethnicity variables*Judge moved to a more violent area	No	Yes
Observations	1,583	1,583
R-squared	0.250	0.250

Notes: The indicator "judge moved to a more violent area" equals one if the total number of fatalities during the conflict period is higher in the judge's modal place of employment post-conflict than in the judge's modal place of employment during the conflict period. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the full set of controls from column 4 of Table 2.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.